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Introducing the Statutory and Interpretive Framework Relating to the Paramountcy 
Principle 
 
Section 1(1) Children Act 1989 (hereafter CA), contains a seminal proposition of English 
family law. Described by Cretney as the ‘clear statement of law that serves to centralise the 
child in the decision making process’, the provision known as the paramountcy principle states 
that whenever a court is determining any question with respect to the upbringing of a child, or 
the administration of a child’s property, the welfare of the child shall be the court’s paramount 
consideration.1 For the Law Commission,2 such a principle dictated that the interests of the 
child assume ‘absolute’ priority. Indeed, it was for this reason that their series of reports 
preceding introduction of the Children Act 1989 advocated abandonment of the previous 
statutory construction that imported a degree of relative scale into assessing the interests of 
children as ‘first and paramount’.3 For Eekelaar, this construction signalled the shift from child 
instrumentalism to welfarism.4 Decisions were now constructed and justified from a point of 
view centred on the child’s interests themselves, as opposed to views concerning what the carer 
(often the father) desired for the child or some form of antiquated paternalism.5  
 
In making a critique of the paramountcy principle’s application in domestic law, this thesis 
recognises that section 1(1) CA does not explicitly term the proposition of law it contains a 
‘principle’. Instead, this thesis will place significance in the way section 1(1) CA has been 
referred to judicially, extra-judicially and in the academic scholarship. Here, particular 
importance will be placed on Law Commission documents and Hansard records setting out the 
intentions of draftsmen and Parliamentarians respectively. This intention was for the provision 
in section 1(1) CA to be both known and developed as the paramountcy principle in a practice-
orientated sense. 
 
Even before adoption into law in its current conception in section 1(1) CA, domestic courts 
had adopted a narrow interpretation of the paramountcy principle. The key case for this thesis’ 
 
1 Stephen Cretney, Family Law in the Twentieth Century, (1st edition, OUP,2003) 719 
2 Law Commission, ‘Review of Child law- Custody’, (Law Com No.96, 1986) 186-189 
3 S1 Guardianship of Minors Act 1971 
4 John Eekelaar, ‘Beyond the Welfare Principle’ (2002) 237 CFLQ 1 
5 ibid 2 
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critique of the paramountcy principle is J v C.6 Despite the fact this was heard in relation to the 
paramountcy principle’s predecessor, section 1 of the Guardianship of Minors Act 1971, Lord 
MacDermott’s interpretation has become, and continues to be, the authoritative exposition of 
the requirements incumbent on a court when applying the paramountcy principle. This was 
affirmed by the Law Commission in its 1986 report prior to adoption of the Children Act 1989.7 
Here, the interests of the child became the sole consideration of the court and were, as such, 
determinative on the making, varying and discharging of any court order concerning the 
upbringing of a child. As the research in this thesis will indicate, this exposition has remained 
authoritative on courts determining section 8 Child Arrangements Orders under the Children 
Act 1989. At this preliminary stage, it is important to note that section 1(1) CA did not ‘create’ 
the paramountcy principle. Instead, it is derived from the Guardianship of Infants Act 1925, 
developed through section 1 Guardianship of Minors Act 1971 before finding current 
expression in section 1(1) CA 1989. 
 
For the sake of this thesis, the operation of the paramountcy principle will centred largely 
around section 8 Child Arrangements Order applications under the Children Act 1989. The 
purpose of section 8 CA orders is for a court to decide with whom a child is to live and spend 
time. These orders have been chosen as the focus for this thesis because of the individualistic 
nature of the litigation therein. Section 8 order applications typically feature individuals; 
traditionally, but not exclusively, mother, father and child, each with competing interests 
existing in tension to each other. This tension will be evidenced through analysis of case law 
and hypothetical situations discussed throughout this thesis. Such litigation forms an ideal base 
upon which to consider the application and effectiveness of a reinterpreted, deontologically-
focused, model of the paramountcy principle that centres its application around the balancing 
of individual rights as opposed to a simplistic welfare assessment. This thesis intends to 
confront the fact that domestic application of the paramountcy principle is incompatible with 
obligations under the ECHR in a post-HRA legal framework. This leaves litigants unable to 
vindicate the article 8 ECHR right to respect for private and family life at a domestic level. The 
primary cause is that, when the paramountcy principle applies in litigation, it necessitates that 
a child’s best interests become the sole consideration of the court. This, as a result, precludes 
judicial analysis of any competing rights or interests in litigation. 
 
6 J v C [1970] AC 668 
7 Law Commission, ‘Review of Child law- Custody’ (n2) 185 
 11 
Overview of the Theoretical Lens Applied in this Thesis 
 
This thesis derives its title from Ronald Dworkin’s famous work Justice for Hedgehogs.8 
Whilst the content of this book lies largely beyond the scope of this thesis, Dworkin chose the 
title to illuminate the importance of interconnections in both thought and political discourse. 
Influenced by the seminal essay of Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox,9 Dworkin argued that 
modern political discourse had become ‘Fox-like’ in its belief that individuals do not require 
coherence in respect of their theories or responses to ethical challenges. This belief, although 
not the focus of his work, was argued to lead to a paucity of coherent thought outside the 
political realm. In contrast to this, in order to defend a political theory, Dworkin argued one 
must be able to evidence connections to a viable ethical theory.10 Such a theory speaks to the 
‘good life’. Here, Dworkin proposed a means by which individuals could pursue a good life 
and, as a result, how a coherent modern political discourse could flow from this. It is in this 
sense that the Hedgehog knows one big thing, the importance of interconnectivity, whilst the 
Fox knows many disconnected things. 
 
Dworkin’s Justice for Hedgehogs is relevant to this thesis in that it provides the three tenants 
of his moral theory. These will be examined in Chapter One but consist of a non-foundationalist 
conception of value; an anti-naturalist conception of morality and moral objectivism. These 
theories underpin Dworkin’s normative construction of the legal system and model of judicial 
discretion. For Dworkin, the theory advanced by Hart in his Concept of Law forms a 
descriptively inaccurate account of the judicial interpretive process.11  In Hart’s descriptive 
approach, law exists positively by reference to the criteria in the central ‘rule of recognition’. 
If a judge applies these criteria, and finds no law exists, they are then free to exercise 
independent judgement to fill ‘gaps’ in the law.12 For Dworkin, this forms an inadequate theory 
of interpretation. As a result, he argues that there always exists an objectively right answer that 
judges are bound to discover by exhausting the interpretive process outlined in Taking Rights 
Seriously.13  
 
8 Ronald Dworkin Justice for hedgehogs (1st edition, Harvard Press, 2013) 
9 Isiah Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox: An essay on Tolstoy’s view of History, (2nd edition, Princeton University 
Press, 2013) 
10 Ronald Dworkin on Justice for Hedgehogs, NYU School of Law                         
< https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5UFVkRGViMc> accessed 27/6/2020 
11 H.L.A Hart, The Concept of Law, (3rd edition, OUP, 2012)  
12 ibid 105 
13 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (8th edition, Bloomsbury, 2018)  
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The purpose of Dworkin’s work, analysed in Chapter One of this thesis, is to interrogate the 
framework that judicial interpretation ought to occur in. In short, when a judge is confronted 
with a novel situation to which no rule is directly applicable, Dworkin argues a judge must 
exercise discretion in disposal of the case. This discretion is characterised as weak in that a 
judge is bound to give effect to the encircling belt of rules and principles they are situated 
within. It is in this sense that Dworkin describes judicial discretion as the ‘hole in the donut’, 
the area of judicial indeterminacy in the application of a rule or principle of the legal system.14 
For Dworkin, these rules and principles provide a structured model of judicial discretion that 
controls an officials use of judgement in the determination of a dispute. 
 
It is the aim of this thesis to utilise Dworkinian jurisprudence as the basis for both critiquing 
and redeveloping domestic application of the paramountcy principle. This will be achieved via 
close reference to the distinction between application of a legal principle and rule. With a 
thorough understanding of this distinction, it is argued that a new criticism can be levelled 
against judicial application of the paramountcy principle in that it operates as a legal rule in the 
Dworkinian sense. This will then be shown to have significant consequences in terms of 
domestic compliance with demands imposed on the UK by the European Convention on 
Human Rights (hereafter ECHR) in a post-Human Rights Act (hereafter HRA) legal system. 
Although not the focus of this thesis, the current domestic interpretation of section 1(1) CA 
will also be evidenced as existing in tension with international obligations under the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
 
 
The Problems Identified in this Thesis 
 
During the period from around 1990 to 2005, academic attention peaked with numerous high-
level contributions both critiquing and reinterpreting the paramountcy principle. Yet, since 
2005, it seems as though the academic community has largely consigned itself to judicial 
disinterest in implementing and engaging with reform proposals. Arguably, this is due to the 
lack of impact the HRA has had on private family litigation, when compared to other areas of 
 
14 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Is law a system of Rules?’, in The philosophy of Law, (1st edition, 1977, OUP) 52 
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law, which has been generously described as ‘minimalist’ by Harris-Short.15 The aim of this 
thesis is to present a new angle of criticism, based on an understanding of analytical 
jurisprudence, and to restart debate surrounding a deontological reinterpretation of the 
paramountcy principle that seems to have stalled in recent years. 
 
This thesis will develop two primary critiques surrounding judicial application of the 
paramountcy principle. The first will be underpinned by the jurisprudential lens established in 
Chapter One and the second is based on an in-depth analysis of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. 
These two will combine to form the problem this thesis seeks to resolve through constructing 
a Convention-compliant model of litigating section 8 CA hearings that is theoretically informed 
but actionable in everyday practice. This would allow individual litigants to vindicate 
Convention-rights in a manner that is currently unachievable in litigation applying the 
paramountcy principle. 
 
The Paramountcy Principle Operating as a Legal Rule 
 
This thesis will identify judicial application of the paramountcy principle as akin to that of a 
legal rule in automatically necessitating a particular judicial approach to the making, varying 
and issuing of section 8 CA orders. This will be established by reference to Family Division 
case-law establishing that, as a result of applying the paramountcy principle, judges are bound 
to give effect solely to the best interests of the child. The leading case here is the 
aforementioned J v C which Reece describes as the ‘seminal’ authority for domestic application 
of the paramountcy principle.16 
 
In the years following J v C, multiple Court of Appeal decisions reaffirmed Lord MacDermott’s 
dicta as authoritative and developed the status of children’s welfare interests to an overriding 
position when in conflict with parental interests or rights.17 However, given the recent paucity 
of academic literature concerning the paramountcy principle, this thesis will analyse the 
contemporary case-law of the courts to assess any divergence away from the earlier J v C 
 
15 Sonia Harris-Short, ‘Family law and the HRA 1998: Judicial restraint or revolution?’ in Helen Fenwick, Gavin 
Philipson and Roger Masterman, Judicial reasoning under the UK Human Rights Act, (1st edition, CUP, 2007) 
340 
16 Helen Reece, ‘The paramountcy principle: Consensus or Construct?’ (1996) 267 CLP 303 citing J v C [1970] 
AC 668 
17 Re O (Contact: Imposition of Conditions) [1995] 2 FLR 124, [128] 
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model. It is in this sense that this thesis seeks to update the work of previous academic 
contributions and lay the foundations for further debate. This thesis argues that recent case-law 
evidences the ‘hybridisation’ of  a welfare and rights-based approach. For example, the 2019 
High Court decision in Re H evidences how judges will make passing reference to article 8(1) 
ECHR rights, in attempting to establish a degree of Convention-compliance, before 
recentralising the role of a welfare assessment to resolving child-related litigation.18 It is clear, 
from cases such as this, that the J v C model of application still determines the judicial approach 
to section 8 CA applications. 
 
When such a finding is contrasted against the theoretical lens provided in Chapter One of this 
thesis, the tension between application of the paramountcy principle and its characterisation as 
a legal principle in the Dworkinian sense becomes clear. Dworkin argued a rule applies in an 
all or nothing fashion in that it is either applied or set aside. A rule cannot be balanced against 
competing considerations unless those considerations are specified in the rule itself. Therefore, 
a rule can be said to necessitate automatic legal consequence as a result of its invocation. It is 
in that sense that a rule differs to a legal principle. A principle enjoys an element of weight in 
that, in application, it will conflict with other competing principles and require a means of 
resolution. For example, in issuing judgment, a judge may have to balance the principles of 
fairness and consistency. One will not completely outweigh the other and a judge must ascribe 
an element of weight to each. 
 
In practice, when a judge applies the paramountcy principle, they are automatically bound to a 
certain method of interpretation that necessitates the child’s interests are the sole determining 
factor in the making, varying and discharging of any order. A judge is consequently unable to 
balance the interests of the child against any competing considerations. Such a model seems 
identical to Dworkin’s definition of a legal rule. Taxonomically, it seems strange to term 
paramountcy a principle in the Dworkinian sense. It is argued that this observation has more 










This thesis will further analyse the relationship between domestic application of the 
paramountcy principle and Strasbourg jurisprudence on the balancing of rights under article 
8(2) ECHR. It will identify the central problem that domestic courts have misapplied the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence and this has led to a situation whereby lower courts are conducting 
everyday litigation that is non-compliant with demands under the ECHR.  
 
From a Strasbourg perspective, the domestic model of the paramountcy principle, as outlined 
in Chapter Two, has not been accepted as compatible with article 8(2) ECHR. The ECtHR has 
been clear in a series of judgments that a balancing exercise is required under article 8(2) that 
does not automatically prioritise the rights of the child over those of the parents.19 Instead, the 
rights of the child have been characterised as being capable of overriding parental rights 
dependent on their nature and severity. At the very least, the Strasbourg position is that a factual 
assessment is required in individual cases to assess the justification of the article 8(1) rights 
infringement. 
 
In response, domestic appellate courts have reconfigured the paramountcy principle to achieve, 
at face-value, Convention-compliance in two ways. Firstly, courts have reasoned that divining 
the best interests of the child, via recourse to section 1(3) CA, satisfies requirements under 
article 8(2) as this is substantially the same factual assessment that must be completed under 
the Convention.20 Alternatively, courts have employed a linguistic sleight of hand to interpret 
the best interests of the child as an automatic justification under article 8(2).21 Either way, both 
of these solutions evidence a disregard for the Strasbourg jurisprudence. This has led lower-
level judges to cite dicta, as erroneously issued by the House of Lords and Court of Appeal, to 
the effect that no change of approach is necessitated in a post-HRA legal system. 
 
Academics have confronted this problem and sought to develop a reinterpretation of the 
paramountcy principle as a response to this in isolation. It is the contention of this thesis that 
the findings of Chapter Two have a direct bearing on domestic non-compliance. This is 
because, if the paramountcy principle is applied as a rule, party interests cannot be balanced 
 
19 Johansen v Norway (application no. 17383/90) [1997] 23 E.H.R.R. 33 
20 Re B (A Minor) (Adoption: Natural Parent) [2001] UKHL 70, [31] 
21 Payne v Payne [2001] EWCA Civ 166 
 16 
under article 8(2) given a rule applies in an all or nothing fashion. This thesis will use these 
findings to develop a reinterpretation of the paramountcy principle that ensures its application 
as a legal principle and, therefore, provides a structured model of judicial discretion for cases 
falling in the scope of section 1(1) CA. 
 
The Literature Gap Pertaining to the Paramountcy Principle 
 
Despite the numerous academic criticisms levelled against domestic application of the 
paramountcy principle, there exists a major literature gap pertaining to a theoretically informed 
critique or reinterpretation. This reflects the erroneous, yet widely-held, belief that legal theory 
is inapplicable to real-life family law given its context-specific and discretionary nature. 
Indeed,  Dewar has described the ‘normal chaos of family law’ which refers to the notion that 
there must exist a certain amount of theoretical ‘chaos’ because of the discretionary nature of 
family law adjudication.22 He argues modern family law has rejected the invocation of bright-
line rules and instead relies on ‘indirect symbolic controls’ which manifest themselves in 
standards and principles governed by the exercise of judicial discretion.23 Far from ‘normative 
anarchy’, this is representative of the law balancing welfare and rights-based justifications, 
between maximising utility for the individual litigant and the rights of family members 
respectively.24 Given these two approaches are often incompatible, but both inevitable, Dewar 
questions why academics have criticised judges for failing to espouse a theoretical basis when 
the law provides no means to do so. Therefore, instead of criticising this ‘chaos’ academics 
should merely accept its existence. 
 
Dewar’s work raises important questions surrounding the role and nature of discretion in family 
law. This thesis argues that, instead of focusing on remedying the tension between rules and 
discretion, academics should instead seek to structure discretion in a way that achieves 
compatibility with a rule-based system as mandated by the ECHR. This thesis argues that this 
can be achieved with an understanding of Dworkinian legal principles. Given that a practice 
area such as family law inevitably requires a degree of discretion, this thesis argues that rules 
and principles need not necessarily exist in ‘conflict’. Instead, as Chapter One will argue, a 
 
22 John Dewar, ‘The normal chaos of family law’ (1998) 61 MLR 467 
23 ibid 472 
24 ibid. For first exposition of the balance between utility and rights see Stephen Parker, ‘Rights and Utility in 
Anglo-Australian Family law’ (1992) 55 MLR 311 
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Dworkinian understanding of rules and principles achieves a balance between the two in a 
model of structured judicial discretion.  
 
In terms of the literature that has attempted to apply legal theory to a critique of the 
paramountcy principle, the majority of this work focuses on the tension between judicial 
discretion and the operation of rules in family law. For example, Herring points to the tension 
between a utility and rights model of law.25 Citing the work of Parker, he has drawn attention 
to the lack of theoretical coherence in moving from a utility to rights-based model of child law. 
In a utility-based model, a judge would decide a case in terms of utility in reaching an end goal; 
the welfare of the child.26 Conversely, a judge acting in a rights-based model seeks not merely 
to evaluate an act on the basis of its consequences, but on the legal rights of the individual.27  
 
The difficulty Herring draws with the work of Parker is that, in domestic child law, there does 
not seem a clear commitment to either model that is easily discernible from the case-law.28 
Whilst, on a traditional J v C model of the paramountcy principle’s application, it would seem 
section 1(1) CA supports a utility-based model that seeks to isolate the best interests of the 
child. However, recent case-law suggests that the courts have undertaken a modest shift 
towards a rights-based model of litigation. This is, however, always followed by the standard 
caveat that the ensuing order is justified on the basis of the best interests of the child. This will 
be evidenced and analysed in Chapter Two of this thesis. In the courts now seeming to 
‘hybridise’ a welfare and rights-based model of litigation, the balance to be struck between the 
two becomes unclear. Therein lies the aim of thesis; to provide a theoretical basis for a shift 
towards a deontological model of litigation that balances the rights of litigants under an ECHR-
compliant methodology. 
 
Importantly, Choudhry and Fenwick have briefly engaged with this juristic critique in arguing 
that ‘the Welfare Principle has been elevated to the status of a rule that determines the outcome 
of such [welfare] applications’.29 Indirectly, they seem to equate the paramountcy principle to 
a Dworkinian rule. This is because the language of determination seems to mirror the automatic 
 
25 Jonathan Herring, ‘The Human Rights Act and the Welfare Principle- Conflicting or Complementary?’, (1999) 
223 CFLQ 2 
26 Stephen Parker, ‘Rights and utility in Anglo-Australian family law’ (1992) 55 MLR 311 
27 ibid 
28 Herring (n25) 2 
29 Shazia Choudhry and Helen Fenwick, ‘Taking the rights of parents and children seriously: Confronting the 
Welfare Principle under the Human Rights Act’ (2005) 25 OJLS 453, 458 
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legal consequences necessitated following a rules invocation. Unfortunately, Choudhry and 
Fenwick do not pursue this avenue of criticism to the conclusion which this thesis intends to 
reach. Presumably, this is because a theoretical criticism of the paramountcy principle lay 
outside the focus of their work. Instead, they pursue a similar critique to that of Herring in 
attempting to provide a theoretical basis for the paramountcy principle in terms of its 
classification as a rule-utilitarian (consequentialist) approach to family law.30  
 
The existing literature highlights an academic concern with finding a unifying justification for 
the domestic operation of the paramountcy principle. Respectfully, this thesis argues this 
approach somewhat misses the point. If this becomes the sole aim of a theoretical criticism, the 
welfare principle becomes a ‘juristic black hole’ given the necessary co-existence of both rules 
and discretion.31 Thus far, academic analysis has sought to defend the current operation of the 
paramountcy principle as accounting solely for the best interests of the child. This has sought 
to justify an approach that this thesis will identify as non-compliant with demands under the 
ECHR. As a result of the failure to find a theoretical basis to justify the paramountcy principle, 
academics have then sought to practically reinterpret section 1(1) CA and have, therefore, cast 
reinterpretation and defining its perceived basis as two separate inquiries. This thesis argues 
that such an approach is flawed in that any practical reinterpretation should only be undertaken 
following the establishment of a theoretical lens as mandated by the work of Dworkin. 
 
Instead of seeking to resolve the tension between rules and discretion, this thesis will utilise 
traditional jurisprudence to achieve co-existence between rules and principles. This will occur 
in a legal framework that provides judges with a structured model of judicial discretion. This 
thesis will further use its theoretical lens to provide a novel critique of the paramountcy 
principle in highlighting its practical application as a rule as opposed to anything like what 
would traditionally be considered a legal principle. This is something academics have failed to 






30 ibid 457 




The central claim of this thesis is that by better understanding the distinction between a legal 
principle and rule, we are able to provide a more coherent and theoretically-informed 
reinterpretation of the paramountcy principle. This claim will be advanced in the following 
way. 
 
Chapter One of this thesis will outline the theoretical lens through which domestic operation 
of the paramountcy principle will be assessed. The purpose of this Chapter is to provide a basis 
for the novel critique surrounding judicial application of the paramountcy principle as a legal 
rule. In order to achieve this, this thesis will first justify its focus on Dworkin via reference to 
another jurist with a contrasting approach to conceptualising the legal system. This will 
necessitate extensive research into H.L.A Hart’s Concept of Law and his descriptive account 
of judicial interpretation. Although a positivist, believing in the conceptual separation between 
law and morality, Hart sought to justify the legal system via a focus on rules, in particular the 
‘rule of recognition’; the rule from which other norms derive their validity. Hart’s approach 
will be characterised as descriptive in nature and thus, when contrasted with the work of 
Dworkin, an inaccurate account of judicial interpretation. This thesis will then turn to the 
jurisprudence of Dworkin as a more accurate account of judicial interpretation. For Dworkin, 
the interpretive process a judge must undertake is structured by the encircling belt of rules and 
principles they must apply. It is this model of weak discretion that this thesis aims to use as a 
basis for reinterpretation of the paramountcy principle in Chapter Five.  
 
Following this, the remainder of the Chapter will be devoted to analysis surrounding various 
models of judicial discretion. After having disregarded characterising discretion in the positive 
sense, a negative conception will be adopted that is closely linked to Dworkin’s work. This 
will become relevant when this thesis discusses the development of a jurisprudence applying 
the reinterpreted paramountcy principle and the guidance judges should be afforded therein. 
 
Chapter Two of this thesis will analyse the relevant case law pertaining to application of the 
paramountcy principle. Importantly, this relates to the first problem identified. Such analysis 
will include discussion of the orthodox J v C model before applying this to a typical section 8 
CA application to evidence the consequences of its application. This is that the rights of other 
litigants are ignored to the extent that they do not weigh on the best interests of the child. This 
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will be shown to have led parents to attempt to align their own interests with those of the child 
and thus distort the protection section 1(1) CA should afford to children. In addition, this 
Chapter will include analysis of recent family law cases and thus serves to update the now 
ageing academic commentary in this area.  
 
Chapter Two will provide a novel critique of the paramountcy principle by contrasting its 
application with the Dworkinian understanding of a rule. This forms this thesis’ unique 
contribution in that, as the literature gap has evidenced, no other academic has taken traditional 
legal theory and applied this to the operation of the paramountcy principle. The tension this 
Chapter evidences will then serve to inform practical reform of section 1(1) CA in Chapter 
Five.  
 
Chapter Three will relate to the second problem identified in this introduction and will involve 
an analysis of both domestic and Strasbourg jurisprudence pertaining to the relationship 
between section 1(1) CA and article 8(2) ECHR. This will be divided into two separate 
analyses. Firstly, this Chapter will briefly outline how a domestic claim under article 8 ECHR 
would proceed at Strasbourg level. This will include consideration of the margin of 
appreciation doctrine, scope of article 8(1) and the justificatory exercise under article 8(2). 
Subsequently, the Johansen line of case-law will be analysed to evidence a degree of 
consistency in the court’s assertion that the rights of the child may, depending on their nature 
and severity, outweigh those of the adult. This will be contrasted to the court’s findings in 
Yousef which some academics have used as authority for acceptance of the paramountcy 
principle at ECtHR level.32 It is argued that this is a misinterpretation of the Yousef judgment 
and, as such, it forms a mere ‘aberration’ on the court’s well established position.33 
 
Chapter Three will then contrast this position with that of domestic courts. As referenced 
earlier, the domestic position will be shown to evidence a misunderstanding of the Strasbourg 
case law. This leads to conflict between the Strasbourg and domestic view of the relationship 
between article 8(2) and section 1(1) CA. This is the conflict this thesis aims to resolve via 
construction of a reinterpreted model of the paramountcy principle. 
 
 
32 Yousef v The Netherlands (application No.33711/96) [2003] 36 E.H.R.R. 20 
33 Shazia Choudhry, ‘The adoption and Children Act 2002, the welfare principle and the Human Rights Act 
1998- a missed opportunity?’ (2003) 15 CFLQ 119 
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It is the purpose of Chapter Four to critique previous academic responses to reformulation of 
the paramountcy principle. These responses will be divided into oppositional, relational and 
deontological models. Each will be assessed, and this thesis will find that oppositional and 
relational models provide little scope for conflict resolution when applied in isolation. Instead, 
a deontological approach will be favoured that first seeks to identify the composite article 8(1) 
rights of litigants before applying an article 8(2) balancing exercise to each. For this to occur, 
Choudhry and Fenwick favour reinterpreting the paramountcy principle as the ‘primary 
principle’. This is an approach that seeks to establish compliance with the ECtHR regime and 
will also be analysed in terms of its broad compatibility with demands found in the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). 
 
This ‘parallel analysis’ model of litigation forms the basis of the interpretive focus of Chapter 
Five. However, such a model will not be accepted without critique. Choudhry and Fenwick’s 
parallel analysis will be shown to lack a theoretical basis given its paucity of reference to 
theoretical jurisprudence. It is argued that this leaves their model vulnerable to judicial 
interpretation akin to that evidenced in Chapter Two given indeterminacy inherent in the term 
‘primary’. This reflects the reality that, despite how academically sound their theory may be, 
it is to be applied by judges in real litigation. Their model will also be shown to be overly 
complex and unrealisable in practice given the process a judge must undertake in applying an 
article 8(2) balancing exercise to each composite set of article 8(1) rights. Chapter Four will 
conclude that, whilst the parallel analysis provides a theoretically Convention-compliant 
methodology, it requires further development to form a realisable model of litigation. 
 
Chapter Five of this thesis will undertake the process of reinterpreting the parallel analysis in 
order to achieve a theoretically structured model of resolving section 8 CA disputes. In light of 
the criticisms identified in Chapter Four, this thesis will favour a model that first, like Choudhry 
and Fenwick, identifies the article 8(1) rights of litigants before conducting a cumulative article 
8(2) analysis that focuses on the relationships between parties.  This will be achieved via 
statutory amendment to section 1(1) CA. It is this statutory amendment, combined with a 
juristic understanding of legal principles, that will structure the discretion required in making, 
varying and discharging Child Arrangements orders and is, therefore, a more actionable model 
of litigation than the complex parallel analysis. Such a model has the incidental benefit of 
moving domestic practice further towards a position that is compliant with the UN Convention 
on the Rights of the Child. 
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Clarifications and the UNCRC 
 
The focus of this thesis is on private litigation concerning the upbringing of children. Therefore, 
section 8 Child Arrangements Order applications will be used as the basis for analysing 
paramountcy principle’s application. However, in light of a paucity of private family law cases 
reaching appellate courts, many of the cases applying the paramountcy principle take the form 
of public law challenges to state interreference . This, as will be argued, may indicate a judicial 
unwillingness to engage with the ECHR in private family litigation. Nonetheless, the presence 
of public family law dicta does not detract from the overall coherence of this thesis given it 
will be applied solely in a private law context. 
 
Whilst this thesis will focus on children’s right obligations under the ECHR, it is important to 
recognise that the UN Convention on the Rights of Child (hereafter UNCRC) offers exhaustive 
provision for children’s rights at the international level.34 Indeed, the UNCRC has become the 
most widely ratified rights document in history with all UN contracting states ratifying save 
for the USA.35 However, in England and Wales, given a dualist approach to International Law, 
the UNCRC has not, as yet, passed in the general corpus of domestic law.36 It is for this reason 
that the UNCRC will not receive exclusive focus in this thesis. 
 
Instead, this thesis will seek to utilise the UNCRC as a means of highlighting how domestic 
and academic practice can bridge the gap between the pre-existing welfare-based model of 
welfare to a rights-based understanding. As Kilkelly notes, improved judicial engagement with 
the UNCRC will serve to bolster domestic rights enjoyment and enforcement.37 As such, whilst 
direct incorporation seems unachievable, practice should seek to give a more ‘prominent role’ 
to children’s international rights protections as a whole. It is argued that a domestic position 
that better reflects and engages with rights demands under the ECHR will also serve to 
encourage further rights engagement with rights-bearing documents such as the UNCRC. It is 
in this sense that the UNCRC can assist in bridging between a welfare-centric to rights-based 
model of domestic law. 
 
34 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol.1577 
35 Geraldine Van Bueren, ‘Children’s Rights’ in Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah and Sandesh Sivakumaran 
(eds), International Human Rights Law, (3rd edition, OUP, 2018), 326 
36 See Oliver De Schutter, International Human Rights Law (2nd edition, CUP, 2017) 280-294 
37 Ursula Kikelly, ‘Best interests of the child, A gateway to children’s rights?’, in, Lesley Anne-Barnes 
Macfarlane, Elaine Sutherland, Implementing Article 3 of the UNCRC; Best Interests, Welfare and Well-Being, 






















































 The Jurisprudence of Hart and Dworkin: Seeking a Jurisprudential Framework for 
the Application of ‘Principles’ in Law 
 
Before contextual analysis concerning application of the paramountcy principle can take place, 
a theoretical lens against which to set this thesis must be established. This will be achieved via 
an exploration of analytical and descriptive jurisprudence to elucidate the interpretation and 
application of legal ‘principles’. The aim of this Chapter is to draw upon the jurisprudence of 
both Hart and Dworkin to place the practical application of the paramountcy principle in a 
theoretical context.1 Importantly, an attempt to resolve the Hart/Dworkin debate lies outside 
the scope of this thesis. Instead, the author will analyse both jurisprudential models and outline 
the basic position of the judge, including understanding of judicial discretion, before adopting 
a Dworkinian model of the legal system.  This will permit analysis of the paramountcy 
principle’s application in light of traditional jurisprudence. It is argued that this forms an 
avenue of criticism that has eluded academic attention thus far. 
 
Through adopting a Dworkinian lens, this thesis intends to place special emphasis on the 
distinction between rules and principles. 2 By applying this distinction, this thesis intends to 
highlight divergence between judicial application of the paramountcy principle and its 
interpretation as  a Dworkinian-style principle. Importantly, this Chapter will further conduct 
a detailed analysis of judicial discretion and its role in domestic family law. Again, this analysis 
will become central to subsequent reinterpretation of the paramountcy principle in later 
chapters and seeks to establish a system of structured discretion out of which a judge can apply 
the reinterpreted model of section 1(1) CA. 
 
This chapter will proceed by analysing Hart’s model of descriptive jurisprudence, exploring 
the purpose of Hart’s project before outlining his overall model of a legal system. This will be 
followed by analysis of the Dworkinian legal system. The Hartian account will be critiqued 
through discussion of strong discretion and its necessary implications on the process of judicial 
interpretation. After having adopted a Dworkinian model, this Chapter will discuss the type of 
 
1 Use of the term ‘Dworkinian’ throughout refers to the jurisprudential model of Dworkin 
2 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (8th edition, Bloomsbury, 2018) 
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judicial discretion required under such a Dworkinian theory of law. The author will explore 
differing models of discretion, both positive and negative, before adopting a negative model. 
From this, the operation of judicial discretion will be modelled onto the welfare checklist as 
found in section 1(3) CA. 
 
 
Constructing the Hartian Model of a Legal System 
 
Law as the Union of Primary and Secondary Rules 
 
The Hartian theory of law adopts aspects of simplistic positivism previously advanced by 
theorists such as Austin.3 Hart began with legal positivism, the conceptual distinction between 
law and morality, and developed this into a complex system of primary and secondary rules 
reflecting the multi-faceted nature of a municipal legal system. An understanding of the Hartian 
legal system is a precondition to understanding the system of discretion that would necessarily 
be implied via its invocation in this thesis 
 
Crucial to understanding Hart’s work is an appreciation of his aims. Hart attempted to provide 
a descriptive account of law that presented the operation of a legal system as a matter of 
‘observable social fact distinct from the question of morality’.4  Importantly, Hart’s objective 
was descriptive analysis and not identification of the laws efficacy.5 This descriptive approach 
aimed to explain why the law is normative and, for Hart, law achieves this quality when it is 
action-guiding. In his descriptive approach, the question of whether the law is objectively right 
is a normative question and need not be confronted. As opposed to the work of positivists 
before him, Hart developed the conceptual separation of law and morality into his social thesis 
of positivism. This social thesis holds that: a) Law is a social creation, b) The validity of legal 
norms is a function of social facts and c) Social facts constitute sources of law. These culminate 
to create a modified separation thesis that holds there is conceptual separation between laws 
existence and merit.  
 
 
3 John Austin, The province of jurisprudence determined (2nd edition, CUP, 1995) 
4 David Jennex, ‘Dworkin and the doctrine of Judicial Discretion’ (1992) 14 DLJ 473 
5 Keith Culver, ‘Leaving the Hart-Dworkin debate’ (2001) 51 UTLJ 367, 398 
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For Hart, the key to understanding the legal system lay in the union of primary and secondary 
rules. Primary rules are rules of obligation that impose duties or confer powers on individuals.6  
Secondary rules are the means by which officials are provided with the ‘authoritative criteria 
for identifying primary rules of obligation’.7 In a similar methodology to Fuller’s desiderata,8 
Hart modelled a system of law incorporating only primary rules of obligation on the primitive 
society of Rex in which law is created by proclamation of obligatory commands.9 Here, Hart 
identified three separate flaws. Firstly, such a society would suffer from uncertainty given that, 
without secondary rules, there exists no means of identifying valid rules of obligation. In 
addition, the law would prove static in that the possibility of deliberate legal change would 
depend on slow evolution and not prescribed rules of the sovereign. The law would further 
suffer from inefficiency if no agency or officials were empowered to adjudicate disputes.10 For 
Hart, the remedy lay in the respective addition of secondary rules of recognition, change and 
adjudication. 
 
Therefore, the foundation of a legal system lay in the use of a ‘rule of recognition’ which 
provides officials with authoritative criteria for the identification of valid primary rules of 
obligation. For Hart, to state a rule is valid is to accept it has passed all the requirements 
provided for in the rule of recognition.11 Culver identifies two possible functions for the rule. 
Semantically, its application permits the statement, ’it is law that’, whilst epistemically it 
allows officials to make authoritative judgements of legal validity.12 Therefore, it is termed the 
ultimate rule of a legal system in that it provides the criteria by which the validity of other rules 
is assessed.13 This provides officials with certainty regarding the identification of valid legal 
norms. 
 
Integral to understanding the ‘rule of recognition’ is recognising the importance of plurality 
and hierarchy in its application. Given the various sources of law in a modern legal system, the 
rule of recognition cannot comprise one singular test. Therefore, in situations where various 
sources of law clash, the rule of recognition should provide for ‘relative subordination’14 in 
 
6 Leslie Green, ‘Introduction’, in H.L.A Hart, The Concept of Law, (3rd edition, OUP, 2012) 20 
7 ibid 21 
8 See Lon Fuller, The morality of law, (1st edition, Yale University Print, 1964) 46  
9 H.L.A Hart, The Concept of Law, (3rd edition, OUP, 2012) 51 
10 ibid 70 
11 Hart (n9) 100 
12 Keith Culver, Michael Guidice Legalities borders, (1st edition, OUP, 2014) 5 
13 Hart (n9) 105 
14 ibid 104 
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order for officials to grant ‘relative place’ in law and thereby resolve conflict.15 Hart uses the 
example of an Oxfordshire County Council by-law to evidence how the rule of recognition 
operates in a legal system.16 To gauge the validity of a by-law, an official must make reference 
to criterion provided by another rule. This may result in the official questioning whether the 
by-law was passed in accordance with powers granted to the council under a statutory order. 
In turn, the official must then turn to assess the validity of the statutory order empowering the 
council to act. This would lead to the official discovering whether the order was passed in line 
with powers granted to the Minister by Parliament. This deferred power is then subject to the 
same process and so on. Upon exhausting this chain of reasoning, the official reaches a rule 
that provides criterion for assessing the validity of other rules but which possesses no test for 
its own validity.17 This rule is known as the supreme criterion as, by recourse to it, rules are 
recognised as valid, even if they conflict with rules identified by reference to other criteria.18  
 
Importantly, the rule of recognition is not a formal rule in the same sense that the paramountcy 
principle is applied in litigation. For Hart, the rule of recognition is not stated but instead shown 
to exist by the fact that legal officials use it to assess a norms validity.19 In this sense, the rule 
of recognition is ‘seldom formulated but always used’, and is, therefore, indicative of the 
internal point of view.20 For Hart, the union of primary and secondary rules forms the essence 
of understanding how a legal system operates. By modelling the legal system thusly, Hart 
provides a test for determining legal validity and develops the simplistic positivism of Austin. 
However, as will now be shown, Hart does not provide an accurate account of the process 
undertaken when the rule of recognition fails to provide for the identification of a rule in novel 
cases. 
 
The Role of the Judge in the Hartian Framework 
 
The rule of recognition provides legal officials with an authoritative test for determining legal 
validity. Therefore, for Hart, when a judge identifies a rule to be applied in a case, this is 
effectively saying the legal official has utilised the rule of recognition to identify valid law. 
 
15 ibid106 
16 ibid 107 
17 ibid 106 
18 ibid 
19 ibid 101 
20 ibid 102 
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Yet, under a Hartian model, the process of judicial interpretation becomes less clear in cases 
where there is no applicable rule or, as Dworkin would term, ‘hard cases’.21 As Waluchow 
argues, law attempts to communicate its expectations via general rules yet this is not always 
possible in that, no matter how well rules are crafted, the individualistic nature of litigation will 
inevitably result in some cases falling outside of situations a rule purports to cover.22 Hart 
models this situation on a rule banning the presence of ‘vehicles’ in a park. Whilst this prima 
facie bans typical cases of ‘vehicles’ such as cars and busses, its application to a bicycle is less 
certain. Hart then further questions whether this would apply to a child’s toy vehicle being used 
in the park. For Hart, this highlights the open-textured nature of language.23 The question of 
how a judge would dispose of such a situation thereby becomes an important element of his 
descriptive model. 
 
For Hart, if there are no relevant rules to draw on then this is equivalent to saying there exist 
no norms that satisfy the rule of recognition given this is the authoritative means of identifying 
valid law.  The law would be termed incomplete and require ‘filling’. Therefore, the official 
must turn to the open-textured nature of language to permit discretion in applying the facts of 
a novel case to existing legal rules. As Waluchow states, sometimes this choice will arise 
accidentally in that a hard case may fall within a ‘penumbra of uncertainty’ meaning a judge 
must utilise choice in discharging the case.24 This permits an official to resolve the child’s toy 
car scenario in favour of the child to avoid absurdity.25  
 
Therefore, whether the judge reverts to their own judgement or uses moral principles when 
filling legal gaps is irrelevant in a descriptive sense. As Jennex argues, this model commits 
Hart to a ‘strong form of judicial discretion’ and ensures that a high proportion of cases will be 
subject to such an approach given the realities of modern litigation.26 This inevitability signals 
the balance between the requirements of formalism, the refusal to prescribe legislation 
designed to cover every possible scenario, and the desire to grant judges the ability to discharge 
individual cases in a factually sensitive manner. 27 It is important to recognise why Hart’s 
 
21 Dworkin (n2) 
22 Will Waluchow, ‘Mixed Blessings’ in A Common law theory of Judicial Review: The Living Tree, (1st edition, 
CUP, 2006) 194 
23 For further see Bartosz Brozek, ‘Analogy in legal discourse’ (2008) 94 ALSP, 2, 188 
24 Waluchow (n23) 205 
25 ibid 194 
26 Jennex (n4) 474 
27 Kent Greenawalt, ‘Discretion and Judicial Decision: The quest for the fetters that bind judges’ (1975) 75 CLR 
359  
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descriptive focus necessarily results in such a model of discretion. Given Hart aims to provide 
a morally neutral and non-justificatory account of law, his juristic project is limited to 
describing the process judges undertake when discharging a case. His project is not normative 
and consequently does not seek to question the efficacy of the law unless the rule of recognition 
prescribes such a test. Therefore, the question of how a judge fills legal gaps does not concern 
Hart and falls outside the ambit of his descriptive methodology. In applying this theoretical 
understanding to a hearing in the Family Division, a judge may simply come to their own 
decision in terms of applying the existing law to a novel factual matrix. For Hart, the question 
of how a judge does this, in terms of which rules and principles are accounted for, is irrelevant. 
In the descriptive sense, a judge exercises their own choice in making, varying or discharging 
a particular order. 
  
Therefore, to summarise, a Hartian account of law envisages a legal system that is based on 
the union of primary and secondary rules of obligation and recognition. In this, the rule of 
recognition is crucial in providing criteria for assessing the validity of other primary rules. If 
no valid rule exists, the law is incomplete and a judge must exercise choice in ‘filling’ that gap. 
Here, judges are afforded strong discretion and may utilise their own judgement in applying 
the law to novel scenarios. Hart does not provide limitations for how a judge may interpret 
language and the open-natured texture of language affords judicial discretion in applying rules 
to a novel situation. This methodology will now be contrasted with Dworkin’s normative 
approach that provides a detailed account of how a judge ought to act in such hard cases. 
 
 
The Jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin 
 
Dworkin’s Moral Theory and Critique of Hart 
 
Having analysed the Hartian legal system, and its consequential impact on judicial 
interpretation, this will now be contrasted through examination of Dworkin’s model of legality. 
Before attempting to analyse Dworkin’s theory of law, it is important to locate his work inside 
the natural law/positivist debate. It will be shown that the moral position Dworkin adopts has 
a direct impact on the means by which he undertakes the process of structuring judicial 
 30 
discretion. In his work Justice for Hedgehogs, from which this thesis derives its title, Dworkin 
outlines the three tenants of his moral theory.28 
 
The first tenet is a non-foundationalist conception of value. This holds that it is not possible to 
use metaphysics to ground the truth of moral principles. Contrasting the work of philosophers 
such as Kant, whose maxims flow from one singular accepted premise, Dworkin argues it is 
impossible to reduce morality to one pre-accepted principle. Consequently, the truth of moral 
principles can only be established via argumentation and reason.29 Secondly, linked to this, 
Dworkin purports an ‘anti-naturalist conception of morality’. This states that the truth of values 
cannot be found by anything pre-existing and can only be reached via argumentation.30 Finally, 
Dworkin is a moral objectivist. This essentially posits that there is always a right answer for a 
judge to reach via argumentation. This rests on the notion that objective moral truth can be 
reached in each case via the use of reasoning modelled in his interpretive framework.31 
Importantly, these three tenets taken together do not bind a judge to a specific factual solution 
but merely to a process through which the objectively right answer can be attained. Such a 
moral position highlights the importance of interconnectivity in political discourse central to 
his claims in Justice for Hedgehogs. This thesis seeks to harness this process to create a 
structured model of discretion to develop a reinterpretation of the paramountcy principle. 
 
To contextualise this, Murphy situates Dworkin against the backdrop of liberal tradition the 
central tenet of which is the advancement and realisation of individual rights.32 Murphy argues 
that Dworkin is directly influenced by Rawls’ Neo-Kantian theory of justice. This posits that 
‘in pluralistic democracy….. respect must be given to each individual to choose their own 
ends’.33 Crucially, in this light, justice becomes a question of rights rather than good. This is 
reflected in Dworkin’s theory of interpretation that seeks to ‘[take] rights seriously’ and centres 
itself  around judicial enforcement of individual rights. 
 
 
28 Ronald Dworkin Justice for hedgehogs (1st edition, Harvard Press, 2013) 
29 Andrei Marmor, Coherence, Holism and interpretation: The epistemic foundations of Dworkin’s legal theory, 
(1991) 10 LP 383 
30 See Stanford Journal of Legal Philosophy <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lawphil-naturalism/> accessed 
14/6/2020 
31 Jon Mahoney, Objectivity, Interpretation and rights: A critique of Dworkin, (2004) 23 LP, 2004 190 
32 Jane Murphy, ‘Rules, responsibility and commitment to children: the new language of morality in family law’ 
(1999) 60 UPLR 1125 
33 ibid 1126 
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This focus on rights is an important part of Dworkin’s overall project. In seeking to ‘take rights 
seriously’, Dworkin espouses a model of legality that sees legal officials balancing conflicting 
interests inside a structured model of discretion. Therefore, under a Dworkinian model, 
officials operate in a rights-based discourse in which government ought to respect individual 
rights and only infringe these rights if there is compelling need.34 This becomes a central part 
of his theory and reflects the pivotal role a fully informed understanding of principles has in 
encouraging practical engagement with rights. It is this balancing of rights that will become 
central to developing the work of previous academics in reaching a Convention-compliant 
model of litigating section 8 CA applications utilising the paramountcy principle. This focus 
on rights will be shown as sitting uneasily in a welfare-centric model of children’s litigation as 
explored in Chapter two. It is in that sense that this thesis argues increased domestic focus on 
the UNCRC and ECHR, as international rights documents, can assist in bridging between a 
rights-based and welfare-centric model. 
 
Before elucidating his own theory, Dworkin provides a critique of the Hartian legal system. 
This critique will form the basis of this thesis’ rejection of Hartian jurisprudence. Dworkin 
evaluates Hart’s theory by arguing it provides an inadequate phenomenological account of the 
judicial decision-making process.35 By referencing a phenomological account, Dworkin refers 
to a description of judicial interpretation from the position of the judge in terms of the way they 
ought to behave. For Dworkin, adjudication does not occur in two distinct stages as Hart’s 
descriptive theory implies. In Hart’s theory, a judge would firstly ‘discover’ law by the use of 
validating criterion in the rule of recognition. The judge would then, if there was no valid 
solution in law, fill the ‘gap’ via use of their own judgement. How the judge fills the gap does 
not concern Hart per se. In contrast, for Dworkin, such an account of adjudication in hard cases 
results in strong discretion.36 The implication of this is that judges are effectively making new 
law and this is something Dworkin regards as repugnant on two levels. Firstly, it is morally 
wrong in that the law would apply retroactively and, secondly, it is anti-democratic in that law 
should only be created by those elected to do so.37 
 
 
34 Greenawalt (n28) 359 
35 Dworkin (n2) 111  
36 ibid 141 
37 ibid 141 
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The distinction between strong and weak discretion  is central to Dworkin’s critique. For the 
sake of this thesis, weak discretion is discretion as judgement. This occurs when an adjudicator 
is required to use personal judgement to fulfil a task such as ‘choosing the 5 best men’.38 Here, 
the adjudicators use of judgement is permitted only insofar as it is relevant to the decision 
made. Therefore, consideration outside of that relevant to choosing the five best men for the 
task is not permitted. In contrast, strong discretion arises when an official is asked to make a 
decision and is given no constraints limiting the range of solutions available or process by 
which the solution may be reached. As Dworkin states: ‘Strong discretion does not mean the 
official is free to decide without recourse to fairness, but only that his decision is not controlled 
by a standard furnished by the authority we have in mind when we raise the question of 
discretion’.39 For Dworkin, Hart’s theory of interpretation descends into this form of unbridled 
judicial discretion which is morally and democratically unacceptable. Dworkin thereby seeks 
to reject strong discretion and model a system of judicial interpretation built around weak 
discretion existing inside a wider legal framework. This will be crucial to the reinterpretation 
of section 1(1) CA outlined in Chapter Five of this thesis. This reinterpretation seeks to 
establish the application of section 1(1) CA as a Dworkinian principle and, therefore, as a 
principle existing within a wider legal framework that serves to structure discretion in cases 
applying the reinterpreted paramountcy principle. 
 
The Conceptual Separation of Rules and Principles 
 
Dworkin critiques the descriptive model of Hart and argues that judges employ standards that 
are not rules but principles in the disposal of hard cases. As Dworkin states: ‘Positivism is a 
model for a system of rules and its central notion of a single fundamental test for law forces us 
to miss the importance of standards within the law’.40 Dworkin defines principles as ‘standards 
to be observed because they are required by a dimension of morality and models their 
application on the US case of Riggs v Palmer.41 Riggs concerned a defendant who murdered 
his grandfather in the hope of claiming inheritance due under a will. The court accepted that 
under a strict reading of the statute the Defendant would be due the inheritance owed to him.42 
However, as Dworkin asserts, all laws can be controlled by Common Law maxims, one such 
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being an individual cannot gain from a crime he has perpetrated for the purpose of profit; Ex 
turpi causa non oritur actio. This maxim is not a legal rule but it was determinative in Riggs. 
Therefore, Dworkin seeks to explain why a principle can determine such a case when it lacks 
the binding nature of a rule.  
 
The distinction Dworkin draws between rules and principles is that rules apply in an all or 
nothing fashion. Rules are either valid and applied or are invalid and set aside.43 For example, 
Dworkin points to the rules of baseball in that, if a rule states that after three strikes a player is 
out, an official cannot acknowledge that as a binding rule of the game and then refuse to apply 
it.44 Rules necessitate binding legal consequences if they are applied. Of course, exceptions 
always exist but the rule should provide for these in its formulation; for example, ‘three strikes 
and out unless the ball is bowled in a fashion inconsistent with the rules of the game’. 
 
In contrast, a principle ‘states a reason arguing in one direction but does not necessitate a 
decision’.45 Therefore, officials must take it into account but they are not bound by its content 
to apply automatic legal consequences. Given that principles will clash, they must enjoy a 
further dimension of weight. This allows officials to grant greater weight dependant on a 
principle’s relevance in the instant case. As principles serve to influence an individual’s 
reasoning they are commonly formulated in terms such as ‘unreasonable’ or ‘fairness’. 
Evidently, these are terms require further judicial interpretation. This interpretive process 
forms the basis of judicial discretion. 
 
Importantly, Dworkin argues these principles are binding but not valid according to any rule 
of recognition. Instead, principles are binding because they enjoy the force of reason. He argues 
that when considering whether the principle of fairness is relevant to a case, a judge does not 
look to see if it has passed into the general corpus of law but whether its consideration is 
appropriate in that scenario. As Dworkin states: ‘The origin of these as principles lies not in a 
particular decision but in a sense of appropriateness developed over time’.46 The positivist 
model of secondary rules cannot, for Dworkin, validate principles in the fashion that a Hartian 
rule of recognition should operate. Whilst a secondary rule may provide criteria for the 
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identification of such principles, this would distort the operation of the secondary rule of 
recognition to such a point that it would not function in the manner anticipated by Hart.47 As 
Kearns observes, the existence of binding principles is crucial to Dworkin’s project in that it 
prevents the existence of strong discretion. Judicial decision-making is structured by the 
existence of principles and these form the framework in which judges can carry out the required 
process of judicial interpretation.48 
 
The Dworkinian Model of a Legal System 
 
Given his rejection of Hart’s two-stage descriptive model, Dworkin presents the rights thesis 
as underpinning his theory of law as interpretation. This forms a different methodology to Hart 
because it is a normative account of law. Dworkin’s rights thesis posits that judicial decisions 
enforce existing rights established by existing law.49 Consequently, gaps in the law do not exist. 
Therefore, judges do not use a rule of recognition to identify gaps in the law but, instead, use 
the existing legal framework to discover the correct legal interpretation. Judges are thereby 
obliged to use reason and argumentation to give effect to pre-existing legal rights. 
 
This leads to the ‘right-answer thesis’. This posits that, because judges do not behave as if there 
are gaps in the law, there is always a right answer that can be reached via reason and 
argumentation.50 This draws on natural law theory in that law is a project that can be ‘done 
well’ according to objective moral standards.51 These two ideas combine to form Dworkin’s 
overall view of law as ‘interpretation….. as a means of interpreting our rule based governance 
that shows how it is reasonable to use coercive force’.52 The law is the process of interpreting 
facts about how we as a society have governed ourselves in the past and the purpose of the 
judge is to interpret this body of rules into a coherent theory.53 
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For Dworkin, interpretation involves painting human actions in the best possible moral light 
and governmental practices in a manner motivated by moral principles or a common moral 
agenda.54 However, these historical facts may seem to have multiple interpretations in that they 
may be driven by amorphous concepts such as freedom, justice or autonomy. In these 
situations, a judge is to find the interpretation that best justifies the use of coercion in the legal 
system according to criteria of fit and moral worthiness.55 Importantly, a judge is not acting 
upon their own preferences when undertaking this process but is instead operating in the legal 
framework of the system’s constitutional settlement and history.56  
 
Given the authority provided to a judge under this model, some suggest this theory descends 
into strong discretion. Critics may argue that when a hard case arises, given the individual’s 
rights pre-exist the legal decision, a judge is able to choose between various competing 
interpretations in line with fit and moral worthiness. In doing so, a judge may simply choose 
the interpretation that leads to a pre-determined answer. The judge could then invoke numerous 
principles that led to this decision without exhausting the interpretive process. This would seem 
to paint Dworkin’s thesis in the same light as Hartian interpretation in that emphasis is placed 
on the decision and not necessarily the method by which it is reached. However, this thesis 
contends that this is an inaccurate portrayal of Dworkinian interpretation. This is because the 
judge is bound to attempt to discover the right answer consisting of the best interpretation of 
the legal system. In this sense, judicial interpretation is constrained by, and exists in, the 
framework of the right answer thesis.57 This has led to some theorists going as far as to describe 
the judge as a ‘fettered creature’ who enjoys interpretive freedom only inside the bounds of the 
existing constitutional framework of the legal system.58 
 
Thus far, this Chapter has analysed descriptive and normative accounts of a legal system. It has 
adopted a Dworkinian model given the accurate depiction of judicial interpretation it provides.  
It rejected Hart’s account of law because he does not provide guidance as to how a judge is to 
go about filling gaps in the law. This thesis will now proceed to analyse judicial discretion 
necessitated within Dworkin’s theory and how this becomes indistinguishable from his process 
of judicial interpretation. 
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An Examination of Judicial Discretion 
 
After having analysed the two competing models of a legal system, this Chapter will now 
outline theoretical and descriptive models of discretion whilst also evidencing its pervasiveness 
in the English model of family law. This section will firstly seek to provide a tentative 
definition of judicial discretion. This will be broken down into competing juristic and 
sociological conceptions. Following this, positive and negative models of discretion will be 
analysed. Throughout, this thesis will seek to contextualise the various models in relevant 
family law and will conclude by bringing the Dworkinian model of legality together with 
discretion as interpretation. 
 
Juristic and Sociological Models of Discretion 
 
Before any definition of judicial discretion can be proffered, it is important to note the 
distinction between juristic and sociological models of discretion. Sociological models of 
discretion analyse discretion from the perspective of the translation of rules into positive action 
by legal officials.59 Whereas a jurist may analyse discretion solely in terms of the interpretation 
of rules, a social scientist places emphasis on discretion as a decision making term. For 
example, this may include a Policeman deciding whether to arrest the child in the earlier park-
based scenario.60 In this light, Teitelbaum has proposed the ‘gap view’ of sociological 
discretion. This concerns the ‘gap’ between an official’s non-conformity and the rule which 
that non-conformity has violated.61 This could be the gap between open-textured law and a 
Police Officers discretion to arrest on reasonable suspicion of breaking it. Galligan has further 
proposed distinctions between public and private law models of discretion.62 Here, executive 
discretion has a limited role in the private sphere, given the personal autonomy of state subjects, 
but a much wider role in the policy-driven field of public law.63 This approach, therefore, 
concerns the location of the official wielding the discretion as opposed to the jurist’s concern 
with rules requiring interpretation.64 
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In contrast, the juristic approach to discretion has traditionally focused on the various ways to 
limit the discretion judges are afforded in individual cases. For the sake of this thesis, the phrase 
‘limiting’ will be replaced by ‘structuring’. The aim of this thesis is to provide a model of 
structured discretion that is not necessarily limited, but ordered in a manner to create a coherent 
jurisprudential framework for the reinterpretation of section 1(1) CA. Taking Fuller’s neutral 
account of law as a foundation, Lacey explores the role of a jurist in the analysis of discretion.65 
If law is defined as the enterprise of subjecting individuals to rules, the jurist is concerned with 
the discretion afforded to judges in interpreting rules and thus centralises the role of the court 
in dispute resolution.66 Traditionally, theorists have been concerned with limiting the role of 
discretion in such cases. Here, Davis posits that there exists a difference between confining and 
structuring discretion.67 Confining discretion involves the drawing of certain boundaries and 
ensuring discretionary judgement does not escape these limits. Structuring discretion concerns 
controlling the way in which judge’s exercise discretion via legislative means.68 Such an 
approach does not try to reduce the amount of discretion a judge enjoys but merely ensures this 
exists inside a legal framework. It is the concept of structuring discretion that this thesis seeks 
to employ. As stated, it is argued this can be achieved via a theoretical understanding of 
principles and their interaction with rules in a Dworkinian legal system. 
 
Schneider provides a concise explanation of the role of the jurist in analysing judicial 
discretion. This model mirrors the Dworkinian legal system in that it centres around the 
‘unremitting struggle’ between rules and discretion.69 For Schneider, there exists a constant 
continuum between the two.70 Within this continuum, it is difficult to conceive of a rule 
requiring no discretion in its application. However, Schneider posits that near such a rule lies 
‘principles’ that operate to structure and order judicial discretion.71 Whilst this balance is 
constantly in flux, a juristic understanding of discretion seeks to prevent the over-rigidity of 
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rule application and serves to ensure that judges are able to interpret rules in a way that can 
develop the law if so required.72  
 
Whilst the sociological and juristic models may seem diametrically opposed, Lacey points to 
the relationship of interdependence between the two arguing that, if jurists are to truly 
understand judicial discretion, we must modify our understanding to accommodate the benefits 
of a sociological outlook.73 It is argued that, despite the existence of statutory provisions such 
as section 1(3) CA welfare checklist, jurists must come to appreciate that discretion is not 
always expressly granted via direct statutory authority. As will become apparent, judicial 
discretion plays an important part in the application of many aspects of family law and the 
ways in which this discretion is utilised are diverse in nature. 
 
Positive and Negative Models of Discretion 
 
One possible characterisation of discretion is as a positive concept. This emphasises the 
autonomy of the legal official in the process of judicial interpretation. Goodin defines a positive 
model of discretion thus: ‘The empowerment to pursue some social goal in the context of 
individual cases in such a way as he judges to be best calculated in the circumstances to 
promote those goals’.74 Therefore, for Goodin, the choice of action or inaction, and indeed the 
method used to legitimise and reach any decision therein, is central to the characterisation of 
judicial discretion.  
 
For Bell, a positive characterisation of discretion involves three key elements; a power to 
choose standards for action by a legal character, whose choice is made unilaterally and that 
choice then legitamised by law.75 If a legal official is termed as having discretion it is accepted 
they enjoy a degree of self-determination to act in the process of achieving a given aim 
(provided by principles of law). Therefore, whilst the content of a decision may be determined 
by law, Bell points to the fact the judge will often have discretion as to whether to initiate a 
legal process culminating in a given decision. This will become evident in application of the 
paramountcy principle itself. Here, if a situation is found to fall in the remit of section 1(1) CA, 
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the judge is bound to deliver the result that gives effect the best interests of the child. However, 
a judge must firstly find the situation in the scope of the paramountcy principle before the 
child’s best interests can be held as determinative. The matter must, therefore, relate to ‘the 
upbringing of the child’, terminology which imports a degree of discretion as to the actual 
invocation of the principle itself.76 
 
In advocating for a positive model, Bell states it is a mischaracterisation to state the function 
of law is to set the boundaries of discretion.77 He argues it is more accurate, given jurists are 
not concerned with limiting discretion, to state the function of law is to provide a framework 
for judicial interpretation to take place inside. This would seem to be constructed as a 
framework which allows an official to choose between two or more competing interpretations 
when each is lawful to some extent.78 It is the power to choose that positively characterises 
judicial discretion in the descriptive model. However, this does not provide a process by which 
a judge should choose between competing solutions in individual cases and is thus descriptive 
in nature. In contrast, a negative model of discretion provides the judge with a process through 
which to apply this discretion and consequently structures the process of judicial interpretation. 
 
In contrast to the positive characterisations above, negative conceptions of discretion focus on 
the constraints placed upon the legal official and the methods by which the law can structure 
judicial exercise of discretion in individual cases. This section will proceed to analyse 
Dworkin’s theory of discretion and some of the implications of this for the jurisprudential 
model in this thesis. 
 
Dworkin termed judicial discretion as the ‘hole in the donut’.79 In analysing this ambiguous 
description, Goodin has suggested Dworkin intended to characterise discretion as a ‘residual’ 
notion, as the ‘area left open’ by the restrictive belt of legal rules that forms the corpus of law 
in a legal system.80 In a Dworkinian model, it seems clearer to define discretion by what it is 
not; the belt of rules encircling the discretionary exercise of judicial interpretation. This belt of 
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rules and principles, for Dworkin, plays a crucial role in structuring judicial interpretation in 
hard cases. 
 
As Goodin asserts, the mere absence of rules is insufficient to regard a situation as discretionary 
as discretion may also exist alongside legal regulation in indeterminate situations. Therefore, 
discretion may more accurately be described  as a situation where there ‘exists a prima facie 
expectation that the decision will be subject to legal rules… but these rules appear in some way 
legally indeterminate’.81 This would appear to create a definition that paints judicial discretion 
as filling a legal lacuna. This speaks not so much to a ‘unregulated hole in the donut’, but more 
to a grey area of law requiring further interpretation. One such family law example may be the 
operation of Emergency Protection Orders (EPO). In order to grant an EPO, a draconian power 
used only in the most severe situations,82 a court must be satisfied that there is reasonable cause 
to believe the child would be subject to significant harm if they are not removed to alternative 
accommodation or remain in the place where they are being accommodated.83 If such a 
situation exists, following application of both section 1(1) CA and section 1(5) CA, a child 
may be removed from a home. In terms of judicial discretion, section 44(1) CA provides a rule 
that requires extensive further interpretation. A judge, when applying the law here, applies 
section 44(1) CA, alongside the paramountcy and no order principles, to the facts of the case. 
Therefore, the judge is influenced by three separate considerations inside the encircling belt of 
rules and principles to reach a conclusion justified by the facts before them. This models 
Dworkinian discretion in that the conditions for an EPO cannot simply be applied without 
recourse to other principles and, ultimately, the decision of the judge as to the severity of the 
danger facing the child. Therefore, we see the belt of rules and principles attempting to guide 
and structure the discretion enjoyed by a judge when making a decision of this kind. 
 
For Dworkin, this encircling belt of rules and principles plays a leading part in his distinction 
between weak and strong discretion. He argues the existence of these principles guides a judge 
in the process of judicial interpretation and that a judge does not enjoy strong discretion because 
they are always under a legal duty to reach a decision that incorporates the best interpretation 
of the legal system according to standards of fit and moral worthiness.84 This provides the 
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structured model of discretion this thesis seeks to utilise. Such a finding is significant in the 
context of the overall argument advanced in this thesis in that a key aspect of the 
reinterpretation of the paramountcy principle is recourse to a theoretically informed model of 
legal principles.  
 
Further Descriptive Accounts of Discretion 
 
In addition to the strong and weak division highlighted by Dworkin, academics have 
subsequently proposed further descriptive accounts of judicial discretion. These models help 
pinpoint the type of discretion proffered in this thesis. For example, Goodin points to the 
contrast between formal and informal discretion.85 Formal discretion occurs when the solutions 
available to a judge are explicitly written into a rule.  Therefore, a judge may have to select 
between one of a number of statutorily pre-determined outcomes dependent on the individual 
facts of the case. In contrast, informal discretion occurs were there exists vagueness in a rules 
formulation. This can be due to the rule being based on abstract concepts. For example, the 
best interests of a child can take expression in any number of formulations dependant on case 
facts. This discretion pervades decisions of lower family courts in terms of routine evidential 
findings. For example, admitting heresy evidence in a criminal trial on the basis of the interests 
of justice demanding so. The ‘interests of justice’ is a subjective principle yet it falls in a 
judge’s discretion to admit evidence on its basis. Such discretion becomes relevant in later 
chapters as, under the current interpretation of the paramountcy principle, courts are routinely 
tasked with evidentially divining the best interests of the child with this becoming 
determinative on the making, varying or discharging of a section 8 CA order. 
 
Rosenberg suggests a further distinction between primary and secondary judicial discretion.86 
Primary discretion occurs when a decision maker has a multitude of options available and is 
free from the interference of legal rules in making the decision.87 Secondary discretion 
concerns the hierarchy of judges in terms of when a legal system ascribes a degree of finality 
to the decision of the lower court only usually enjoyed in a higher court. For the sake of this 
thesis, this distinction is not overtly relevant but further evidences the multifaceted and 
complex nature of discretion.  
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Applying Discretion to Section 1(3) CA 
 
Recalling Dworkin’s model of a legal system, there exists a clear distinction between rules and 
principles. It is now important to fit Dworkinian discretion into this wider picture to illuminate 
the jurisprudential framework the authors reinterpretation of section 1(1) CA will operate 
within. 
 
It is important to avoid viewing Dworkin’s theory as creating a bright-line divide between rules 
and discretion. It is easy to view Dworkin’s theory this way if the donut analogy is applied 
rigidly. It is argued that discretion is more than the ‘dead analytical space’ signalling the mere 
absence of rules in his negative characterisation and requires careful interpretation as part of 
his wider legal and moral theory.88 Dworkin’s development of weak discretion, the idea that 
an official’s judgement is bound by amorphous principles in the process of interpretation, 
allows discretion to be viewed as a necessary part of the Dworkinian legal system. In order for 
a judge to find the objective right answer, they must look to principles of the legal system 
manifested in concepts such as ‘fairness’, ‘justice’ or ‘reasonableness’.  
 
One way to model the operation of these accounts of discretion is to analyse their applicability 
to existing statutory instruments applied in family law. The example of section 1(1) CA is 
relevant here. Importantly, this thesis will critique the application of section 1(1) CA to section 
8 CA orders but, for the sake of evidencing the operation of discretion in family law, its current 
application will be used as a model here. When a court is issuing a section 8 Child 
Arrangements Order, s1(4) CA dictates that the court shall have regard to the welfare checklist, 
found in s1(3) CA. Whether or not using the checklist in and of itself amounts to strong 
discretion, these factors form a discretionary list that judges should have regard to when 
determining the best interests of the child.89 These factors are provided by Parliament in the 
form of legislation with judges then left to apply them on a case by case basis.  
 
The discretion offered under the welfare checklist may be characterised as positive in that the 
statute empowers a judge to choose which specific provision to give weight to. This draws 
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upon the institutional autonomy of the judge to make a decision which is then validated by the 
discretion granted under the statutory framework. However, problematically for this thesis, a 
positive characterisation does not provide a legal framework through which judicial decisions 
can be structured in a normative manner and, therefore, seems suited to a Hartian account of 
law. If the operation of the welfare checklist were to be modelled on a Hartian account, all the 
external observer could state was that the official gave some regard to the factors therein. The 
judge would turn to the open-natured texture of language and derive discretion from this to 
reach a decision.  
 
Whilst this positive characterisation is possible, a better case could be made for modelling this 
type of discretion in a negative Dworkinian sense. If we take judicial interpretation of the 
welfare checklist as the ‘hole in the donut’, it could be said judges carry out this interpretive 
task within the framework provided by statutes such as the Children Act 1989. Here, a judge 
will exercise discretion to give weight and interpret particular factors but only to the extent that 
the existing legal framework allows them to do. This process provides the structuring of weak 
judicial discretion in that a judge is provided with a list of factors and empowered to come to 
a solution as a result of their application. 
 
Having characterised the discretion under the welfare checklist as negative, we may say this 
discretion is informal in that judges are provided with an abstract set of principles to take into 
account but given no guidance on how each relates to the other or the relative weights they 
enjoy. For example, a child’s wishes and feelings expressed through section 1(3)(a) CA may 
be given greater weight correlating to the age of the child and thus developing understanding.90 
It is in a judge’s discretion to account for this given they enjoy no guidance in the statute itself. 
 
Conferral of Discretion 
 
Given this thesis has analysed the operation of judicial discretion in the context of an existing 
family law scenario, it is important to consider how this discretion is conferred on the judiciary. 
The orthodox understanding here is one of a hierarchical relationship in which legislation 
empowers judges to exercise discretion in the application of legislation. In challenging this 
simplistic structure, Schneider has offered alternative interpretations of conferral to highlight 
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how structured discretion can be used ‘creatively’ to provide certainty to ambiguous conferred 
powers.91 
 
Rule-failure discretion occurs where a hard case arises which appears so novel, on its facts, 
that no existing rule or previous decision can sensibly be applied to it.92 This equips judges 
with an element of flexibility, particularly in family law, to adapt to changing factual matrixes. 
Rule-compromise discretion occurs when legislators cannot decide on a given rule and instead 
hand authority to the individual decision maker.93 Arguably, this allows legislators to avoid 
sensitive issues, often social reforms, in the formulation of the rule and leaves judges to apply 
and develop the law in individual cases. In contrast, rule-building discretion occurs where the 
legislature could make rules but elects to not make these exhaustive to allow judges to build a 
body of expert case law allowing specificity according to the facts before them. This is seen in 
common law adjudication in that, the more cases that come before the court, the greater the 
clarity of the rule and the more authority a judge can call upon to legitimise its application.  
 
If the alternative accounts of discretion are adopted alongside these, we are able to construct a 
more accurate account of judicial discretion than the mere strong/weak or formal/informal 
dichotomies. For example, if the welfare checklist is taken as an example, it is possible to view 
conferral in the orthodox form. However, viewing the discretion as rule-building offers a more 
accurate depiction of the legal framework. In terms of section 1(3) CA, the legislature could 
have offered further statutory guidance on the operation of the checklist. For example, it may 
have specified which provisions take precedence over others, how judges are to structure 
analysis or how sections interact. In the absence of this, judges are left to develop case-law 
concerning application of the checklist and thus provide the guidance required in lower courts. 
This allows courts to build an appropriate interpretation of the checklist without outside 
interference on their expertise. This will become important for Chapter Five of this thesis in 
that rule-building discretion will be utilised to develop a jurisprudence surrounding the 
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This Chapter has sought to analyse a Dworkinian model of a legal system and the necessary 
role of judicial discretion. This shall form the theoretical lens through which the current 
application of the paramountcy principle shall be critiqued.  
 
To briefly restate, this thesis adopted a model of the legal system centred around the distinction 
between rules and principles. A principle merely indicates reasons for a decision and does not 
necessitate automatic legal consequences. These principles then weigh on an official’s 
judgement when carrying out the process of judicial interpretation. This process of 
interpretation then forms Dworkin’s theory of discretion which this thesis has defended from 
a simplistic critique. It is the existence of weak-discretion that shields the judge from 
accusations of strong-discretion and thus links the process of interpretation to the principles 
encircling the area of judicial discretion. Dworkin’s theory is a complex web of interconnected 
rules, principles and discretion. It is this web that forms the jurisprudential basis of this thesis. 
This will be developed to justify judicial creativity and discretion within the proffered 
reinterpretation of section 1(1) CA in which the term principle shall assume greater 
















































Analysing Domestic Case-Law to Evidence Taxonomic Conflict Between Section 1(1) 
CA and Dworkinian Principles 
 
Having established the jurisprudential framework this thesis will utilise, the domestic operation 
of the paramountcy principle can now be analysed. This thesis has favoured a Dworkinian style 
model of legality that draws particular attention to the distinction between rules and principles. 
This was found to form the basis of Dworkin’s ‘interpretation as weak discretion’.1 However, 
this cannot be applied in this thesis without analysis of domestic case-law applying the 
paramountcy principle. Given much of the academic commentary in this field was written 
between 1990 to 2005, it is important to update previous research in order to assess the 
continued applicability of the critiques academics have previously offered. The analysis of 
recent case-law will then be utilised in Chapter Five of this thesis in its attempts to provide a 
realisable Convention-compliant model of the paramountcy principle for use in litigation 
concerning children. 
 
This Chapter aims to apply the legal theory of Chapter One to the contemporary application of 
the paramountcy principle in order to elucidate a previously unidentified criticism of its 
operation in domestic litigation.2 Through a taxonomic analysis of the term ‘principle’, it is 
argued that section 1(1) CA is not applied in the way a principle ought. Instead, application of 
the paramountcy principle has developed into a rule whereby its invocation necessitates the 
automatic legal consequence that the interests of the child are prioritised over those of other 
litigants. This is not the way in which a Dworkinian ‘principle’ should function in that a 
principle enjoys an element of weight and thus must be balanced against competing 
considerations in its application.  
 
Chapter Two will be divided into two sections. Firstly, section 1(1) CA will be contextualised 
with discussion surrounding the Law Commission reports and Parliamentary debates prior to 
adoption of the Children Act 1989. This will evidence uncertainty at a drafting level 
surrounding the status of the paramountcy principle as either a legal rule or principle. This will 
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2 The paramountcy principle is interchangeably referred to as the ‘Welfare principle’ or ‘welfarism’ in the relevant 
literature. This thesis will adopt the term ‘paramountcy principle’. 
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be followed by extensive analysis of case-law pertaining to the paramountcy principle. 
Secondly, this thesis will take the application of section 1(1) CA and compare this against the 
Dworkinian definition of a principle in a taxonomic analysis. This tension will be assessed in 
terms of evidencing a disparity between the operation of the paramountcy principle and how a 
legal principle ought to function as part of the Dworkinian model of a legal system.  
 
 
The Children Act 1989 
 
Confusion in Law Commission Reports Prior to Adoption of the Children Act 1989 
 
The provision of law termed as the paramountcy principle forms the central tenet of the 
Children Act 1989. Here, section 1(1) CA states that whenever a court is determining any 
question with respect to the upbringing of a child, or the administration of a child’s property, 
the welfare of the child shall be the court’s paramount consideration.  
 
At this stage, it is important to note that section 1(1) CA does not explicitly refer to the 
paramountcy principle. Indeed, nowhere in the Children Act 1989 is the proposition of law 
referred to as a principle.  Furthermore, it is acknowledged that the provision in section 1(1) 
CA has been academically referred to by several alternative names: the best interests test, the 
welfare test or the welfare principle. Of these terms, the most widely used, in the academic 
sense, are the welfare principle and paramountcy principle.  Given the central tenet of this 
thesis is to criticise the (non)-application of section 1(1) CA as a legal principle, one may 
suggest that it is unfair to advance this critique given the 1989 Act does not refer to the term 
principle itself. 
 
However, this thesis focuses on the way in which the provision in section 1(1) CA is referred 
to judicially, extra-judicially and in the academic scholarship. As this Chapter will evidence, 
Law Commission documents, relevant case law and academic contributions have all referred 
to paramountcy as a ‘principle’. Specifically, this thesis argues that, in light of the Law 
Commission documents that will be analysed, it was the clear intention of Parliament to 
conceptualise the provision in section 1(1) CA as such. Therefore, in a practical sense, it seems 
that an understanding of section 1(1) CA as a principle has become embedded in the way judges 
and practioners deploy this provision. 
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Given evidence to support this claim that will be discussed in this Chapter, it is argued that 
section 1(1) CA is termed a principle not solely as a result of common terminology but in light 
of established practice determining as such. This is significant and is indicative the gulf 
between section 1(1) CA’s statutory wording and its actual invocation in domestic family 
courts. Therefore, whilst section 1(1) CA does not explicitly term its provision as such, this 
thesis argues there is significance in domestic practice, and academic commentary, terming the 
provision in section 1(1) CA the paramountcy principle. 
 
Before engaging in critical analysis of section 1(1) CA’s application in domestic litigation, it 
is important to analyse the documents and debate leading to adoption of the Children Act 1989. 
Described as ‘the most comprehensive and far-reaching reform of child law in living memory’, 
the Act was an attempt to create a coherent framework for the robust protection of children’s 
welfare.3 The Act serves to centralise the child in family litigation and, whilst not a direct 
response to the sexual exploitation highlighted in the Cleveland report,4 was underpinned by 
Parliamentary consensus that over-interference in the family by public bodies was non-
beneficial.5 
 
The Children Act 1989 was adopted as a result of wide-scale legal review into the domestic 
operation of family law by the Law Commission and Department for Health and Social 
Security. As Bainham notes, this is unusual in that the Act had multiple influences that resulted 
in the hybrid focus on both public and private child law.6 This divided focus will be later shown 
to arguably impact upon the extent to which family courts have been receptive to Convention-
based arguments in litigation. The first relevant review into the treatment of children in care 
was undertaken by the House of Commons Social Services Select Committee.7 This report, 
largely into public aspects of child law, concluded that the applicable law at that time was 
ineffective and resulted in an inability to protect those children most at risk.8 As a result of 
these findings, the Committee suggested that a wider scale report was required into the 
operation of domestic child law.9  
 
3 HC Deb, 27th April 1989, Vol.151, col 1135 
4 Cleveland Report Inquiry into child abuse in Cleveland 1987 (1988) Report of the inquiry into child abuse in 
Cleveland 1987 Cm 412 London:  
5 Steven Cretney, Family law in the twentieth century, (1st edition, OUP, 2003) 722 
6 Andrew Bainham and Stephen Gilmore, Children the modern law, (4th edition Jordan Publishing, 2013) 33 
7 House of Commons Health and Social Services Committee, ‘Report by the Secretaries of State for Social 
Services and for Wales on Children in care in England and Wales’ (Cmd 2322 1983) 




The recommendations of that report were, in turn, revised in light of the Law Commission 
proposals found in four separate reports from 1985-1987.10 The final Law Commission 
recommendations were outlined in its 1988 report.11 This report recommended the 
‘consolidation and [amendment] of the existing law to form a rationalised regime’; a coherent 
legal code that provided clear entry points to litigants in both the private and public spheres of 
family litigation.12 This consolidated the previously piecemeal approach to child law and thus 
constituted a ‘completely new’ framework of rights and responsibilities with the central aim of 
protecting the child from both public and private persons.13 
 
Importantly, throughout the process of the Children Bill gaining the approval of both 
Parliamentary chambers, the provision in section 1(1) was emphasised as central to the overall 
coherence of the Act. Such an approach is evidenced in the 1986 Law Commission paper 
analysing the domestic application of the paramountcy principle.14 Here, the Law Commission 
stated  that the paramountcy principle must be applied without ‘qualification or gloss’ and in a 
manner that gives ‘absolute priority to the welfare of the child’.15 This is further emphasised 
by statements from both the Minister of State for Health and Solicitor General during Second 
Reading of the Children Bill whom both pointed to the centrality of the principle: ‘the child’s 
welfare must be the paramount consideration.…. All courts in reaching all decisions about the 
care of children must do what is best for the child’.16 Such comments are significant in the 
context of this Chapter in that such an approach would seem to mirror judicial application of 
the paramountcy principle in J v C. This lends further support to this chapter’s contention that 
Parliament intended for the provision in section 1(1) CA to be termed a principle in law. 
 
Interestingly, in the various Law Commission reports and Parliamentary debate, there exists 
some confusion as to the terminology to be employed surrounding the provision within section 
1(1) and its application as a legal principle. This Chapter aims to evidence section 1(1) CA was 
 
10 See Law Commission, ‘Review of Child Law- Guardianship’, (Law Com No. 91, 1985), Law Commission, 
‘Review of Child law- Custody’, (Law Com No.96, 1986), Law Commission, ‘Review of Child law- Care, 
supervision and interim orders’, (Law Com No.100, 1987) and Law Commission, ‘Review of Child Law- Wards 
of Court’, (Law Com No.101, 1987)  
11 Law Commission, ‘Review of Child Law- Custody and Guardianship’, (Law Com No. 172, 1988) 
12 HL Deb, 6th December 1988, Vol.502, col 490 
13 Bainham and Gilmore (n6) 33 
14 Law Commission, ‘Review of Child law- Custody’, (Law Com No.96, 1986) 
15 ibid 186-189 
16 HC Deb, 27th April 1989 (n3) col 1111 (emphasis added) 
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intended to be termed a principle by Parliamentary draftsmen and Law Commission researchers 
yet, even during its adoption, there existed confusion as to its precise status as a principle or 
rule. The significance of this remains under-unexplored given the lack of academic focus on 
traditional analytical jurisprudence in family law. 
 
Records of Parliamentary debate evidence the view that both Parliamentary chambers intended 
the provision in section 1(1) CA to be termed a principle in law. The Secretary of State for 
Health stated that the ‘welfare principle necessitates children’s interests are paramount’, whilst 
this characterisation is mirrored by the Solicitor General in his appraisal of the proposed Bill.17 
Such an approach is further evident in the House of Lords, in which the Lord Chancellor stated 
that ‘the [paramountcy] principle requires….’ and that there is a ‘danger such a broad principle 
could lead to inconsistent practice’.18 Further references to the language of principles can be 
found in the speeches of both Lord Mischon and Lord Meston.19 This suggests that, throughout 
the Parliamentary process, legislators intended the legal provision in section 1(1) CA to be 
characterised as a principle and not a rule. This will have significant consequences for this 
Chapter as it points to the misapplication of section 1(1) CA as a Dworkinian style rule. 
 
However, the characterisation of section 1(1) CA as a principle is not as clear when the Law 
Commission reports are analysed. In its 1986 paper, the provision was termed both a legal 
principle and rule.20 Firstly, the Law Commission, in considering whether paramountcy was 
the right ‘rule‘ to apply in the domestic setting, stated: ‘Where the adults' interests are 
concerned the case against diluting the paramountcy rule is strong’.21 Such a characterisation 
does not appear in isolation and accompanied by statements such as: ‘the paramountcy rule 
will only apply where the child's welfare is directly in question’ and ‘the paramountcy rule 
suggests that, for as long as he is a child, he should be given the best opportunity to develop 
his own potential’.22 
 
This said, the Law Commission report also provides authority for the characterisation of 
paramountcy as a legal principle by stating: ‘it [paramountcy] provides a strong principle that 
 
17 ibid col 1145 (emphasis added) 
18 HL Deb, 6th December 1988 (n12) col 490 
19 ibid col 496 and col 500 
20 Law Commission, ‘Review of Child law- Custody’ (n14) 179-182 
21 ibid 190  
22 ibid 186 
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the child’s interests are to be paramount’.23 Interestingly, the report contains an element of 
internal inconsistency in its approach to Lord MacDermott’s authoritative judgment in J v C. 
Here, the Law Commission initially described the dicta as the ‘most often quoted expression 
of the paramountcy rule’.24 However, when discussing whether parental interests should 
influence a welfare assessment, the Commission reasoned: ‘Since J v C, the meaning of the 
paramountcy principle has been clear’.25 Therefore, on one level, J v C is cited as authority for 
paramountcy operating as a legal rule whilst, shortly after, it is cited as a legal principle. This 
would suggest the Law Commission used the terms rule and principle interchangeably and 
without regard for the taxonomical distinction between the two and the consequential impact 
on its application in domestic courts.  
 
Whilst it would seem too far to charge the Law Commission as being disingenuous in their 
interchangeable use of language, this does suggest that the report regards legal principles and 
rules as applying in the same manner. The fact that J v C is characterised as authority for the 
paramountcy ‘rule’ would suggest that the drafters were imprecise in their use of language 
given they reverted back to the standard characterisation of the paramountcy principle. The 
Law Commission, when writing the report, did not have the benefit of a Dworkinian 
jurisprudential lens and so used rule and principle interchangeably without regard for the 
practical consequences of doing so. Such imprecision has, thus far, not impacted an academic 
critique of the paramountcy principle’s application in domestic law because of reluctancy to 
engage with traditional legal theory. However, given the theoretical lens established in Chapter 
One of this thesis, the interchangeable use of rule and principle directly impacts the practical 
application of section 1(1) CA. This Chapter will go on to analyse how the paramountcy 
principle has been applied as a Dworkinian rule in domestic practice. 
 
The Scope and Relationship of Section 1(1) CA to Section 1(3) CA 
  
The paramountcy principle enjoys a relatively narrow sphere of application. It directly applies 
to courts when considering an issue concerning the upbringing of a child, or administration of 
property, but also enjoys further general application.26 For example, the principle will apply in 
 
23 ibid 191 
24 ibid 185 (emphasis added) 
25 ibid 200 
26 Nigel Lowe and Gillian Douglas, Bromley’s Family Law, (11th edition, 2015, OUP) 419 
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wardship proceedings27 and to the exercise of the court’s inherent jurisdiction.28 Beyond this, 
section 1(1) CA does not enjoy unlimited application.29 Given the principle only applies to 
courts, private ordering is not caught in its scope and parents are consequently able to act in a 
manner that does not solely serve to maximise the welfare of a child. This contrasts to section 
3(1) of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.30 Here, the characterisation of children’s 
interests as ‘primary’ enjoys a significantly wider field of application including administrative 
authorities, legislative bodies and private individuals in the process of taking decisions 
affecting the child.31 As such, article 3(1) has become a threefold concept when applied to 
situations in which a child’s interests are at stake; a substantive right, interpretive principle and 
procedural rule.32 
 
Section 1(1) CA’s limited field of application is further evidenced by its non-application to 
determination of leave to apply for a section 8 CA hearing on the basis that the question of 
welfare only arises in the section 8 hearing itself.33 Accordingly, as Herring states,34 domestic 
law makes no attempts to ensure private actions are viewed through the prism of the 
paramountcy principle and parents are free to prioritise their own/others interests over and 
above those of the child.35 
 
Furthermore, for a case to fall in the scope of section 1(1) CA, the issues must directly affect 
the upbringing of a child.36 The example this thesis will utilise is the issuing of section 8 Child 
Arrangements Orders. However, given the issue must directly relate to upbringing, there are 
practice areas in which a child’s welfare is not the paramount consideration and merely forms 
a consideration for the court. Such situations include the lawfulness of deportation decisions 
concerning parents37 and applications under Part IV Family Law Act 1996 for an occupation 
order in the domestic violence context.38 This evidences that, despite the paramountcy principle 
 
27 See J v C [1970] AC 668 
28 See Re T (a minor)(wardship: medical treatment) [1997] 1 ALL ER 906 
29 Lowe and Douglas (n26) 420 
30 s3(1) UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol.1577, 3  
31 Lowe and Douglas (n26) 420 
32 UN Committee on the rights of the child, General commen No.14 [6] 
33 Re A (Minors) (Residence Orders: Leave to Apply) [1992] Fam 182 [191G] 
34 Jonathan Herring, ‘The Human Rights Act and the Welfare Principle- Conflicting or Complementary?’, (1999) 
223 CFLQ 1,2 
35 Bainham and Gilmore (n6) 70 
36 s1(1)(a) Children Act 1989 
37 See ZH (Tanzania) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 4  
38 s33 Family Law Act 1996 
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pervading family practice, there are clear instances of lesser or non-applicability. The full force 
of section 1(1) CA will only apply in a small number of contested cases directly affecting the 
upbringing of the child and in which another statutory provision has not ousted its influence.39 
 
 
Judicial Application of the Paramountcy Principle 
 
The J v C Model of Section 1(1) CA 
 
This thesis will now examine the jurisprudence of family courts to evidence judicial trends in 
application of the paramountcy principle. This will begin with analysis of the House of Lords 
decision in J v C. Following discussion of subsequent jurisprudence, it will become apparent 
that, despite family courts becoming less willing to explicitly cite the traditional J v C model, 
domestic practice has undergone little change. This Chapter reflects the fact that academic 
debate surrounding the paramountcy principle critiques domestic interpretation rather than the 
construction of section 1(1) CA per se.40 
 
As already stated, the previous statutory expression of the paramountcy principle, found in 
section 1 Guardianship of Minors Act 1971, required the courts to treat the child’s interests as 
the first and paramount consideration. The inclusion of ‘first’ suggests that, in practice, there 
existed two competing models for its application. On one level, a child’s interests could be 
considered alongside the interests of other relevant parties. Under such a construction, the 
welfare of the child forms an important first consideration but is to be balanced against other 
interests in litigation. The opposing interpretation is that the child’s welfare forms the only 
consideration of the court. Consequently, the course of action found to evidentially be in that 
child’s best interests determines the making, varying or discharging of an order.  
 
In England and Wales, even before the introduction of the Children Act 1989, the courts had 
arguably adopted a narrow conception of the paramountcy principle that resulted in the welfare 
of the child becoming the only consideration of the court. The authoritative exposition of this 
is found in the pre-Children Act 1989 case of J v C in which Lord MacDermott stated: 
 
39 See s105(1) Children Act 
40 Jonathan Herring, ‘Farewell Welfare?’ (2005) 27 JSWFL 159 
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Reading these words [first and paramount] in their ordinary significance…. The    
course to be followed will be that which is most in the interests of the child’s welfare 
as that term has now to be understood…… [the child’s welfare forms] the paramount 
consideration because it rules upon or determines the course to be followed.41  
 
As the Law Commission argued, such an approach necessarily implies the terms ‘first and’ 
became superfluous to section 1 Guardianship of Minors Act.42 Therefore, following J v C, it 
became evident that the child’s welfare dictated any order a court was able to grant; the notion 
of welfare being merely the first consideration amongst others had been firmly rejected by the 
House of Lords. This necessitated the automatic rejection of the rights and interests of other 
parties to litigation. It is the central claim of this Chapter that, when critiqued through a 
Dworkinian lens, such a finding offers an important development in attempting to construct a 
Convention-compliant model of litigation. 
 
Following section 1(1) CA superseding section 1 Guardianship of Minors Act, Re O confirmed 
that Lord McDermott’s exposition of the law was equally applicable to the new statutory 
regime.43 Therefore, section 1(1) CA confirmed that, in cases falling under the scope of the 
paramountcy principle, the child’s welfare was determinative on the order a court was able to 
issue.44. This narrow interpretation was subsequently approved in Re K in which it was stated 
that the law was clear; ‘The welfare of the child is the paramount consideration…. This was 
stated with clarity by Lord MacDermott and will be in the mind of every judge who tries an 
infant case’.45 Whilst this case pre-dates the Children Act 1989, it is representative of a judicial 
willingness to elevate paramountcy from the position of a ‘first consideration’. 
 
Indeed, in much of the initial jurisprudence following the Children Act 1989 such an approach 
is prevalent.  For example, several Court of Appeal decisions from this period suggest the 
paramountcy principle was determinative on the making of an order in that analysis of a child’s 
best interests must occur in isolation to the interests of the primary carer.46 Such an approach 
 
41 J v C (n27) (emphasis added) 
42 Law Commission, ‘Review of Child law- Custody’, (n14) 186 
43 Re O and another (Minors) (Care: Preliminary Hearing) [2004] 1 AC 523 [24] 
44 Lowe and Douglas (n26) 414  
45 Re K [1977] Fam 179, [183] (emphasis added) 
46 Herring, ‘The Human Rights Act and the Welfare Principle- Conflicting or Complementary?’ (n33) 1 
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is favoured in Re KD.47 Here, Lord Oliver stated: ‘parenthood confers the privilege of ordering 
a child’s early years but this is subject to limitations’. 48 Here, the court’s interpretation of the 
paramountcy principle constituted one such limitation. In these situations, parental privilege 
does not terminate but becomes subservient to the welfare principle and the best interests of 
the child.49 As a result, parental interests could only be assessed insofar as they weighed on the 
best interests of the child. This was further developed in Re O, in which the paramountcy 
principle was termed a ‘fundamental principle overriding all else’.50 This dicta was approved 
as recently as 2012 in the Court of Appeal decision of Re W.51 Here, the court held the 
‘definitive exposition’ of the [paramountcy] principle, in relation to parental disputes, is to be 
found in Re O and, as a result, the best interests of the child, divined after a welfare analysis, 
overrides all other considerations in such cases.52 
 
In this light, Harris-Short has examined judicial resistance to tempering the operation of the 
paramountcy principle to allow for the balancing of rights and interests following adoption of 
the HRA 1998.53 She draws particular attention to cases such as Dawson v Wearmouth,54 to 
evidence the problematic influence of the J v C model of application in denying courts the 
opportunity to balance various rights and interests. In Dawson, the court confirmed that, once 
a section 8 dispute has arisen, the ‘paramount consideration is the welfare of the child’ and, 
consequently, the views and interests of parents are relevant only insofar they bear on that 
child’s welfare.55 Subsequent cases have raised no prospect of ‘interfering with the established 
line of authority [J v C] binding the interpretive approach of the court’.56  
 
It is important to distinguish between the impact of the paramountcy principle’s narrow 
interpretation in J v C and its actual application by domestic courts. As is apparent, the courts 
have used a variety of terms to express the effect of the paramountcy principle on cases falling 
under the ambit of section 1(1) CA.57 These subsequent cases do not necessarily cite J v C as 
 
47 Re KD (Minor) (Ward: Termination of Access) [1988] 1 All ER 577 
48 ibid [58] 
49 ibid [58] 
50 Re O (Contact: Imposition of Conditions) [1995] 2 FLR 124 [128] 
51 Re W (Children) [2012] EWCA Civ 999 
52 ibid [37] 
53 Sonia Harris-Short, ‘Family law and the HRA 1998: Judicial restraint or revolution?’ in Helen Fenwick, Gavin 
Philipson and Roger Masterman, Judicial reasoning under the UK Human Rights Act, (1st edition, CUP, 2007) 
54 Dawson and Wearmouth [1999] 1 FLR 1167 
55 ibid [1174] 
56 Re A (Permission to Remove Child from Jurisdiction: Human Rights) [2000] 2 FLR 225 [226] 
57 See Re P (Contact: Supervision) [1996] 2 FLR 314 [328] 
 57 
authority. Indeed, the most recent Court of Appeal application of J v C is found in the 2013 
case of Re G; concerning the impact of section 1(1) CA on a section 31 CA Care Order.58 Here, 
the Court of Appeal merely noted that J v C remains the authoritative interpretive approach to 
the paramountcy principle and that the child’s welfare is the paramount consideration.59 As 
Harris-Short suggests, the subsequent failure to cite J v C does not diminish the importance of 
Lord MacDermott’s exposition.60 Instead, following enactment of the Children Act 1989, a 
narrow interpretation of the paramountcy principle became entrenched in the Family Division’s 
jurisprudence with, as an automatic legal consequence of its application, the interests of the 
child assuming priority over and above those of other parties to litigation. This is dependent on 
evidentially demonstrating what is in the child’s best interests.61 When a court has determined 
this issue, the interests of others may become a consideration ‘only insofar as they bear on the 
welfare of the child’.62 As will be discussed in the second part of this Chapter, this gives effect 
to a rule-like application of the paramountcy principle. This entrenchment mirrors the 
imbedded nature of the categorisation of the provision in section 1(1) CA as the ‘paramountcy 
principle’ in domestic practice. 
 
The J v C Model in Practice 
 
The J v C model of application purports to place the child at the centre of the decision-making 
process. This serves to isolate the child’s interests from the interests of other parties to 
litigation.63 This thesis will now model this approach onto a section 8 CA application to 
highlight the process courts are bound to when applying a J v C model of the paramountcy 
principle. The factual scenario this thesis will utilise comes from the case of Re E.64 For 
Herring, Re E is emblematic of a wider tension in family law between ‘promoting welfarism 
and respecting the rights of family members’. As a result, he concludes that the issues raised 
in it are illustrative of prevailing trends in children’s litigation.65 
 
 
58 Re G (A Child) [2013] EWCA Civ 965 
59 ibid [55] 
60 Harris-Short (n53) 347 
61 Shazia Choudhry and Helen Fenwick, ‘Taking the rights of parents and children seriously: Confronting the 
Welfare Principle under the Human Rights Act’ (2005) 25 OJLS 460 
62 Re O (Contact: Imposition of Conditions) (n50) [128] 
63 John Eekelaar, ‘Beyond the Welfare Principle’ (2002) 237 CFLQ 1,10 
64 Re E (Residence: Imposition of Conditions) [1997] 2 FLR 638 
65 Herring, ‘The Human Rights Act and the Welfare Principle- Conflicting or Complementary?’ (n33)2 
 58 
Re E concerned a mother, residing in London, who enjoyed a residence order in favour of her 
child.66 The father was granted regular contact and this was found to be largely beneficial for 
the child. Upon the mother indicating a desire to move to Liverpool, the father sought a 
condition to be placed upon the residence order preventing relocation. This is a case of clashing 
parental interests alongside the calculation of the child’s best interests. On one hand, the child 
benefitted from regular contact with the father and there was nothing to suggest it was in the 
child’s best interests that this stop or decrease in frequency. Furthermore, there was no evidence 
to suggest a move to Liverpool would benefit the child if considered in complete isolation. On 
the other hand, the mother argued that her continued residence in London had such an effect 
on her that it inhibited her ability to care for the child. This was significant given she was the 
primary carer and, therefore, counsel submitted this should be considered in a welfare 
assessment as she was primarily responsible for maximising welfare. Ultimately, the court 
found for the mother in that such a limitation could not be placed onto a residence order as it 
would have the effect of limiting her ability to freely choose where both herself and her child 
would reside. 
 
Such cases give rise to the conventional criticisms of the paramountcy principle’s application 
in domestic child law. One such argument is that the paramountcy principle fails to robustly 
protect the interests of children given its application often provides the means of expressing 
the interests of others.67 For example, in Re E, the mother aligned her own interests with the 
best interests of the child by arguing that remaining in London would adversely impact her 
child’s welfare.68 Despite the order being framed as in the best interests of the child, it is 
difficult to reason how moving to Liverpool, thus losing contact with the father, was positively 
in that child’s welfare interests if considered in total isolation. The order could only be granted 
if the child’s welfare was tied to that of the mother. This is something the individualistic 
application of the paramountcy principle seeks to prevent. 
  
This, for Eekelaar, evidences the susceptibility of the J v C model to the ideological input of 
those not explicitly relevant to the formulation of the child’s best interests.69 This input can 
operate on two levels. On one level, Reece points to the potential of welfarism to undermine 
 
66 Note, following the Children and Families Act 2014 Schedule Two (3), Residence Orders are now termed Child 
Arrangements Orders. 
67 Eekelaar (n63)10 
68 Re E (Residence: Imposition of Conditions) [1997] 2 FLR 638 [15] 
69 Eekelaar (n63) 10 
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the rights of adults given the move from a rights to welfare based model. To evidence this she 
draws on the line of case-law pointing to the homophobic preference for heterosexual carers in 
the issuing of Residence Orders.70 Given judges applied their own biases by equating the best 
interests of the child to being raised in a traditional nuclear family, she argues that the 
paramountcy principle led to the favouring of heterosexual parents.71 Given the paramountcy 
principle imports a degree of discretion to the trial judge, cases such as Re D highlight the 
dangers of allowing an individual to divine the best interests of a child in a manner that gives 
effect to prejudices.72 These cases speak of the dangers of ‘exposing’ children to ‘ways of life 
[leading] to a severance from normal society and discriminating against homosexual parents 
on the grounds of so-called ‘lifestyle choices’.73 For Reece, the paramountcy principle results 
in an approach that equates social normality to best interests and thereby ‘approximates that 
the nuclear family is always better for the child’.74 The discretion afforded under section 1(1) 
CA allows for these individual biases to find expression in case-law. 
 
Alternatively, relevant to this thesis, the paramountcy principle gives rise to a situation 
whereby parents can seek to align their own interests with those of the child. As a result, 
children’s interests are viewed through the prism of litigation brought and dominated by adult 
parties.75 This is the inevitable consequence of family litigation being initiated by parents with 
children often remaining unrepresented; as per Baroness Hale in Williamson: ‘This is a case 
about children, their rights and those of the parents…. Yet no one is here to speak on behalf of 
the children… The battle has been fought on grounds selected by the adults’.76  
 
At a domestic level, it is apparent that the necessary implication of the child’s interests being 
the sole consideration of the court is that parents will attempt to align their own interests with 
those of the child. The consequence is that the best interests of the child often become indicative 
of primary carers. Despite the fact this refers to the manner in which the paramountcy principle 
 
70 Helen Reece, ‘The paramountcy principle: Consensus or Construct?’ (1996) 267 CLP 291, 303. Note, Residence 
Orders refer to what are now termed section 8 Child Arrangements Orders. 
71 C v C [1991] 1 FLR 223. It is important to note the ECtHR has specifically stated that discriminating on the 
grounds of sexual orientation in residency disputes is prohibited under the convention. See Salgueiro da Silva 
Mouta v Portugal [2001] FCR 653 
72 Re D [1977] AC 602 
73 ibid [629] 
74 Reece (n70) 291 
75 Herring, ‘The Human Rights Act and the Welfare Principle- Conflicting or Complementary?’ (n33) 10 
76 Regina v Secretary of State for Education and Employment and others(Respondents) ex parte Williamson 
(Appellant) and others 2005 UKHL 15 [71] 
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is applied in litigation, as opposed to the statutory construction of section 1(1) CA itself, this 
formulation is problematic on both a theoretical and practical level. Practically, it reflects the 
fact that the paramountcy principle is not operating in the manner in which it ought. Under a 
narrow application of the paramountcy principle, courts are tasked with issuing orders 
determined by evidentially assessing the best interests of the child. In a strict reading 
thereunder, courts should not consider the interests of others unless they directly impinge on 
the interests of the child as per the J v C model. This is emblematic of the wider divergence 
between the textual provision in section 1(1) CA and its subsequent application in the courts. 
 
Arguably, by the court ‘smuggling’ the interests of others into a welfare analysis, the 
protections afforded to children are ‘watered down’.77 For Bainham, this is a particular problem 
if the aim of law is to protect children, not necessarily their rights.78 Therein lies an important 
distinction. Protecting children necessitates a certain degree of paternalism, of divining their 
best interests in the form of a value judgement.79 If this is the aim of the law then it is not 
functioning consistently if the interests of others are ‘smuggled’ into the conducting of a 
welfare test. In this light, the question of whether the court was protecting the interests of the 
child or mother in Re E can be raised. If the latter, this at the expense of the interests of the 
father who lost contact time with his child. If the court was protecting the child, then the 
decision to allow relocation seems a strained maximisation of their best interests. 
 
 
Impact of the HRA on Litigation Applying Section 1(1) CA 
 
Given the period in which academic interest peaked in the paramountcy principle, it is 
important to recognise that existing analysis of the case law is considered limited. 
Consequently, this thesis will now examine contemporary case law to determine whether 
family judges have maintained the J v C approach to litigation engaging the paramountcy 
principle. Emphasis will be placed on the modest recognition of rights, as opposed to interests, 
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Cases Concerning the Presumption in Favour of Biological Parents 
 
The line of case-law concerning the potential presumption in favour of biological parents 
provides an insight into the contemporary judicial approach to the paramountcy principle. 
Despite concerning presumptive standards, which are not the subject of this thesis, these cases 
serve to highlight both the continued application of the paramountcy principle and the lengths 
to which courts have gone to reflect the importance of natural parenthood whilst 
simultaneously respecting the determinant nature of children’s welfare post J v C.80 This 
section will now evidence examples of courts seeking to use presumptions to predetermine an 
outcome that is not based on a welfare assessment under the Children Act 1989. Such attempts 
have been firmly rejected and, post Re B, courts will utilise a welfare-based approach to 
litigating section 8 CA applications.81 It is now the case that appearing as the child’s biological 
parent yields no right or presumption to contact.  
 
Following initial judicial support for the idea of a presumption in favour of biological parents 
found in Re D,82 the courts have retreated and emphasised the centrality of the paramountcy 
principle in that any section 8 CA order must be justified by reference to the best interests of 
the child. As Herring and Powell state, ‘the courts have rejected the utility of these 
presumptions and assert that in each case the court should seek to determine the welfare needs 
of the child before it’.83 This was affirmed in Re B in which it was stated: ‘All consideration of 
the importance of parenthood in private law…… must be firmly rooted in an examination of 
what is in the child’s best interests’.84 Therein, the Supreme Court made clear that a courts role 
in section 8 applications was to determine the best interests of the child.85  
 
In Re B, the Supreme Court was faced with the task of interpreting dicta from the earlier House 
of Lords decision in Re G that had been consistently cited in a manner that seemed to give rise 
to a presumption in favour of biological parents.86 Re G concerned a dispute between a same-
sex couple over the upbringing of two children conceived via artificial insemination. Following 
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birth of the children, the relationship between the parents broke down and both parties formed 
new relationships. The biological mother took care of the children and moved to Leicester 
whilst allowing the non-biological parent to maintain contact. However, upon the non-
biological mother’s application for a shared residence order, it became clear that the biological 
mother intended to move to Cornwall. In light of this, the Court of Appeal granted a shared 
residence order to protect the non-biological mothers role in the child’s life. Further 
proceedings were brought upon the biological mother relocating. The House of Lords allowed 
the appeal and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal in providing that the shared 
residence order should be varied to reflect its original form and that the children’s primary 
residence should be with the biological mother.87 
 
Dicta from Re G has been subject to contested interpretation. Baroness Hale, as she then was, 
emphasised the significance of natural parenthood by stating; ‘the fact that CG is the natural 
mother of these children….. while raising no presumption in her favour, is undoubtedly an 
important and significant factor in determining what will be best for them now and in the 
future’.88 It was further stated that J v C was the ‘plain’ exposition of the law in that the child’s 
welfare dictates the issuing of an order.89 Consequently, there is no question of a parental right 
or presumption in favour of contact with a child.90 This serves to both reinforce the centrality 
of the paramountcy principle whilst also reject the characterisation of such clashes as 
deontological in nature. 
 
Whilst this seems to reject the presence of any presumption, the judgment of Lord Nicholls 
appears contradictory. Here, Lord Nicholls challenged anyone with the ‘tendency to diminish 
the significance of natural parenthood.91  Thus, on one level, the House of Lords rejected the 
existence of presumptions whilst simultaneously emphasising the importance and significance 
of natural parenthood. In this formulation, a court must bear in mind that the ‘ordinary way’ of 
rearing a child via biological parenthood can be normally expected to be in their best interests.92 
In practice, this was used to attempt to create a presumption in favour of biological parents 
when conflict arises in a section 8 CA application.93 
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The later Supreme Court judgment in Re B attempts to provide clarity surrounding Re G and 
firmly rejects the existence of a presumption in favour of natural parents. The court made clear 
that: ‘the quest is to determine what is in the best interests of the child’.94 In this, it is only as a 
‘contributor to the child’s welfare that parenthood assumes any significance’ and it must be 
assessed in terms of its potential to fulfil the ultimate maximisation of the child’s best 
interests.95 The Supreme Court seemed to firmly reject framing paramountcy in terms of rights 
and thus failed to balance the various interests of the parties; ‘to talk in terms of a child’s rights, 
as opposed to best interests, diverts from the child’s welfare’.96 Indeed, the very question of 
balancing rights is only raised once in analysis of the first instance judgment. Here, Lord Kerr 
provided a somewhat cursory approval of the trial judge’s approach when acknowledging ‘[the 
judge had] balanced all interests in making their decision and had treated Harry’s welfare as 
paramount’.97 
 
Furthermore, both Re B and Re G reject the formulation of parental interest’s as rights. This 
was explicitly stated by the House of Lords in both cases. This opposition is emblematic of a 
clear hostility to a rights-based discourse that is both entrenched and ‘markedly felt’ in 
litigation.98 This is despite some modest efforts by individual judges to characterise disputes in 
terms of clashing rights. Harris-Short identifies the judgment of Mr. Justice Charles in Re R as 
a concise exploration of why the family judiciary are reluctant to introduce a rights-based 
discourse.99 Here, the judge stated that he feared a rights-based approach may obscure section 
1(1) CA as the central tenet of children’s litigation. If parental interests were characterised as 
rights then, as Harris-Short argues, they become qualitatively different in that there is no 
developed Strasbourg jurisprudence on children as independent rights holders.100 This is further 
reflected in the paucity of jurisprudence interpreting the impact of UNCRC on children as 
rights bearers. 
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The message from these cases is that there exists no presumption in favour of biological 
parents. Instead, biological parentage is a factor that must be fed into a wider welfare 
assessment. If the child being raised by biological parents is evidentially found to be in their 
welfare interests, it becomes a factor in the issuing of a section 8 order. However, it cannot 
stand alone as either a presumption or assumed to be in the best interests of the child and must 
be shown evidentially. Furthermore, both Re B and Re G firmly reject the characterisation of 
interests as rights. This is an important finding in the context of this thesis given requirements 
in a post-HRA legal framework to balance rights under article 8(2) ECHR as discussed in 
Chapter Three.  
 
Subsequent Presumption Cases 
 
Both Re G and Re B apply the paramountcy principle in a manner that centralises the child’s 
interests in the judicial decision-making process. This thesis will now examine subsequent 
jurisprudence to evidence that, whilst the child’s interests remain paramount, there exists an 
modest judicial willingness to characterise such cases as clashes of rights and thereby invoke 
an rights-based discourse. 
 
Interestingly, subsequent cases in this area have adopted a similar approach to, and largely 
cited dicta from, Re B. For example, TE v SH, concerned an application by the father for a 
section 8 CA order in respect of an 11-year-old boy.101 This would have involved removing 
the child from the care of his mother. In exposition of the law, Judge Bellamy drew extensively 
on dicta in Re B, citing Lord Kerr’s guidance in interpreting Re G as requiring legal analysis 
centred on the welfare of the child.102 The judge, in TE, repeated on numerous occasions that, 
when conducting the analysis required under the welfare checklist, the child’s welfare was his 
paramount consideration. This was affirmed via citation of Baroness Hale’s approval of J v C 
in Re G.103 This led Judge Bellamy to the conclusion that ‘all other principles [in this case] are 
secondary to that central principle, that any decision about S’s residence must be firmly rooted 
in an examination of what is in his best interests’.104 This constitutes an approach that follows 
the previous Supreme Court authority. 
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Similarly, the 2012 case of Re B, concerned a grandmother’s challenge to a  first instance 
decision granting the mother a residence order in favour of her child.105 The Court of Appeal 
was presented with dicta from the trial judge that was arguably inconsistent with the line of 
authorities discussed above. Here, the trial judge had stated that, if the mother had a suitable 
place to live, the child ought to be living with her rather than grandmother.106 The judge then 
further added: ‘the law is clear that a child should have the right to grow up with his own 
parents and should not be in the care of third parties unless welfare demands it’.107 Evidently, 
language invoking a ‘right’ to be brought up by natural parents is not supported by Re B or Re 
G and is, in fact, flatly rejected by both. However, in the context of this case, the Court of 
Appeal held that the language employed by the trial judge did not ‘involve an elementary error 
of law’ as it did not amount to an assumption that the mother’s status granted automatic 
entitlement to her child.108 Instead, the addition of ‘unless welfare demands’ ensured that the 
judgment was grounded in the child’s best interests. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of 
Appeal was clear in its statement that ‘the mother’s status provides no rights governing a 
residence application’.109  
 
Similarly, Re RO concerned a residence order application by a father following the death of the 
child’s mother.110 During the intervening period, the child had been cared for by a guardian. 
Here, Recorder Keehan QC, as then was, began with standard exposition of the law stating that 
the court was bound by section 1(1) CA meaning the child’s welfare must form the paramount 
consideration.111 However, unusually for these cases, he then stated that, were article 8(1) 
rights of the child conflict with those of the parent, the rights of the child prevail. This seems 
unusual in that, throughout the judgment, there is no mention of rights and the submissions of 
the various parties are firmly framed in the language of ‘interests’. It is, therefore, unclear as 
to why the judge thought it necessary to introduce this reference to the process required under 
article 8(2) ECHR when his disposal of the case makes no mention of such a process. 
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Interestingly, the trial judge introduced language that would, as per the previous example of 
Re B, lead to questions of compatibility with the previous line of established authorities. The 
judge stated that the child was ‘in desperate need of a mother... she needs a mother figure’ and 
that the benefit of this was stability.112 These comments were then followed by a welfare 
analysis that found the father wanting in terms of the emotional support he could provide given 
he was found to be partially motivated by a desire to acquire leave to remain in the jurisdiction. 
The rejection of the father’s application was made on the basis of applying the paramountcy 
principle and the finding of F’s welfare interests. This, to some extent, distances the decision 
from the finding that the child ‘required’ a mother figure but, as per Re B, seems to move 
towards language that invokes a presumption. 
 
The final judgment this thesis will examine is the 2015 Court of Appeal decision in Re E-R.113 
This was an appeal against the granting of a residence order in favour of the father which 
permitted some contact with the mother. At first instance, the trial judge instructed himself 
thusly: ‘There is a broad natural parent presumption in existence under our law and indeed 
commons sense would cause one to recognise that a young child will be better off in the care 
of a parent’.114 This led the judge to conclude that the argument in favour of the status quo was 
not strong enough to displace the proposition that the father as a capable parent should assume 
T’s care.115 This effectively casts the presumption as rebuttable so long as positive evidence is 
provided. Here, unsurprisingly, the Court of Appeal was brief in its analysis of the first instance 
decision. In a return to the orthodoxy, the court cited Baroness Hale in Re G and thereby 
confirmed application of the J v C model of the paramountcy principle.116 The court then 
further cited dicta from Re B confirming that a judge must centre their analysis around the best 
interests of a child. This is the totality of a court’s role in these cases.117 Given this construction 
of the law, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge had erred in stating there existed a 
presumption in favour of natural parents.118 The consequence of such a statement would be that 
the father is granted care of the child for being ‘capable’.119 
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In light of these contemporary authorities, it can be stated that domestic courts have followed 
the approach of the House of Lords in both Re G and Re B in subsequent section 8 CA 
applications. These cases highlight that a  J v C model of the paramountcy principle lies at the 
heart of the assessment a judge must undertake when conducting litigation concerning children. 
In this light, Herring and Powell have argued that presumptions have been ‘whittled away to 
vanishing point’.120 Despite the reference to article 8(1) rights in Re O, judges have 
continuously refused to cast parental interests as rights, as per direction in Re G, and have not 
engaged in balancing the various interests and rights granted domestic effect by the Human 
Rights Act 1998. As Harris-Short states: ‘Whilst recognising its [paramountcy] flaws, many 
family lawyers and judges remain deeply loyal to its basic premise’.121 Therefore, the 
conclusion to draw from these authorities is that the best interests of the child remain the key 
determinant within litigation concerning section 8 CA applications. 
 
However, interestingly, these authorities also evidence that, despite clear guidance from both 
Court of Appeal and Supreme Court, judges are increasingly willing to use language that would 
seem to tentatively indicate the privileging of parental interests. Evidently, if a judge were to 
state a presumption exists this would be overturned on appeal as per Re E-R. However, 
statements referring to the necessity of a ‘mother figure’ or how a child ought to live with a 
natural parent remain unchallenged.122 Such judgments will not be found to err in law if the 
paramountcy principle is invoked to justify granting the order. Thus, judges are able to make 
such comments so long as they are followed by the caveat that the child’s interests remain 
determinant. In this light, one may suggest that the paramountcy principle is used to mask 
certain problematic dicta in cases concerning the privileging of natural parents in section 8 CA 
applications. It is the assertion of this thesis that such a process need not occur if family courts 







120 Herring and Powell (n83) 556 
121 Harris-Short (n53) 347 
122 See Ro v A local authority and others [2013] EWHC B31 (Fam) and In the matter of B (a child) [2012] EWCA 
Civ 632 (emphasis added) 
 68 
Analysis of Recent Section 8 Order Applications 
 
The above analysis evidences the modern approach to the paramountcy principle in section 8 
applications as consisting of a purely welfare-based assessment. It evidenced a modest 
willingness to apply section 1(1) CA alongside rights-based reasoning but concluded that 
decisions are still determined via reference to the best interests of the child. However, this 
thesis does not posit that judges have completely rejected the influence of the HRA in domestic 
family litigation and, in recent cases, some judges have undertaken brief balancing exercises 
in terms of assessing the rights of parties. This is relevant to this chapter’s exposition of the 
paramountcy principle in that it suggests a modest shift away from the requirements inherent 
in the J v C model of application. It is the purpose of this section to analyse recent section 8 
CA order applications in order to fully update the academic commentary in this area. 
 
The first relevant case is Re H.123 This was an application to transfer the care of a child from 
mother to father. Here, Mr. Justice Keehan began with exposition of the relevant law by citing 
section 1(1) CA and, as per his analysis in Re O, stating that the article 8(1) rights of the child 
will prevail over those of the parents. This suggests a characterisation of the child’s interests 
as Convention rights. However, as per Re O, this was quickly followed by statements re-
emphasising the centrality of the paramountcy principle: ‘The test is, and must always be, based 
on a comprehensive analysis of the child’s welfare’ as dictated by reference to the section 1(3) 
CA welfare checklist.124 Therefore, the judge stated the only way in which these best interests 
could be met was via a section 8 order in favour of the father.  
 
However, as opposed to previous judgments, Mr. Justice Keehan felt it necessary to state: ‘I 
am satisfied that this order is a necessary and proportionate response to the situation’.125 This 
was after listing accounted in favour of granting the order in favour of the father including: the 
child had lived with his mother continuously, he was settled in school, he had lived in the 
Midlands previously and would therefore have to form new friendships upon moving to the 
South of England.126 In the language of rights, the latter aspects of this list would seem to exist 
as infringements to the child’s article 8(1) rights. Therefore, the judge seems to have sought to 
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justify these infringements by commenting on the support the child would receive from new 
family and the trauma caused by the status quo. This evidences a tentative move towards a 
rights-based discourse. However, it is important to remember that the judge did explicitly state 
the test must be based on application of the paramountcy principle. Therefore, as per the 
presumption cases, it appears other interests (or rights) are being considered in the formulation 
of a child’s best interests but are hidden behind classical exposition of the requirements 
inherent in applying section 1(1) CA. 
 
The language of rights being introduced into these judgments is again seen in Re G.127 
Concerning a section 8 application, the judge began analysis with section 1(1) CA and a basic 
statement of the paramountcy principle. However, following this the judge stated: ‘In addition 
to those statutory provisions the court must have regard to the article 8 rights of both parents 
and G and must endeavour to arrive at an outcome that is both proportionate and in G’s best 
interests’.128 This statement seems to hybridise a proportionality exercise and welfare-centred 
assessment of the child’s best interests. By stating it was the courts role to undertake both 
assessments, His Honour Judge Bellamy seemed to temper the narrow application of the 
paramountcy principle with a modest acknowledgment of the necessity for a proportionality 
exercise. However, presumably to satisfy the requirements of previous authorities rejecting 
such an approach, the judge cited Baroness Hale’s dicta in Re G, expressly approving J v C, 
and, therefore, rejected the characterisation of parental and children’s interests as rights.129 
Following these cases, it seems that, at best, the judicial approach is one of striving to achieve 
a balance between the narrow application of section 1(1) CA and requirements on the court in 
a post-HRA legal framework. As this and later chapters will make clear, the co-existence of 
these two approaches does not give rise to a genuinely Convention-compliant model of 
litigation. 
 
It appears an overstatement to argue that the courts have a tendency to engage with the process 
of balancing rights in section 8 order applications. Instead, it appears there exists differing 
practices amongst judges that leads to an element of inconsistency in terms of linguistic 
expression regarding the conflict of interests. For example, in G v M heard in 2019, discussion 
of the law pertaining to section 8 orders (and applications to bring those orders) contained no 
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reference to rights at all.130 Instead, His Honour Judge Ahmed simply cited section 1(1) CA 
and stated the interests of the child are paramount in these cases. Such an approach is further 
seen in Re G (2013) in which the paramountcy principle was characterised simply by reference 
to section 1(1) CA.131 As a consequence, cases that do cite requirements under the ECHR 
evidence only a modest shift towards normalising a rights-based discourse. Noticeably, even 
in cases where this is apparent, reference is made to the centrality of section 1(1) CA to justify 
the order on the best interests of the child. Therefore, whilst other considerations may now 
come into play during litigation, judges still feel bound to revert back to the paramountcy 
principle. This dictates the children’s interests are the only interests the court can account. 
 
Whilst, in 2006, Fortin was correct to state the courts rarely mentioned ECHR obligations in 
children’s litigation, contemporary evidence suggests that the position is now more nuanced.132 
The overall picture is one of inconsistency with some judges invoking rights-based reasoning 
in a justificatory process. Others, it appears, simply invoke section 1(1) CA as necessitating 
the child’s interests become the paramount consideration.  This forms what Fortin terms a 
‘judicial myopia’ in terms of accounting Convention rights in children’s litigation.133 Whilst 
this is true, this thesis points to the ‘hybridisation’ of a welfare and rights-based approach that 
detracts from the overall coherence of the law in this area. With some judges seemingly willing 
to apply deontological reasoning and others rejecting rights-based discussion in totality, 
judicial reasoning becomes hard to predict and appears without any theoretical basis. 
 
In terms of why some judges will tentatively apply a rights-based approach, it is apparent that 
the judicial discretion inherent in the making, varying and discharging of section 8 CA orders 
permits the expression of individual judicial personalities and permits a degree of flexibility in 
the construction of an order. Therefore, as long as a judge justifies the order by reference to the 
centrality of section 1(1) CA, they are able to modestly pursue rights-based reasoning whilst 
remaining protected from appeal. The paramountcy principle would, therefore, appear to 
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Taxonomic Analysis of Section 1(1) CA   
 
Following findings relating to the marginalisation of parental interests insofar as they do not 
weigh on the best interests of the child, this section will now evidence how such an 
interpretation of the paramountcy principle does not mirror how a legal principle ought to be 
applied in the Dworkinian sense. Importantly, this thesis has drawn attention to the entrenched 
judicial practice of applying section 1(1) CA as the paramountcy principle. This mirrors Law 
Commission and Parliamentary intent as expressed before adoption of the Children Act 1989. 





As stated in Chapter One of this thesis, Dworkin defined a principle as a standard to be 
observed as required by morality.134 Such principles operate in a manner distinct from rules in 
that they do not necessitate automatic legal consequences as a result of their invocation.135 
Therefore, judges are merely bound to account for the principle in their exercise of weak 
discretion. Given the inevitability of these principles conflicting with each other, Dworkin 
provided them with an element of weight. As these principles will always require further 
interpretation in their application, they are central to forming Dworkin’s theory of weak 
discretion. 
  
In contrast to this, Dworkin characterised a rule as applying in an all or nothing fashion.136 
Here, Dworkin employs a baseball analogy as a means of describing their operation. A referee 
cannot acknowledge a rule of Baseball as being ‘three strikes and out’ before proceeding to not 
apply the rule consistently. If he does not apply this standard it is not a valid rule of the game. 
Therefore, a rule necessitates binding legal consequences that the official cannot ignore without 
ceding that the rule is not valid in that situation.  
 
Here, it is important to recall the central tenants of Dworkin’s theory of weak discretion. For 
Dworkin, discretion is characterised negatively in that it occupies the area encircled by a belt 
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of legal rules and principles that exist in a legal system; the domestic corpus of law. In the 
exercise of interpretation during a novel case, a judge cannot be said to possess strong 
discretion in that they are constantly guided by principles of the legal system. These principles 
structure judicial discretion given interpretation occurs within the existing framework of a legal 
system. 
 
The Application of Section 1(1) CA as a Rule 
 
In the light of this, it is ironic that the paramountcy principle is termed a ‘principle’ in law. It 
is the contention of this thesis that, instead of operating as a principle in the Dworkinian sense, 
the paramountcy principle has been applied as a rule in the context of section 8 CA order 
applications. This new line of criticism has been briefly acknowledged by Choudhry and 
Fenwick in their contention that: ‘the Welfare Principle has been elevated to the status of a rule 
that determines the outcome of such [welfare] applications’.137 Indirectly, they seem to equate 
the paramountcy principle to a Dworkinian rule in that the language of determination mirrors 
the automatic legal consequences necessitated following a rules application. Indeed, as 
evidenced by previous analysis of Law Commission Reports and Parliamentary debates, 
Choudhry and Fenwick’s classification of the paramountcy principle as a rule seems to enjoy 
historical precedent.138 In these documents, the conflation of ‘principle’ and ‘rule’ is 
widespread and used without regard to practical implications. This is further evidenced in 
Cretney’s work where he refers to the paramountcy rule and welfare principle 
interchangeably.139 This thesis argues that this conflation has very real practical consequences 
for the manner in which the paramountcy principle is applied in domestic law if viewed through 
the prism of Dworkinian jurisprudence. The lack of precision surrounding the terms principle 
and rule reflects the paucity of focus on legal theory by academics who have treated theory and 
practice as two separate enquires. 
 
Contrasting Dworkin’s account of a legal principle with the prevailing application of the 
paramountcy principle, it seems difficult to formulate an argument whereby the two can be 
reconciled. Beginning with the question of necessitating a legal result, it is clear that application 
of the paramountcy principle results in the automatic legal consequence of the child’s welfare 
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becoming the sole consideration of the court. This creates a judicial starting point that de-
prioritises the interests of others unless these can be shown to be directly impinging the welfare 
of the child.140 This is despite the fact that judges have undertaken a modest shift towards 
considering the rights of others in a deontological framework. Such an approach is necessitated 
by the domestic construction of the relationship between section 1(1) CA and article 8 ECHR 
as will be discussed in Chapter Three of this thesis. Here, it will be suggested that there is case 
law showing erroneous interpretation of Strasbourg jurisprudence and that judges have 
behaved as though the HRA had no impact on litigation concerning children. 
 
If the previously analysed presumption cases are examined, language that seems to indicate 
automatic legal consequences is evident in the Re G judgment. For example, Baroness Hale 
states: ‘J v C is the plain exposition of the law in that the child’s welfare dictates the issuing of 
an order’.141 This is subsequently developed in Re B through dicta that states the effect of the 
paramountcy principle is that the role of a judge is limited to determining the best interests of 
the child.142 Therefore, once the paramountcy principle is applied in these section 8 
applications, it follows that the child’s welfare interests are the sole consideration of the court. 
Logically the interests of parents and other parties are automatically deprioritised and the 
interests of the child assume a determinant position.  
 
Consideration must then shift to whether the paramountcy principle can be said to enjoy any 
element of weight in domestic law. Given the exposition above, it would seem not.  If a section 
8 CA order is sought, recourse to section 1(1) CA is mandated via section 1(4) CA. In the rare 
circumstances in which a court will attempt to identify the article 8(1) rights of the adults and 
the interests of the child independently, any order is still justified by reference to the best 
interests of the child. The question then becomes not whether but how to give effect to the best 
interests of the child through a welfare test. Seemingly, in domestic law, the only way to temper 
the effects of the paramountcy principle is for a parent to align their own interests alongside 
those of the child or to hope that an individual judge gives effect to other interests in a welfare 
analysis. The ways in which judges have done this are inconsistent and have been shown to 
create theoretical and practical confusion in section 8 applications. Therefore, the current 
 
140 Fortin (n132) 8 
141 Re G (n88) [44] 
142 Re B (n81) [20] 
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judicial interpretation of the paramountcy principle cannot be said to possess an element of 
weight.  
 
With its current application, it appears the paramountcy principle constitutes more a ‘rule’ than 
‘principle’. Whilst applying the paramountcy principle cannot bind a judge to reach a certain 
factual decision, given the diverse range of factual matrixes the courts are presented with, it 
binds the judge to a certain interpretive process that requires the automatic de-prioritisation of 
parental interests and prioritisation of a child’s best interests. Instead of the child’s interests 
becoming a consideration amongst multiple factors, the court is bound in its interpretation of 
the welfare checklist to consider the interests of the child in complete isolation. Therefore, this 
thesis argues that to term the paramountcy principle a ‘principle’ is misleading given its current 
application. Instead, as will be shown in the following chapters, section 1(1) CA requires 
reinterpretation in light of this new critique to ensure its application as a genuine legal principle.  
 
The Impact on Dworkinian Weak Discretion  
 
Given this thesis will utilise a Dworkinian critique to inform reinterpretation of section 1(1) 
CA, it is important to briefly consider the effect of the paramountcy principle’s misapplication 
on Dworkin’s theory of weak discretion. As identified in Chapter One, there is a distinction 
between ‘structuring’ and ‘confining’ discretion. As Davis argues, the confinement of 
discretion involves the creating an express limitation on a judge’s ability to employ 
discretionary judgement.143 This thesis has sought to avoid such a conception and has instead 
sought to structure discretion in a wider framework of rules and principles. This speaks more 
to balancing the continuing struggle between rules and discretion whilst recognising and 
appreciating the need for both in a functioning legal system.144  
 
If the Dworkinian negative conception is adopted, discretion is ‘the ‘hole in the donut’ or area 
of legal indeterminacy surrounded by the belt of rules and principles that guides judicial 
interpretation.145 Taxonomically, the paramountcy ‘principle’ should lie in this belt and guide 
the operation of judicial interpretation in the process of making, varying or discharging a 
 
143 K.C Davis, Discretionary justice: A preliminary Enquiry, (1st edition, 1977, University of Illinois Press) 
144 See Carl Schneider, ‘The tension between rules and discretion in family law: a report and reflection’ (1993) 
27 FLQ 232 
145 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Is law a system of rules?’, in The philosophy of law (1st edition, 1977, OUP) 52 
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section 8 CA application. The principle should guide the operation of judicial discretion and 
become part of a wider web of considerations during the process of choosing the right 
interpretation of the law.  
 
Therefore, it is evident the findings of this Chapter have a marked impact on how judicial 
discretion operates in litigation. In the context of a section 8 child arrangements application, 
judges applying the paramountcy principle enjoy only one legitimate interpretive avenue. This 
is to give effect to the best interests of the child. At the moment, on analysis of the 
contemporary jurisprudence in this Chapter, competing interpretations, such as giving effect to 
rights obligations under the ECHR, are subsumed by the paramountcy principle. The fact that 
section 1(1) CA enjoys no element of weight obscures the process of weak discretion so 
important to the Dworkinian lens utilised in this thesis. The prevailing interpretation of the 
paramountcy principle does not seem an attempt to ‘structure’ discretion but an attempt to 
‘confine’ it. Here, a bright-line rule is formed that creates a boundary past which the family 
judge cannot exercise discretion; once section 1(1) CA is found to apply in a case, a judge is 
bound to give effect to the best interests of the child no matter what competing considerations 
exist. As Chapter Four will evidence, this leads to situations whereby judges manipulate the 
facts of cases to prevent section 1(1) CA applying and thereby retain the discretion required to 
balance the various interests of litigants.146 Without doing so, a judge’s hands are ‘completely 
tied’ to a certain interpretation as the result of a singular rule dominating the discretionary area 
characterised as discretion.147 This is not the way in which a Dworkinian model of discretion 





This Chapter has analysed the domestic application of the paramountcy principle and advanced 
its current misapplication as a legal rule. Cases used to highlight this reveal the practical impact 
and deficiencies of characterising the paramountcy principle as a rule. Given application as 
such, domestic judges are automatically bound to a starting point that places the interests of 
the child as the only consideration in the issuing of an order. As such, the rights of others escape 
 
146 Such a criticism will be developed within Chapter Four and discussion of Re S (A child) (identification: 
restrictions on publication) [2003] EWCA Civ 963 [1] 
147 Eekelaar (n63) 1 
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rigorous assessment by the court. Therefore, it is no surprise that judges refuse to engage with 
balancing rights since a rule cannot be balanced; it applies or is set aside.  
 
This thesis argues that the courts cannot begin to adopt a deontological approach to section 
1(1) CA until this fundamental mischaracterisation is explicitly recognised. Therefore, this 
thesis identifies a critique that has, until now, remained unexplored because of the paucity of 
juristic analysis in this field. Rather than starting with the practical application of the 
paramountcy principle, as other academics have, this thesis has traced the taxonomy of a 
principle back to Dworkin. By exposing the application of the paramountcy principle as a rule, 
the inevitability of the court’s refusal to engage with rights, and recognise the interests of 
others, is evidenced.  
 
It is argued that if the paramountcy principle is applied as a principle ought, this brings the 
Family Division closer to a model of litigation that is Convention-compliant. It is to this 
question of achieving compliance that this thesis will now turn. Chapter Three will analyse the 
relationship between section 1(1) CA and Article 8 ECHR from both the perspective of the 
ECtHR and domestic courts. This will suggest manifest non-compliance with obligations in a 
post-HRA legal framework. The reinterpretation required to remedy this will take into account 
not only traditional considerations but also the findings of this Chapter and impact of a 












































Assessing the Paramountcy Principle’s Compliance with Rights Obligations at the 
ECHR and Domestic Level 
 
Under section 2 HRA, domestic courts are required to take into account Strasbourg 
jurisprudence when conducting litigation engaging Convention rights. It has already been 
shown that, in the practice of determining section 8 CA applications, the courts will adopt a J 
v C model of the paramountcy principle in that the child’s best interests are determinative on a 
judge in granting an order. This Chapter will compare this position to the approach under 
relevant ECtHR jurisprudence. Here, it is important to clarify that this Chapter will not examine 
the domestic operation of the paramountcy principle but will instead focus on the perceived 
relationship between section 1(1) CA and article 8 ECHR. This will be analysed from the 
perspective of both the Strasbourg and domestic courts. In the context of section 8 CA 
applications, this relationship differs depending on whether the Strasbourg or domestic court 
is delivering judgment. For the Strasbourg court, the requirements of article 8(1) and 8(2) must 
be met before any privileged status can be attached to the interests of the child. For domestic 
courts, the interests of the child assume a paramount status automatically as a result of a judge 
applying section 1(1) CA. 
 
Chapter Three will seek to contextualise domestic unwillingness to adopt a rights-based 
discourse via reference to ECtHR jurisprudence on the weighting of children’s interests in an 
article 8(2) balancing exercise. It will highlight that the ECtHR has not accepted the 
paramountcy principle as compatible with article 8 ECHR. It will then move to analysing the 
domestic interpretation of the Strasbourg case-law in a post HRA legal system. This case-law 
will be analysed to suggest an inaccurate interpretation of the ECtHR position on the part of 
domestic courts.1 It will be argued that, instead of engaging with Convention rights, the 
domestic judiciary have simply reconfigured section 1(1) CA to justify non-compliance with 
requirements under the ECtHR jurisprudence. Upon analysis of the domestic relationship 
between article 8 and section 1(1) CA, this thesis will propose that the paramountcy principle 
now forms an automatic justification under article 8(2) when the rights of adult and child clash.  
 
1 David Bonner, Helen Fenwick and Sonia Harris-Short, ‘Judicial approaches to the HRA’ (2003) 52 ICLQ 580 
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At this preliminary stage, it is important to note that the Strasbourg jurisprudence exists against 
a backdrop of varying standards of child welfare in contracting states. Therefore, other states 
do not adopt a ‘paramountcy principle’ as understood in England and Wales. Instead, they have 
their own domestic approaches that are compliant with the Strasbourg regime. In this sense, 
the findings of this Chapter indicate that domestic model of paramountcy exists as an outlier 
in that it is inconsistent with Strasbourg jurisprudence. The exact content of other contracting 
states legislation pertaining to the welfare of the child lies beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
 
Basic Structure of Rights Claims Brought under the ECHR 
 
Before engaging with the relevant ECtHR jurisprudence, the basic structure of claims brought 
under the ECHR will be analysed. This will be divided into two sections. Firstly, this thesis 
will provide analysis of the qualified article 8(1) Convention right itself. Secondly, it will 
engage with domestic statutory provisions granting domestic enforceability in the form of  
various provisions found in the HRA 1998. 
 
Whilst an exhaustive analysis of Convention rights lies outside the scope of this thesis, a broad 
outline of how a claim engaging qualified Convention rights would be assessed by a court is 
of utility. The Convention right explicitly relevant to this thesis is article 8(1) ECHR. 
Importantly, article 8(1) is termed a materially qualified right in that its application is 
dependent on balancing the rights of the individual against the interests of wider society.2 
Article 8(1) ECHR enshrines the right to respect for private and family life and can be divided 
into two composite sections. Section 8(1) ECHR contains the positive right therein; ‘everyone 
has the right to respect for his private and family life’. It is important to note that article 8(1) 
imports a right to respect for family life. Therefore, the respect owed to various aspects of 
family life will vary from state to state depending on national practices.3 Again, this is 
indicative of varying national formulations of the balance struck between a child’s welfare 
interests and rights of the adult.  
 
 
2 Jane Fortin, ‘International Children’s rights’, in J Fortin, Children’s rights and the developing law, (3rd edition, 
CUP, 2012) 58 
3 Helen Fenwick, ‘Selected key substantive articles and ECHR doctrines’ in Helen Fenwick, Gavin Philipson, 
Alexander Williams, ‘Text, cases and materials on public law and human rights’, (4th edition, OUP, 2015) 284 
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Article 8(2) reflects the fact that article 8(1) rights are materially qualified: ‘there shall be no 
interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as in accordance 
with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security…’.4 
Therefore, the article 8(1) right to respect for private and family life can be infringed if the 
limitation fulfils three composite requirements: accordance with the law, required to meet a 
legitimate objective and necessary in a democratic society. The implication inherent in 
qualified rights is that the court must balance their application against the competing rights of 
other parties. This balancing of interests is of crucial importance to this Chapter given it forms 
the crux of domestic non-compliance with requirements under the ECHR. 
 
As Fortin states, in children’s litigation, the requirements pertaining to accordance with the law 
and legitimate objective are usually prima facie established given the national court will have 
acted under a statutory framework motivated by maximising the best interests of the child.5 
This legislation will take various forms in differing contracting states. However, the 
requirement of necessity is more demanding in that the restriction must be both relevant to the 
aim pursued and the minimum action required to secure the pressing social need. This is known 
as the doctrine of proportionality.6 Therefore, the action taken by the state must be logically 
connected to the aim pursued and cannot go further than is needed to achieve this.7 The ECtHR 
has been clear in that if a less intrusive method of infringing the right is available it should be 
pursued. Given this, there is a proportionate relationship between the level of interference and 
justification provided by the state.8 
 
When undertaking the process required under the doctrine of necessity, the ECtHR will give 
effect to the margin of appreciation doctrine. This reflects the notion that primary responsibility 
for rights protection lies with member states given the Strasbourg court is a secondary body of 
rights review.9 Thus, in recognising divergent practices in members states, the Strasbourg court 
has stated:  
 
 
4 Article 8(2) ECHR 
5 Fortin, ‘International Children’s rights’ (n2) 59 
6 See Olsson v Sweden (application no. 10465/83) [1992] ECHR 75 
7 Fenwick, ‘Selected key substantive articles and ECHR (n3) 301 
8 Fortin, ‘International Children’s rights’ (n2) 60 
9 Roger Masterman, ‘Section 2(1) of the HRA 1998: binding domestic courts to Strasbourg?’ (2004) Win PL 
728 
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it is not possible to find in the domestic law of the contracting states a uniform 
conception of morals…. [by virtue of this] state authorities are in a better place than the 
international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of these requirements as well 
as on the necessity of a restriction intended to meet them.10  
 
The margin of appreciation accepts that member states will adopt different methods of 
implementing certain qualified Convention rights based on national conceptions of morality.11 
The ECtHR thus affords a degree of discretion in the interpretation and application of 
Convention rights which will narrow/widen dependent on the severity of the alleged breach 
and justification relied on by the state.12 The Convention, therefore, forms an ‘irreducible 
minimum’ that falls to interpretation and development by members states in a manner 
compatible with domestic practice.13 
 
This permits states to go further than strictly required under the Convention. For example, the 
UK legalised same-sex marriage under the Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act 2013. This goes 
further than is required under article 12 ECHR guaranteeing the right to marry and found a 
family. This right was interpreted conservatively by the ECtHR in Schalk and Kopf v Austria 
in which the court found that the terminology of man and woman was deliberate and could not 
legitimately be interpreted as including ‘everyone’, thereby excluding same-sex couples.14 This 
judgment was predicated on the lack of consensus across Europe regarding same-sex marriage 
and thus a wide margin of appreciation was afforded to the member state. Despite this, the UK 
legalised same-sex marriage in 2013. 
 
Whilst the ECtHR has traditionally afforded a wide margin of appreciation in private family 
disputes, Harris-Short identifies an increasingly interventionist position in the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence.15 Such a position was identified in Gorgulu v Germany in which the court, after 
acknowledging the margin of appreciation is dependent on the nature and severity of the 
 
10 Handyside v UK (1979-1980) 1 E.H.R.R. 737, [48] 
11 Franz Matcher, ‘Methods of interpretation of the convention’, in Franz Matcher, Ronald Macdonald, Herbert 
Petzold, ‘The European system for the protection of Human Rights’, (1st edition, Brill, 1999) 
12 K v Finland (2001) 31 E.H.R.R 18, [166] 
13 Jack Beatson, Peter Duffy and Stephen Grosz, The 1998 Act and the European Convention, (1st edition, Sweet 
and Maxwell, 2000) 20 
14 Schalk and Kopf v Austria (application no.30141/04) [2012] 1 WLUK 255 
15 Sonia Harris-Short, ‘Family law and the HRA 1998: Judicial restraint or revolution?’ in Helen Fenwick, Gavin 
Philipson and Roger Masterman, ‘Judicial reasoning under the UK Human Rights Act’, (1st edition, CUP, 2007) 
361 
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interests at stake, held stricter scrutiny is required for limitations going beyond simple custody 
arrangements.16 Therefore, when authorities restrict the contact rights of parents, resulting in 
the curtailing of the enjoyment of family life, the court will narrow the margin of appreciation 
and conduct strict review into the rights determination of the national court.17 Such 
considerations are significant for this thesis in that, as will become clear, the domestic 
interpretation of section 1(1) CA is inconsistent with ECtHR jurisprudence. If this were to be 
challenged at ECtHR level, the stringency of review would be dependent on the margin of 
appreciation afforded to the member state. As Short has argued, this margin seems to be 
narrowing.18  
 
Substantive rights contained in the ECHR are granted domestic effect by the HRA 1998. Upon 
litigants invoking a Convention right, the courts must read, insofar as possible, primary and 
subordinate legislation in a manner compatible with Convention rights.19 In doing so, section 
2(1) HRA mandates the court to have regard to jurisprudence of the ECtHR. As Masterman 
states, the construction of section 2 HRA, mandating courts to ‘take into account’ Strasbourg 
jurisprudence, permits a ‘more generous’ domestic interpretation regarding the scope of 
Convention rights.20 Here, where the Strasbourg position is ‘clear and constant’, domestic 
courts are obliged to take the jurisprudence into account insofar as it is relevant to the instant 
case.21 Such an approach was approved by Lord Bingham in Anderson in which he stated:  
 
‘the duty under section 2(1) HRA is to take into account judgments of the ECtHR which 
are not strictly binding, the House will not without good reason depart from the 
principles laid down in a judgment of the European court’.22 
 
This latter formulation affords the court greater discretion in accounting for the Strasbourg 
position as it speaks of following ‘principles’ as opposed to jurisprudence.23 This seems to 
 
16 Gorgulu v Germany (application No.74969/01) [2004] 1 FCR 410 [41] 
17 Schneider v Germany (application No.17080/07) [2012] 54 E.H.R.R. 12 [94] 
18 Harris-Short, (n15) 361 
19 s3(1) Human Rights Act 1998 
20 Roger Masterman, ‘The status of the Strasbourg jurisprudence in domestic law’, in Helen Fenwick, Gavin 
Philipson and Roger Masterman, Judicial reasoning under the UK Human Rights Act, (1st edition, CUP, 2007) 
58 
21 R (on the application of Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport 
and Regions’ [2001]  UKHL 23 [26] 
22 R (on the application of Anderson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] UKHL 46 [18] 
23 Masterman (n9) 728 
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accord closely with the position of the ECtHR regarding the binding nature of its own 
jurisprudence. Whilst the Strasbourg court has no equivalent of the domestic system of 
precedent, it has made clear that it is in the interests of legal certainty and equality that national 
courts should not depart without good reason.24 Therefore, for domestic courts, if Convention 
rights are engaged, a judge is bound to follow any clear and consistent jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR unless there is good reason to not do so. As this thesis will argue, the domestic courts 
have not adequately achieved this in relation to the Strasbourg position on the paramountcy 
principle. 
 
Section 3 HRA places an interpretive obligation on the court to read and give effect to domestic 
legislation in a manner that is compatible with Convention rights. Given section 6 HRA dictates 
that the court as a public authority must act in a convention compliant manner in any case 
concerning ECHR rights, a judge is under an obligation to interpret domestic legislation in a 
compliant manner insofar as possible. If such compatible interpretation is not possible, courts 
are empowered to issue a section 4 Declaration of Incompatibility. These declarations, raised 
in proceedings in which a court determines whether a provision of primary legislation is 
compatible with a Convention right, are issued only when the court is satisfied the legislation 
is incompatible with the ECHR right. Importantly, these declarations do not affect the 




The Jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court 
  
It is important to note that the ECHR does not specifically provide for children’s rights 
protection. This non-engagement with children’s rights is indicative of the ECHR’s focus on 
first generation, i.e. civil and political, rights. Typically, these are viewed as ‘negative’ rights 
in that a state is to refrain from infringing the individual’s right to participate in the 
community.26 As a result, the ECHR contains few child-specific references because it is 
unlikely that the right to freedom of speech, assembly and political participation would apply 
 
24 Goodwin v UK [2002] 35 E.H.R.R 18 [74] 
25 s4(6)(a) HRA 
26 Fausto Pocar, ‘Some thoughts on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the ‘generations of rights’, 
(2015) 10 IHRLR 43  
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to a minor. In contrast, subsequent rights Conventions, such as the UNCRC, are considered 
‘second generation’ in that they require positive action from the state in their enactment. This 
is evident in article 3(1) UNCRC dictating that the interests of the child are to be the ‘primary 
consideration’ for states. Such treaties, allow states to ‘children’s rights-proof’ domestic law 
against consistent international standards.27 Indeed, the UNCRC currently has 194 state 
signatories making it the most widely ratified Human Rights treaty in history.28 It is these 
subsequent documents, applying enumerated human rights norms to specific groups, that grant 
children’s rights an ‘international dimension which is difficult for national governments to 
ignore’.29 However, such international rights treaties enjoy a lesser degree of enforceability in 
a dualist system, such as the UK, in which the treaty must be incorporated into domestic law. 
It is for this reason that this thesis’ focus lies with the ECHR granted domestic effect by the 
HRA. 
 
Whilst the ECHR fails to offer ‘even the most basic [explicit] recognition of the child’, it is 
inaccurate to state it provides no basis for such protection.30 The Convention does offer a 
system of petition, open to citizens of member states, to challenge alleged rights infringements 
and this procedure is available to both children and individuals who claim on their behalf. 
Furthermore, although the ECHR is not specifically designed for application to children, the 
Strasbourg Court has utilised both the ECHR and subsequent international Conventions to 
develop a significant volume of jurisprudence pertaining explicitly to children’s rights.31 Such 
jurisprudence relies on interpretation of the Convention as a ‘living instrument’ and as a list of 
abstract rights the individual holds against the state that is capable of development according 
to societal and moral developments unforeseen at the time of drafting.32 This reflects the 
potential of the ECHR to develop according to a children’s rights agenda to account for the 
limited focus of the Convention itself.33  
 
 
27 Ursula Kilkelly and Laura Lundy, ‘Children’s rights in action: using the UNCRC as an auditing tool’ (2006) 
331 CFLQ 32 
28 Susan Bissell, ‘Overview and Implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (2006) 25 
The Lancet 689 
29 Fortin, ‘International Children’s rights’ (n2) 34 
30 Ursula Kilkelly, The Child and the European Convention on Human Rights, (2nd edition, Routledge, 2016) 4 
(emphasis added) 
31 Conor O’Mahony, ‘Child protection and the ECHR’ (2019) 27 ICJR 662 
32 George Letsas, ‘The ECHR as a living instrument: its meaning and legitimacy’, in Andreas Follesdal, Birgit 
Peters and Geir Ulfstein, ‘Constituting Europe, The ECtHR in a National, European and Global context’, (1st 
edition, CUP, 2013) 106 
33 Ursula Kilkelly, ‘Protecting children’s rights under the ECHR’ (2010) 61 NILQ 247 
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In achieving this recognition for the status of children, academics point to the theoretical value 
of both article 1 and 14 ECHR.34 Here, article 1 provides that the rights contained in the 
Convention apply to everyone, including children, whilst article 14 states that Convention 
rights will be secured without discrimination. Therefore, both of these article could, 
theoretically, be used to secure recognition of children’s rights. This said, these articles have 
rarely been raised in actual litigation concerning application of the Convention to a child. 
Instead, the ECtHR has developed its jurisprudence via reference to article 8 and the child’s 
right to respect for family life. For the purposes of this thesis, article 8 has been utilised in 
seeking to compensate for the lack of a comparable provision to section 1(1) CA in the ECHR 
itself. As a result, there is no initial privileging binding the ECtHR that dictates the balance to 
be struck between an adult and a child’s rights.35 Consequently, the ECtHR has developed its 
own approach to balancing a child’s best interests and the article 8(1) rights of the adult. In 
finding this balance, the jurisprudence of the court can be divided into composite approaches.  
 
As Fortin argues, the ECtHR position on reviewing the decisions of national courts in cases 
involving the paramountcy principle, or (more usually) domestic equivalents, has suffered from 
an inconsistency of approach. Whilst Fortin’s argument has developed from 1999, immediately 
following domestic adoption of the HRA,36 she maintains that the Strasbourg court has, at best, 
adopted an ad-hoc approach to the question of the continued compatibility of section 1(1) CA 
with the ECHR regime.37 
 
Johansen v Norway and the Balancing of Rights under Article 8(2) 
 
Johansen v Norway represents the orthodox exposition of the obligation on national courts to 
undertake a balancing exercise under article 8(2) when resolving conflicts between the best 
interests of children and the rights of adults.38 The case concerned an appeal by the applicant 
mother against an adoption order granted in relation to her child by the Norwegian authorities. 
Here, the mother was 17 when she gave birth and lived with an abusive partner. Her child was 
 
34 Kilkelly, ‘The child and the European Convention on Human Rights (n30) 12 
35 Fortin, ‘International Children’s rights’ (n2) emphasis added 
36 Jane Fortin, ‘Rights brought home for children’, (1999) 62 MLR 350. Here Fortin argued the rights-based 
regime would merely result in the amalgamation of the rights and interests of parent and child. 
37 Jane Fortin, ‘A decade of the Human Rights Act and children’s rights’, (2011) 176 FL 1 
38 Johansen v Norway (application no. 17383/90) [1997] 23 E.H.R.R. 33 
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taken into care at 12 and, shortly after, she gave birth to a second child. This child was removed 
as the national authorities concluded she was unable to meet the child’s welfare requirements.  
 
In rejecting the mother’s application, the ECtHR provided significant guidance on the process 
domestic courts should follow when undertaking an article 8(2) balancing exercise. Here, the 
court stated the oft-cited principle of law: ‘In this regard [taking a child into care] a fair balance 
has to be struck between the interests of the child in remaining in public care and those of the 
parent in being reunited with the child’.39 Therefore, domestic courts are charged with 
balancing the qualified article 8(1) rights of various parties in order to establish whether the 
infringement was justified. In order to resolve tension between competing rights, the court 
stated: ‘In carrying out this balancing exercise, the Court will attach particular importance to 
the best interests of the child, which, depending on their nature and seriousness, may override 
those [rights] of the parent.’40  
 
Therefore, when faced with a child’s interests interfering with the article 8(1) rights of the 
parent, a domestic court must balance the interests of the child against the rights of the parent 
under article 8(2). Rather than the child’s interests forming the paramount consideration in 
such a process, as the national government argued, they hold particular importance and, 
depending on their nature and severity, may justify overriding the rights of the parent.41 It is in 
this light that Fortin described the court’s ruling in Johansen as ‘skilful compensation’ for the 
absence of a best interest’s formula in the ECHR itself.42  
 
However, it is important to view Johansen v Norway as part of a continuing effort by national 
authorities to achieve recognition of a paramountcy principle-style provision at ECtHR level.43 
Indeed, Johansen itself was heard subsequently to other significant rulings. In 1992, Olsson v 
Sweden established that the interests of the child must be respected alongside other individual 
article 8(1) rights in an article 8(2) exercise.44 The court stated: ‘the rights and freedoms of all 
concerned must be taken into account, notably the children’s interests and their rights under 
 
39 ibid [78]  
40 ibid (emphasis added) 
41 For the national authorities’ submissions as to the national equivalent of the paramountcy principle see ibid [76]  
42 Fortin, ‘International Children’s rights’ (n2) 70 (emphasis added) 
43 Stephen Gilmore and Lisa Glennon, Hayes and Williams’ Family Law, (6th edition, 2018, OUP) 481 
44 Olsson v Sweden (n6). See Heather Swindells, ‘Family law post the Human Rights Act 1998’, in Stephen 
Cretney, ‘Essays for the new millennium’, (1st edition, Jordan publishing, 2000) 63 (emphasis added) 
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article 8 of the Convention’.45 Subsequently, in Hokkanen v Finland, the court stated that: ‘the 
interests as well as rights and freedoms of all concerned must be accounted, and more 
particularly, the best interests of the child and their rights under article 8.46 Placing Johansen 
in this continuum, the finding that children’s interests occupy a particular place in the balancing 
exercise under article 8(2) seems a logical development from Hokkanen and Olsson. 
 
Importantly, the approach in these cases stops short of characterising the child’s interests as 
paramount in their own right. As Probert states, the most once can take from Johansen is that 
the interests of the child may override the article 8(1) rights of the parent dependent on the 
circumstances. This judgement is one for national courts to make.47 Additionally, the rights of 
the child are not cast as independent but as qualifications to the article 8(1) rights of the parent. 
Therefore, the child’s substantive rights were rarely independently formulated. Instead, they 
were analysed only in terms of an article 8(2) exercise and, therefore, as a means of justifying 
any rights infringement brought by the parent. 
 
It is important to provide some context into the type of litigation this Chapter will analyse. 
Johansen formed a public law challenge to an adoption order issued by the Norwegian 
authorities. As such, the proceedings naturally contained heavily context specific 
considerations such as the degree to which state interference was required in those 
circumstances given the issuing of the order resulted in the removal of the child from the 
mother’s care. Therefore, it is unsurprising that the Strasbourg court spoke in the language of 
conditionality resulting in a finding that the child’s interests override dependent on their 
severity. Such litigation is contrasted to the private law focus of this thesis. Such private contact 
cases do not sit as comfortably in the traditional ‘individual v state’ paradigm and instead 
concern a horizontal relationship between the parties. It is, therefore, unsurprising that 
litigation raising questions of law posed by the ECHR have, thus far, occurred predominantly 
in the field of public law. Comparatively, few private family law cases reach the Court of 
Appeal or Supreme Court and, even when this is the case, litigation has rarely considered 
questions of law linked to the ECHR. For example, Re B, one of the last major private child 
law cases to reach the Supreme Court, re-emphasised the centrality of section 1(1) CA to a 
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welfare assessment without confronting its relationship with article 8 ECHR.48 Therefore, in 
the context of private law disputes, it is perhaps unsurprising that lower courts have failed to 
come to grips with requirements under both the ECHR and ECtHR jurisprudence if, as this 
Chapter will show, they are largely ignored by appellate courts. 
 
Subsequent Application of Johansen v Norway 
 
The ECtHR has cited Johansen subsequently as authority for the requirement of  balancing the 
rights and interests between parent and child under article 8(2). However, the weight attached 
to the interests of the child has received linguistic development that has established the ‘ad-
hoc’ approach which Fortin identified.49 There are multiple instances of dicta from Johansen 
being cited as authority for the balancing exercise under article 8(2). One such example is K v 
Finland in which the court stated: ‘In this regard, a fair balance has to be struck between the 
interests of the child… and those of the parent. In carrying out this balancing exercise, the 
Court will attach particular importance to the best interests of the child, which may override 
those of the parent’.50  
 
Such a formulation of the balancing exercise is evident in several other ECtHR cases from this 
period. In Hoppe v Germany, the ECtHR stated consideration of the child’s best interests was 
of ‘crucial importance but that a ‘fair balance must be struck between those interests and the 
rights of the parents’.51 Therefore, the best interests of the child may override the rights of the 
parent’s dependent on their nature and severity.52 Similar dicta can be found in Gorgulu v 
Germany in which the German Court of Appeal was found to err in its approach to article 8(2) 
in finding that denying the father contact with his child was justified in law but not necessary 
in a democratic society.53 This was because the national court had not considered the long-term 
impact of denying the child a meaningful relationship with the father. Similarly, Suss v 
Germany evidences a direct reference to the dicta in Johansen  in that the court held a fair 
balance had to be struck between the rights and interests of the litigants and, in this process, 
importance had to be attached to the best interests of the child.54 These cases seem to evidence 
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a straightforward repetition of the Johansen formulation and are significant in that they suggest 
a degree of consistency surrounding the weight to be attributed to a child’s interests in an article 
8(2) balancing exercise. Here children’s interests have the potential to displace the rights of 
parents dependent on a factual assessment of their nature and severity. 
 
In his discussion of the developing jurisprudence of the court in this period, Eekelaar points to 
Elsholz v Germany as succinctly summarising the Grand Chamber’s approach to the best 
interests of the child.55 Elsholz formed a challenge brought by an unmarried father who resided 
with his child and partner for a period of two years.56 Following relationship breakdown, he 
continued to see the child for another three years but this was ended on the basis of the child’s 
wishes. The father applied to the national courts for a contact order which was granted on the 
basis of a welfare assessment. Given the national court held that contact was not in the best 
interests of the child it refused to grant the order. 
 
The Strasbourg court found there had been an infringement of the father’s article 8(1) rights. 
Nevertheless, under an article 8(2) analysis, the court found that the breach was in accordance 
with the law and pursued the aim of protecting the child.57 The court was unwilling to grant a 
wide margin of appreciation in its analysis given the national measure went beyond merely 
limiting the child’s time with the father and, instead, resulted in the complete severance of 
contact from the father’s life.58 Citing Johansen, the court stated that a fair balance of the rights 
of the litigants had to be undertaken with particular regard being paid to the best interests of 
the child.59 Owing to the narrow margin of appreciation afforded, the Grand Chamber found 
that the infringement was not necessary in that the national court should have sought expert 
psychiatric review of the child’s wishes instead of relying on statements made in infancy.60 
 
As Swindells argues, Elsholz evidences the difference in paying particular regard to the child’s 
best interests and regarding such interests as paramount.61 Despite the domestic finding of fact 
that contact was not in the best interests of the child, the Grand Chamber found that the article 
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8(1) infringement was not justified by such a consideration. Thus, the evidential burden on the 
state was ‘very strong indeed’ to displace the rights of the father.62 This emphasises the key 
dicta in Johansen demonstrating that the best interests of the child may, depending on their 
severity, displace the rights of the parent.63 Elsholz highlights that such displacement is 
conditional on an individual proportionality exercise and that a national court may legitimately 
find that the best interests of the child do not outweigh the rights of the parent.  
 
Yousef v The Netherlands and Apparent Acceptance of the Paramountcy Principle at 
Strasbourg Level 
 
As Johansen had been used as authority for the necessity of balancing rights in an article 8(2) 
analysis, dicta in the same judgment has been used by national authorities to endorse an 
approach akin to the domestic interpretation of the paramountcy principle. In Johansen, the 
ECtHR stated: ‘In particular, as suggested by the Government, the parents cannot be entitled 
under article 8 to have such measures taken as would harm the child’s health and 
development’.64 For Choudhry, this comes close to ‘endorsing paramountcy in and of itself’ in 
that the statement determines parents are not able to pursue a course of action that would 
actively damage the interests of the child.65 This dicta was subsequently emphasised in K v 
Finland in which the court stated that the inability to act contrary to the health and development 
of the child was a particular feature of the balancing exercise the court must undertake.66 Here, 
the Grand Chamber concurred with the submissions of the national authority in Johansen in 
that the child’s interests were paramount and formed a justification under article 8(2). In doing 
so, the Grand Chamber seemingly paved the way for recognising children’s interests as 
paramount at the Strasbourg level. 
 
Yousef v The Netherlands is significant for the development of the ECtHR’s approach to the 
balancing exercise required under article 8(2).67 Yousef concerned an unmarried father’s appeal 
against the refusal to grant a deed of recognition regarding parenthood in relation to his 
biological daughter. This refusal, made by the domestic court, was on the basis that such an 
 
62 ibid 
63 Eekelaar, (n55) 242  
64 Johansen v Norway (n38) [78]  
65 Shazia Choudhry, ‘The adoption and Children Act 2002, the welfare principle and the Human Rights Act 1998- 
a missed opportunity?’ (2003) 15 CFLQ 119, 130 
66 K v Finland (n50) [156] 
67 Yousef v The Netherlands (application No.33711/96) [2003] 36 E.H.R.R. 20 
 91 
order was contrary to the best interests of the child.68 Interestingly, the father in Yousef hoped 
to have his fatherhood recognised in Dutch law despite never having care of the child.69 The 
question confronting the court concerned the weight attached to the interests of a child in 
justifying infringement of the father’s article 8(1) rights. If we recall Elsholz, the child’s 
interests were paid particular regard in such an exercise and this resulted in the infringement 
being found to be unjustified.70 However, in Yousef, the court adopted a different linguistic 
approach to the interests of the child by stating that: ‘the court reiterates that where the rights 
under article 8 and those of a child are at stake, the child’s rights must be the paramount 
consideration’.71 Furthermore, in a statement that seems remarkably close to the domestic 
interpretation of the paramountcy principle, the court held that ‘if any balancing of interests is 
necessary, the interests of the child must prevail’.72 Therefore, considering that the applicant 
intended to interfere with the welfare of the child via acquiring the order, the national court 
had conducted the correct process in balancing the interests of the adult and child at first 
instance.73 
 
Linguistically, the selection of ‘paramount’, in describing the weight attached to the interests 
of the child, seems to contradict previous language which ascribes particular or crucial 
importance therein. In this light, Harris-Short has described Yousef as an ‘outlying case’ that 
provides ‘some scope’ for defending the paramountcy principle’s compatibility with the ECHR 
regime.74 In contrast, Prest has characterised Yousef as providing a ‘strong line of authority’ 
for the advancement of the rights and interests of children as paramount in the ECtHR 
jurisprudence.75 This is on the authority of both dicta in Johansen and the latter case of Maire 
v Portugal which, for Prest, cements the potential for the Strasbourg court to accept national 
rulings pre-empting the article 8(2) balancing exercise via the invocation of a domestic 
conception of the paramountcy principle.76 
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However, Choudhry has criticised the court’s approach in Yousef as creating uncertainty 
surrounding the judicial approach to the balancing exercise required under article 8(2). In order 
to justify its approach, the Strasbourg court cited Elsholz v Germany77 and TP v UK.78 
Importantly, it did not cite Johansen. As has already been shown, Elsholz does not provide 
authority for the child’s interests forming the paramount consideration in an article 8(2) 
balancing exercise. Instead, Elsholz merely states that they are a particular consideration and 
thus affirms the position of Johansen.79 Similarly, in TP, the court stated that the interests of 
the child are of ‘crucial’ importance when considering justifications provided by the national 
authority.80 This, again, mirrors the construction of the law in Johansen. These cases do not 
equate to a model of paramountcy that prioritises the interests of the child as understood 
domestically.81 Therefore, in Yousef, through the court ‘reiterating’ that the interests of the 
child are paramount, it employs a linguistic sleight of hand that suggests its position has 
remained unchanged from that of Elsholz and, as a result, Johansen.82 This is not the case. As 
Tolson argues, it is important to recognise the unusual facts of Yousef in that the court 
recognised the father’s motivation for pursuing the order was to interfere with the welfare of 
the child.83 Therefore, it is less surprising that the ECtHR gave effect to the best interests of 
the child on a factual level. What is surprising is the legal justification it provided for doing so. 
Nevertheless, Yousef is significant in that it has been the case domestic courts have cited to 
establish compliance with demands under the ECHR. This will become the focus of the 
following section of this Chapter.  
 
Subsequent Application of Yousef v The Netherlands 
 
In order to determine whether Yousef indicates a change of approach for the ECtHR, this thesis 
will now analyse subsequent case-law of the Strasbourg court.  Significantly, the language of 
Yousef is replicated in Zawadka v Poland.84 Zawadka concerned a public law appeal against a 
district court order that first limited, and subsequently severed, the applicant’s contact with his 
child. This was following an attempted abduction. The applicant, relying on his article 8(1) 
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rights, claimed the authorities had failed to take effective steps to enforce contact between the 
two.85 The court found for the applicant in that there had been a breach of the father’s article 
8(1) rights and this was, in itself, sufficient to justify issuance of the damages sought .86 As per 
Johansen, the national authority sought to establish that its decision was justified on the basis 
of the best interests of the child assuming paramountcy in a balancing exercise.87 Here, the 
difficulty for the national authority was that, in the first instance decision, no finding was made 
as to contact being adverse to the interests of the child and, indeed, expert evidence indicated 
the necessity of maintaining the link between father and child.88  
 
The Strasbourg court acknowledged that the strained relationship between parents made cases 
such as these difficult to manage yet this did not affect the obligation on national authorities in 
respect to upholding article 8(1) rights.89 Instead, such tension ‘imposed an obligation to take 
measures that would reconcile the conflicting interests of the parties, keeping in mind the 
paramount interests of the child’.90 This finding was followed by the court stating that, whilst 
national courts must do their utmost to facilitate parental cooperation, this obligation must be 
limited since ‘the interests and rights of all concerned must be accounted, and more particularly 
the best interests of the child and their rights under article 8 of the Convention’.91  
 
Upon closer inspection, it appears the court adopted two contradictory positions in relation to 
the weight afforded to the best interests of the child. On one level, it appears to grant the 
interests of the child paramount importance, a position seemingly corresponding to dicta in 
Yousef, despite the case not being cited by the court. Such an approach is similarly evident in 
Maire v Portugal, in which the court noted it should not be forgotten that the children’s interests 
are paramount.92 This found similar favour in Kearns v France, in the adoption context, in 
which the court stated that, when striking a balance between various interests and rights, the 
child’s interests shall assume paramountcy.93 
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However, language purporting to accept paramountcy in these cases is situated alongside dicta 
that seems to favour an approach akin to that in Johansen. For example, the direction to national 
courts to have ‘more particular’ regard to the interests of the child in Zawadka directly 
correlates to Johansen and indeed cites Hokkanen and Olsson as authority.94 In a recent 
analysis of these cases, Bridge has stated that the court’s decision in Zawadka was based on a 
balancing exercise and on ‘taking the child’s best interests into account’.95 These authorities, 
as per the above exposition, do not support an ECtHR position that would seem to acknowledge 
the paramountcy principle automatically prioritising the interests of children.  
 
Further reflecting this inconsistency, the ECtHR, post-Yousef, has handed down judgments that 
do not characterise the child’s interests as paramount and instead revert to ‘a more familiar 
formula’.96 These cases have seen repetition of the orthodox position in that it has been held 
that the interests of the child shall assume particular importance and may override the interests 
of the parents depending on their nature and severity. Such examples include Hoppe v 
Germany,97 handed down shortly following Yousef, Gorgulu v Germany,98 and Suss v 
Germany,99 handed down shortly before Zawadka. Interestingly, Suss v Germany cites 
Johansen, Elsholz, Hoppe and Gorgulu as authority for the balancing of interests the national 
authority was expected to undertake. Therefore, authority for the interests of children holding 
particular importance can be found both before and after the Yousef judgment. This is 
significant for this thesis in that it rejects the proposition that paramountcy has been accepted 
as a Convention-compliant model of litigation and, instead, will adopt the approach in 
Johansen as the authoritative position of the Strasbourg court. 
 
Where Does this Leave the ECtHR Position? 
 
It appears that the ECtHR oscillates between positions that pay ‘particular regard’ to the 
interests of the child and those that attribute ‘paramount’ importance. Both approaches have 
been applied by the courts in the years since Yousef. However, on analysis of the case law, it 
becomes clear that the Strasbourg court has more readily cited the Johansen position in terms 
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of a numerical assessment. Therefore, whilst more case-law is required to definitively answer 
whether Yousef signals a new approach, for the moment it appears the court has reached a 
position whereby a balancing exercise is mandated under article 8(2) that may tolerate a 
national authority treating children’s interests as paramount. As Prest notes, ‘in carrying out 
the balancing exercise, the interests of the child should be treated as paramount…. yet it 
remains unclear under which circumstances parental rights will outweigh the interests of the 
child’.100 Importantly, when this Chapter refers to interests being treated as paramount, this 
refers not exclusively to the paramountcy principle in English law but to any equivalent 
provision in the law of various contracting states. 
 
Problematically, alongside these developments, the Johansen line of case-law has become 
‘firmly established’ in the jurisprudence of the court.101 Therefore, what these cases evidence 
is linguistic inconsistency regarding the weight afforded to the best interests of the child. From 
a practice perspective, Tolson argues that the approach of the ECtHR remains that of 
Johansen.102 This is the case given subsequent cases ‘establishing’ the paramountcy principle 
at ECtHR level actually cite and entrench case-law supporting the Johansen position.103 Such 
a finding has been evidenced throughout this Chapter. Therefore, Prest’s assertion that a 
domestic interpretation of the paramountcy principle has been accepted by the ECtHR seems 
inaccurate. 
 
Despite this inconsistency, Fortin argues there is a basic formulation we can draw from the 
case-law. Whether the court uses the phrase ‘particular,104 ‘notable’,105 or ‘crucial 
importance’,106  it seems clear that, when deciding if the rights infringement is justified, the 
court will attach special significance to the best interests of the child. Therefore, at the ECtHR 
level, the interests of the child will prevail only after a balancing exercise has been undertaken 
with the rights and interests of the various parties being assessed on a presumptively equal 
footing.107 Following this, the interests of the child may then override those of the parents 
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depending on the courts assessment of their nature and severity.108 The positioning of this 
privileging will be crucial when this thesis turns to comparing the domestic and ECtHR 
positions. Such an approach seems similar to the process required when applying legal 
principles in the Dworkinian sense. Here, at the Strasbourg level, the child’s interests only 
indicate a particular legal consequence after the rights of all litigants have been assessed. It is 
accurate to state that the interests of the child enjoy an element of weight alongside the rights 
of the parents. This cannot be said of the process judges undertake domestically as evidenced 
in Chapter Two of this thesis. 
 
 
The Domestic Approach to the Relationship between Section 1(1) CA and Article 8 ECHR 
 
This thesis has considered the ECtHR position on the relationship between article 8 ECHR and 
the paramountcy principle. In order to evidence domestic non-compliance with the demands of 
the EHCR, this thesis will now examine the domestic jurisprudence concerning the 
paramountcy principle and its interrelationship with article 8. This Chapter will analyse the 
post-HRA jurisprudence of the court and the various ways in which courts have avoided 
conflict between ECtHR jurisprudence and the domestic interpretation of section 1(1) CA. 
 
Post-HRA Engagement with Section 1(1) CA and Article 8 ECHR 
 
In terms of engagement with the ECHR in a post-HRA legal system, Fortin describes the 
judiciary as taking ‘two steps forward and one step back’.109 Whilst one reason for this failure 
is partially down to ‘loyalty to the supposed demands of section 1(1) CA’, Fortin attributes the 
majority of the blame to the relationship the domestic judiciary have attributed to the 
relationship between the Children Act 1989 and article 8 ECHR.110 Similarly, Fenwick, Harris-
Short and Bonner have described judicial reasoning under the ECHR as ‘conspicuous by its 
absence’ and characterised judicial approaches to ECtHR jurisprudence as ‘openly hostile’.111 
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Re KD, although a pre-HRA case, highlights the approach of continuing as though 
implementation of the HRA necessitated no substantive alteration to the application or 
interpretation of the paramountcy principle.112 Importantly, Re KD formed the first domestic 
challenge to the co-existence of section 1(1) CA and article 8 ECHR. The case concerned a 
challenge to a local authority decision to terminate contact between a mother and son so that 
the child could be placed for adoption. Counsel for the mother argued that, upon proper 
application of article 8 ECHR, a natural parent has the legal right to contact with their child 
were this was found to not actively damage the welfare of the minor.113 In response, the House 
of Lords held that, despite the first instance court characterising the risk of harm in mild terms, 
this statement amounted to ‘a finding that there existed a present risk of harm from continued 
access [to the child]’.114 Therefore, given there was a risk of harm to the child resultant of 
contact, the court was not required to rule on the nature of the ‘right’ to contact.115 
 
However, the court evaluated, albeit obiter, the relationship between the domestic 
interpretation of section 1(1) CA and requirements under article 8. For Lord Templeman, there 
existed ‘no inconsistency of principle in application’ between the two.116 However, it was the 
opinion of Lord Oliver that provided the clearest exposition of the domestic approach to 
demands under article 8. Responding to the question of the continued applicability of Lord 
MacDermott’s dicta in J v C, Lord Oliver stated: ‘I do not discern any conflict between the 
propositions laid down in J v C and the pronouncements of the ECtHR’.117 He went on to argue 
that:  
 
‘such conflict as exists is, I think, semantic only and lies in differing ways of giving 
expression to the single common concept that the natural bond and relationship between 
parent and child gives rise to universally recognised norms which ought not to be 
gratuitously interfered with and which, if interfered with at all, ought to be so only if 
the welfare of the child dictates it.118 
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Therefore, for Lord Oliver, to ask whether the jurisprudence of the ECtHR contradicted the 
domestic position was a question ‘without content’ given that, if a child’s welfare was 
maximised by contact, it added nothing to speak of a parental right to that contact.119 The 
concern of the Court was the best interests of the child and Lord Oliver found nothing in the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR to contradict the centrality of a welfare-based assessment. As a 
result, the domestic interpretation of section 1(1) CA was found to be compliant with demands 
under article 8 ECHR. 
 
Subsequently, as Lowe and Douglas note, the adoption of the HRA provided the opportunity 
for ‘reappraisal’ of this position.120 However, as this thesis will now evidence, such reappraisal 
has proven elusive. For example, in the post-HRA case of Re L, Butler-Sloss P stated that 
domestic interpretation of section 1(1) CA was compatible with ECtHR jurisprudence.121 In 
this ruling, the manner in which Butler-Sloss P approached the ECtHR case-law merits 
analysis. The court began by citing Hendricks v Netherlands as an example of the Strasbourg 
court resolving a serious conflict of interests between parent and child in favour of a minor 
under article 8(2).122 It then continued to reference Johansen by stating ‘the principle of crucial 
importance being the best interests of the child has been upheld in subsequent decisions of the 
ECtHR’.123 Therefore, crucial to the finding of compatibility was the previously referenced 
dicta in Johansen that states a national authority is unable to take measures that would harm 
the interests of the child.  Similarly, dicta in the 2001 case of Dawson v Wearmouth indicates 
that there ‘exists nothing in the Convention or case-law that requires the courts to act otherwise 
than in the interests of the child’.124 Therefore, for Butler-Sloss P, dicta stating that parents 
could not act contrarily to the interests of their children was sufficient to establish domestic 
Convention-compliance. 
 
Such an approach is significant in the context of this thesis in that it evidences a perception 
among lower courts that adoption of the HRA necessitated no alteration in terms balancing the 
rights of adult and child. If one views this in light of the hierarchical relationship between 
courts, this is unsurprising given the obiter in Re KD guiding practice. However, it could be 
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assumed that, given the advent of the HRA, a case reaching the House of Lords four years 
subsequently would acknowledge the material difference required under an ECHR compliant 
model of litigation. As this Chapter will now evidence, such an acknowledgment did not occur. 
 
The House of Lords was next confronted with the question of Convention-compliance in Re 
B.125 Here, the Court of Appeal judgment of Hale LJ, as she then was, merits consideration in 
that it identifies the non-compatibility lying at the heart of this thesis’ critique of the 
paramountcy principle.126 In her judgment, Hale LJ dedicated a significant section to the impact 
of the ECHR regime on domestic interpretation. She found there was ‘no pressing social need’ 
to deprive the child of a relationship with her birth family and this found expression in a 
restrictive interpretation of the statutory provision, section 15(3)(b) Adoption Act 1976, to 
achieve ECHR compatibility.127 In first identifying the article 8(1) right and then applying the 
article 8(2) qualifications, Hale LJ affirmed that a proportionality exercise must be conducted 
on a case-by-case basis and that a simple application of section 1(3) CA was not sufficient to 
achieve Convention-compliance.128 This approach  rejected avoiding the question of non-
compliance in favour of recognising the impact of the HRA on children’s litigation. This is 
significant in that it forms the basis of this thesis’ proposals for reinterpreting the application 
of section 1(1) CA in Chapter Five. 
 
However, upon Re B reaching the House of Lords, Hale LJ’s approach was found to be 
unnecessary. Lord Nicholls reasoned that, in granting an adoption order, the court hears 
evidence from all parties to the litigation. The order was then determined by what the court 
considered the best interests of the child to be. Consequently, Lord Nichols failed to see how 
an order made under those circumstances could infringe a child’s article 8(1) rights. Lord 
Nicholls stated:  
 
Inherent in both these Convention concepts is a balancing exercise, weighing the 
advantages and the disadvantages. But this balancing exercise, required by article 8, 
does not differ in substance from the like balancing exercise undertaken by a court 
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when deciding whether, in the conventional phraseology of English law, adoption 
would be in the best interests of the child.129 
 
Therefore, for Lord Nicholls, despite the differing phraseology, the same criteria were applied 
when deciding whether an order is justified under article 8(2) and in divining the best interests 
of the child under domestic law.130 As the result under both approaches would be the same, 
article 8(2) called for ‘no more’ than a thorough exploration of the child’s best interests.131 This 
subsequently became the authoritative exposition of domestic compatibility with the ECHR 
regime.  
 
The approach of the House of Lords is unsurprising in light of the hostility to rights-based 
arguments permeating domestic family litigation following adoption of the HRA. Whilst public 
law litigation may not reject rights-based reasoning to the same degree as the ‘deeply 
entrenched hostility’ of private law, it is easy to see the attraction in a simplistic assertion that 
existing domestic practice is in accordance with the demands of the ECtHR. Therefore, as was 
the case in Re KD, family courts continued in the erroneous belief that domestic interpretation 
of section 1(1) CA was fully compliant with Strasbourg jurisprudence. This was despite, 
shortly following Re B, calls from Munby J to rectify the obliviousness of the domestic 
judiciary to the changes necessitated in judicial mind-set resultant of the HRA.132 It is clear 
that the Human Rights message had not made its way onto the ground in private family 
litigation at this stage.133 This is further emphasised by lack of engagement with a rights-based 
focus of the UNCRC by both Parliament and the courts. 
 
Erroneous Analysis of the Strasbourg Jurisprudence 
 
In order to further evidence this ‘cavalier’ approach to the ECtHR jurisprudence, Choudhry 
argues the courts went to extraordinary lengths in misinterpreting requirements under the 
ECHR regime.134 One oft-cited example is the judgment of Thorpe LJ in Payne v Payne.135 
Payne concerned a mother, originating from New-Zealand, who married an English-national 
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father. They had a son and upon relationship breakdown the mother sought to return to New-
Zealand with the child. The father argued that the existing approach of granting such relocation 
orders, in situations where the proposal was reasonable and practical, was contrary to his article 
8(1) right to contact.136 Giving judgment, Thorpe LJ made comments that have been described 
as ‘misunderstanding the Convention’.137 Citing Johansen, Thorpe LJ stated that the ECtHR 
position was that: ‘the court will attach particular importance to the best interests of the child, 
which…. may override those of the parent’.138 This, taken alongside what he perceived as 
acknowledgment of the paramountcy principle in section 3(1) UNCRC, led to the conclusion 
that ‘the jurisprudence of the ECtHR inevitably recognises the paramountcy principle, albeit 
not expressed in the language of the domestic statute.139  
 
It is important to analyse the reasoning of Thorpe LJ. Firstly, he misquotes Johansen. The full 
quotation, as shown above, reads: ‘the court will attach particular importance to the best 
interests of the child, which depending on their nature and severity, may override those of the 
parents’.140 The omitted section of dicta is crucial to an article 8(2) analysis in that, given the 
rights of the child may override dependent on severity, a domestic court must undertake an 
individual proportionality exercise in every case. In neglecting to include ‘depending on their 
severity’, Thorpe LJ effectively precludes article 8(2) analysis in that, instead of weighing the 
individual factors in the case, the paramountcy principle automatically necessitates the interests 
of the child override those of the parents as a matter of law. Furthermore, article 3(1) UNCRC 
does not affirm the paramountcy principle as domestically understood. Instead, the provision 
states that the interests of the child shall be a ‘primary’ consideration. This observation will 
prove significant when this thesis considers reinterpretation of section 1(1) CA as the primary 
principle in chapters Four and Five of this thesis. On the weight to be attached to the interests 
of the child, the UNCRC position mirrors that suggested by Fenwick and Choudhry in their 
reform proposals and, indeed, the later statutory amendment presented in this thesis. 
 
Whilst the judgment in Payne has been subsequently challenged in a series of cases outside the 
scope of this thesis, Thorpe LJ’s dicta concerning the paramountcy principle has escaped 
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judicial criticism. Indeed, in the 2011 case of K v K, the Court of Appeal, in a panel including 
Thorpe LJ, approved dicta from Payne pertaining to the paramountcy principle: ‘the only 
principle to be extracted from Payne v Payne is the paramountcy principle’.141 This, evidences 
a continued failure to engage with the requirements of the ECtHR jurisprudence or, at worst, 
an attempt to avoid culpability for a much-criticised section of dicta.142 
 
Another example of failure to engage with Convention requirements is Re H.143 This case 
concerned a father seeking a contact order in favour of his child. This was opposed by the 
mother on the basis that the father suffered from Huntingdon’s disease and was a risk to the 
child.144 Wall J began his judgment by acknowledging that it will make minimal reference to 
ECtHR jurisprudence.145 He stated that almost every contact order involved an interference 
with article 8(1) rights and, therefore, the interference must be proportionate.146 However, in 
assessing this proportionality, Wall J stated that a proper application of section 1(3) CA was 
equivalent to requirements under article 8. Given this, section 1(3) CA served as a useful 
‘crosscheck’ to assess justification for the order.147 For the judge, a welfare analysis under 
domestic law was enough to satisfy requirements under article 8(2) ECHR. Therefore, in this 
period, welfare remained the conclusive consideration for the court and ousted rights-based 
analysis in private family litigation.148 
 
Harris-Short characterises such an approach as ‘disappointing’.149 The message from the case-
law is that the HRA necessitates no change in the paramountcy principle as interpreted in J v 
C. One thing to highlight is the judicial approach to citing ECtHR jurisprudence. As 
demonstrated in Re B, Payne and Re H, it is unlikely judges will cite ECtHR jurisprudence in 
depth before concluding that the interests of the child automatically outweigh the rights of the 
parents. However, where such cases have been cited, the citations are ‘incomplete and even 
inaccurate’.150 Whilst this may not be disingenuous, it is difficult to see how a court could 
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misquote dicta if lifted directly from an ECtHR ruling. Therefore, as previously stated, such 
application of the case-law can be attributed to the desire to find a simplistic solution to 
Convention-compatibility that can be readily applied in the lower courts. The approach adopted 
by the Family Division achieves this in that no change is required. 
 
In dealing with the perceived incompatibility, the judicial approach can be sub-divided. One 
approach is that undertaking the process of divining the best interests of the child via use of 
section 1(3) CA automatically satisfies requirements under article 8(2). Factually, this holds 
that the outcome of such a domestic analysis would be the same as if under an ECHR approach. 
This was evident in Re B in which Lord Nicholls found the welfare checklist was an alternative 
means of giving effect to the balancing exercise required under article 8(2). This seems difficult 
to accept given section 1(3) CA was clearly not devised with a rights-based framework in 
mind.151 Alternatively, the court may analyse the article 8(1) rights of the parent. If such rights 
are engaged, the court will attempt to undertake an article 8(2) balancing exercise. Here, the 
judiciary have cited Johansen to establish ECtHR acceptance of the domestic interpretation of 
the section 1(1) CA. Therefore, under article 8(2), the children’s interests automatically 
override the rights of the parents without any need to analyse the individual facts of the case. 
The question is a matter of law not fact. This approach sees support in Payne via the 
misquotation of Johansen. This forms the so-called ‘welfare-first’ approach.152 
 
Both these approaches culminate in a belief that the HRA necessitates no shift in the domestic 
application of the paramountcy principle from that established in J v C. This evidences the fact 
that the courts have merely ‘reconfigured’ the paramountcy principle to amount to an automatic 
justification under article 8(2).153  
 
Fortin maps this judicial approach onto a hypothetical section 8 CA application and states it is 
unlikely that a court, applying the Re B approach, would feel it necessary to undertake an article 
8(2) analysis. The full extent of the court’s assessment concerns whether the application sought 
by the father is more in the best interests of the child than that proposed by the mother.154 In 
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essence, the paramountcy principle pre-empts the invocation of ECtHR jurisprudence.155 As 
Probert and Harding suggest, this interpretation serves as a mere linguistic adjustment to 
achieve a sufficient degree of compliance.156 It is the purpose of this thesis to utilise the 
Dworkinian distinction between rules and principles to better structure the judicial discretion 
afforded under section 1(1) CA and, thereby, reduce the extent to which judicial personality 
can hide behind application of section 1(1) CA. This, it will be argued, provides a degree of 
certainty as to the process a court will undertake when litigating section 8 CA applications. 
 
Has This Approach Changed in the Contemporary Case-Law? 
 
It is apparent that the aforementioned approach to Convention-compliance has not been directly 
challenged by appellate courts. As Fortin argues, the courts have not gone beyond a ‘cursory 
nod’ to the balancing exercise required under article 8(2).157 Recent case-law suggests the 
contemporary approach to achieving ECHR compatibility is to cite Yousef as authority for the 
approval of something like the domestic interpretation of section 1(1) CA at ECtHR level. This 
is apparent in two 2018 public law judgments handed down by Keehan J. In Re PM, Keehan J 
summarised the influence of the ECHR as ‘[having] regard to the article 8 rights of the children, 
mother and father, I bear in mind that where there is a tension between the article 8 rights of 
each, the rights of the child prevail’.158 Similarly, in the latter case of Re AB, Keehan J repeated 
his approach stating ‘When considering welfare in this case, I account a) the court’s paramount 
consideration is the welfare of the child, b) the welfare checklist, c) the article 8 rights of the 
child and adults’.159 He went on to repeat the fact that, when rights conflict, the ECtHR position 
in Yousef is that the rights of the child prevail.160 Therefore, in Re AB, the welfare interests of 
the child dictated the granting of a section 8 order in favour of the respondent. In concluding 
comments to this effect, the child’s article 8(1) rights escaped elucidation, given it was the 
child’s welfare that determined the order. Again, such an approach was evidenced in Re H in 
which the order was justified solely by reference to the welfare of the child; that was the central 
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and only consideration of the court.161 Here, as per the above, Yousef was cited as authority for 
the rights of the child prevailing in an article 8(2) balancing exercise.162 
 
Whilst Keehan J cites Yousef as authority for the prioritisation of the child’s interests at ECtHR 
level, other judges have provided passing reference to a balancing of interests. For example, in 
Re G, Bellamy J stated that ‘in addition to those statutory provisions [section 1(1) CA] the 
court must also have regard to the article 8 rights of both parents and of the child. It must 
endeavour to arrive at an outcome that is both proportionate and in the child’s best interests’.163 
Indeed, he continued to cite McFarlane LJ in Re A establishing that, in public law cases, a court 
has the duty under article 6(1) ECHR not to determine the application in a way that is 
incompatible with article 8.164 
 
However, those examples aside, it seems that, from 2018 onwards, the courts have consistently 
chosen to cite Yousef as authority for the automatic prioritisation of children’s welfare at 
ECtHR level. Here, courts have not engaged with dicta from Yousef and have instead merely 
cited the case by name only. The pervasiveness of this belief in Yousef as authority for the 
interests of the child assuming paramountcy in a balancing exercise is highlighted by its 
numerous invocations in lower level family courts. Here, judges have cited Keehan J’s analysis 
in Re H in cases including Re T,165 Re A,166Re M,167Re ME,168and Re AB.169 Importantly, this 
suggests that lower courts are no longer undertaking the article 8(2) balancing exercise in any 
meaningful way. Instead, it appears that judges are content to cite previous authority that asserts 
the ECtHR has accepted that domestic interpretation of section 1(1) CA automatically results 
in the interests of the child prevailing over those of the adult.  
 
Therefore, in analysing whether contemporary jurisprudence evidences the court becoming 
more receptive to the exercise demanded under article 8(2), one can conclude that the evidence 
suggests that, at most, the court are more willing to hear ECHR-based arguments in litigation. 
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However, when it comes to the balancing of interests, family judges merely cite ECtHR 
jurisprudence which they perceive justifies the automatic prioritisation of the child’s interests. 
It is difficult to argue that the courts are paying anything other than lip-service to the obligation 
to balance interests and have instead utilised a ‘linguistic adjustment to achieve domestic 
compliance’.170 The contemporary position of the Family Division is, in essence, symptomatic 
of the earlier stance taken by the House of Lords in both Re KD and Re B. This is a position 
that asserts adoption of the  HRA necessitates no substantive alteration to interpretation of 




Locating Conflict Between the Domestic and ECHR Positions 
 
In analysing the difference between the domestic and ECtHR position as stretching beyond 
mere ‘semantics,171 Herring points to the differing starting points for litigation brought under 
section 1(1) CA and article 8 ECHR. This is to evidence how, dependant on the judicial starting 
point, the interests of children will receive different weighting and priority when balanced 
against the rights of adults. Such a contrast between the approaches can now be made given 
the exposition of both provided in this Chapter. 
 
The Domestic Starting Point in Litigation. 
 
As has already been stated in this thesis, the domestic interpretation of the paramountcy 
principle does not allow judges to consider interests other than those of the child and, based on 
this, Herring has cast the paramountcy principle as inherently individualistic in nature.172 
Therefore, the starting point in a standard section 8 CA application is a factual determination 
of what the best interests of the child are.173 
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In a section 8 CA dispute, Herring asserts that the court begins with the presumption that 
contact, for example, should be encouraged.174 Since publication of Herring’s work, this has 
been enshrined in section 1(2A) CA and the presumption of continued parental involvement.175  
The relationship between section 1(1) CA and section 1(2A)was analysed in Re A and B.176 
This case highlights that the presumption can be rebutted by evidence pointing to the best 
interests of the child. Here, Russell J summarised the law thus:  
 
The court is well aware of the amendments to section 8 CA and that section 1(2A)CA 
now includes the presumption that, unless the contrary is shown, involvement of a 
parent will further that child’s welfare. But, the presumption is subject to the 
requirement that the parent concerned may be involved in a way that does not risk the 
welfare of the child.177 
 
Evidentially, the presumption in favour of the father’s continued involvement could be rebutted 
on the basis of a welfare analysis. Consequently, the best interests of the children dictated the 
exclusion from their upbringing and thus displaced the presumption under section 1(2A) CA. 
Therefore, whilst the domestic courts have engaged with the presumption of continued parental 
involvement, in reality, this is subject a best interests assessment. Section 1(2A) CA does not 
materially change the starting point in section 8 CA applications. 
 
Despite a lack of academic attention, it is difficult to identify the utility of section 1(2A) in a 
practice-orientated sense. Certainly, and at a theoretical level, the presumption forms another 
statutory attempt to structure the discretion in this area of law. In terms of the rights focus of 
this thesis, one would presume that a presumption in favour of contact would assist a parent’s 
article 8(1) claim. Therefore, whilst section 1(2A) does not explicitly form a deontological 
development in litigation, it has the potential to foster a rights-based approach in that, in the 
same way in which an article 8(1) rights infringement must be justified, a parent now has the 
prima-facie assumption of contact. However, in terms of practice, the presumption has become 
conditional on a welfare analysis factually proving continued involvement to be in the child’s 
best interests. Therefore, despite modest promise to develop a rights-based framework, it seems 
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the courts have rejected this in favour of continued centralisation of the paramountcy principle 
to contact disputes. It is clear that presumptions cannot assist in developing a rights-based 
framework in section 8 CA litigation. 
 
In litigation, once the factual welfare determination is made, the court will pay lip-service to 
ECHR demands via the statement: ‘where a clash between parental rights and children’s 
interests occurs, the interests of the child will prevail’.178 Therefore, the interests of the child 
are granted priority before balancing can take place under article 8(2). As Choudhry and 
Fenwick suggest, judges effectively neglect to balance the interests of all parties on a 
presumptively equal footing.179 In failing to do so, the court accounts consequentialist 
arguments, with a place under article 8(2) ECHR, without first identifying the composite article 
8(1) rights of litigants.180 Therefore, as a matter of law, the interests of the child automatically 




To highlight the divergence between the domestic and Strasbourg approach, Herring contrasts 
this with the process undertaken in a case engaging ECHR rights. In denying a parent contact 
via a section 8 order, the court must first identify the article 8(1) right before then justifying 
the degree of interference. Therefore, an ECHR approach would begin with an article 8(1) 
right, as opposed to a presumption, encompassing contact with a child. Here, the child’s rights 
exist separately to those of the adult and this means that all substantive rights must be divined 
and assessed individually. It is at this stage that the interests of the child can be assessed on an 
equal footing with those of the parents.182  
 
The court must then turn to the question of justifying infringement of the article 8(1) right via 
conducting the balancing exercise necessitated under article 8(2). It is at this stage that the 
interests of the child, identified under article 8(1), can receive privileged status. The ECtHR 
has characterised these interests as ‘particularly important’ but has not approved their 
formulation as the domestic understanding of section 1(1) CA necessitates . Therefore, under 
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article 8(2), the best interests of the child become one of a number of factors the court will 
consider. In an ECHR compliant jurisdiction, there is nothing to support the basic assumption 
that a child’s interests will assume priority before the rights and interests of other litigants have 
been balanced.183 The conflict, therefore, lies in beginning from the premise that the parent’s 
article 8(1) rights may be justifiably infringed under article 8(2) versus determining a section 
8 order application solely on the basis of the child’s best interests.184 As Elsholz evidences, 
there is a significant difference between regarding children’s rights as prioritised, therefore 
determinative, and affording them a special weight. 
  
According to Herring, the difference in approaches is two-fold.185  Firstly, the burden of proof 
is greater under the ECHR. In order to justify a rights breach, evidence must be ‘clear and 
convincing’ and point to the fact that any infringement was necessary and proportionate.186 For 
example, as per Elsholz, the court may be required to seek specific psychiatric or medical 
evidence pointing to contact damaging the best interests of the child. Under the domestic 
approach, the court need only characterise evidence as pertaining to ‘best interests’ and it will 
automatically determine the outcome of an application. It would appear less evidence is 
required to rebut a presumption of continued parental involvement, via reference to the best 
interests of the child, than to justify a rights infringement under article 8(2).187 In this process, 
the factors falling for consideration will also differ. Under the domestic approach it has been 
shown that evidence pertaining to the child alone will be considered. Evidence relating to other 
individuals will only be evaluated insofar as it relates and bears upon the welfare of the child. 
Under the ECHR approach, a right to a relationship with the child, derived from article 8(1), 
may require the court to have regard to interests of the parent that do not bear on the best 
interests of the child.188 
 
Secondly, under each approach, the nature of the question differs. The question under the 
ECHR is one of judgement in that a court is tasked with determining if a breach has occurred 
and, if so, whether it is justified. Here, respect for Convention rights dictates a conclusion the 
court should reach unless justification is found under article 8(2). Under the domestic approach 
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the question is factual.189 The only question the court need answer is what the best interests of 
the child are.  
 
This relates to the location of the privileging of interests referenced to at the start of this 
Chapter. Under a domestic approach, following Re B, the interests of the child automatically 
assume a prioritised status before any article 8(2) balancing exercise can be undertaken. 
Therefore, a judge need not undertake an article 8(2) analysis because, if they do, the result is 
inevitable. However, ECtHR jurisprudence dictates that, under article 8(1), the rights of all 
individuals are first assessed on an equal footing. If conflict exists, a court can then continue to 
balance the interests at play under article 8(2). It is in that process that a child’s interests can 
receive privileged status. Therefore, whilst the interests of the child have the potential to 
override the rights of the parent, such a conclusion is not inevitable in every case.190 Following 
Elsholz, there will exist some cases in which the interference is so severe that only the most 
serious welfare considerations of the child will justify infringement. Whilst, admittedly, this 
has occurred in the context of public law challenges against the actions of local authorities, the 
same is true of private family litigation. This domestic approach replicates the earlier J v C 
model of the paramountcy principle analysed in Chapter Two. As a result of appellate court 
dicta assuring Convention-compliance, this thesis argues lower courts are now failing to 






This Chapter has sought to establish requirements under a Convention-compliant model of 
litigation concerning children. The jurisprudence of the ECtHR can generally be taken to 
necessitate the balancing of rights under article 8(2). In this process, the interests of the child 
are to be privileged to an extent. This thesis concluded that, whilst the child’s interests have 
not been expressly approved as automatically prioritised, the ECtHR’s dicta in Yousef and 
Zawadka have gone some way towards the ECtHR refusing to challenge national decisions 
based on various domestic understandings of provisions akin to section 1(1) CA. 
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The Chapter further evidenced an unwillingness on the part of the domestic judiciary to take 
these requirements seriously in a post-HRA legal framework. Domestic jurisprudence has 
sought to evade conflict between section 1(1) CA and article 8 ECHR in two ways. The first 
was to equate requirements under section 1(3) CA to the balancing exercise required under 
article 8(2). The second was to treat the child’s best interests as an automatic justification under 
the article 8(2) balancing exercise. In recent case law, the courts have cited Yousef as authority 
for this approach being consistent with ECtHR jurisprudence. This approach has justified the 
courts unwillingness to reference article 8(1) rights in section 8 CA litigation as evidenced 
previously in Chapter two. The two constructions of the relationship between article 8 ECHR 
and section 1(1) CA were then contrasted in terms of the starting points for litigation under 
each approach. The work of Herring was drawn on extensively to evidence the differences 
therein. 
 
This thesis will now proceed to analyse the various reinterpretations of the paramountcy 
principle in light of the criticisms outlined in both chapters Two and Three. One of the 
qualitative criteria applied to these reinterpretations will be the degree of Convention-
compliance they achieve in litigation. This is how this thesis will justify adopting, and then 










































An Examination of Previous Reinterpretations of the Paramountcy Principle in Light of 
Domestic Non-Compliance with Demands Under the ECHR 
 
 
As this thesis has demonstrated, the domestic interpretation of section 1(1) CA is incompatible 
with the demands of both the ECHR and Strasbourg jurisprudence. As Choudhry and Fenwick 
have stated, the ECHR requires assessment of the litigant’s article 8(1) rights on a 
presumptively equal footing before any balancing exercise can be conducted under article 
8(2).1 It is at this stage that the ECtHR has privileged the interests of the child in the Johansen 
line of case-law.2 
 
In response, academics have advanced various theories attempting to reconcile the 
paramountcy principle with deontological requirements under the ECHR. It will be argued that 
these theories can be divided into three categories. Some academics have sought to develop 
oppositional reinterpretations of the paramountcy principle. Such theories place the rights of 
child and parent in direct conflict as a means of identifying individual article 8(1) rights. Others 
have sought to develop relationship-based approaches to the paramountcy principle and, 
therefore, see the welfare of the child as directly linked to, and contingent on, satisfying the 
rights of the parent. Other academics such as Fortin, Choudhry and Fenwick, have advanced a 
deontological approach to the paramountcy principle that seeks to reinterpret the wording of 
section 1(1) CA via the interpretive obligation in section 3 HRA. Such an approach 
acknowledges the obligations placed on the court by section 6 HRA and seeks to achieve 
Convention-compliance by reinterpreting section 1(1) CA as the ‘primary principle’. This 
Chapter will suggest such a model of reinterpretation forms the most practically actionable 
means of reforming application of the paramountcy principle. 
 
This Chapter will proceed by analysing both oppositional and relationship-based approaches 
to reinterpreting the paramountcy principle. It will critique both these approaches as 
insufficient when considered in isolation and will instead turn to the deontological model as 
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the basis for this thesis’ own methodology in Chapter Five. This Chapter will analyse how, 
despite forming a theoretically thorough account of Convention-compliance, Choudhry and 
Fenwick’s deontological approach lacks a degree of practical actionability given the 
complexity of the model they favour. Here, it is important to note that, despite favouring a 
rights-based model of litigation, Choudhry and Fenwick do not fully dispense with welfare-




Differing Approaches to Reinterpreting the Paramountcy Principle 
 
The Oppositional Approach to Reinterpreting Section 1(1) CA 
 
The work of Bainham provides an example of the oppositional approach to reinterpreting the 
paramountcy principle. Bainham ‘rejects the predominance’ of the paramountcy principle and 
instead argues that a model of welfare should exist whereby parents and children accept both 
duties and responsibilities towards each other in a welfare assessment.3 Therefore, the 
balancing of interests between parent and child is of central importance.4 This is achieved via 
the categorisation of interests as either primary or secondary. If a child’s primary interest clash 
with an adult’s secondary interest the primary interest of the child would prevail.5 In addition, 
Bainham adds a third category of ‘collective family interests’ that are to be considered in any 
balancing exercise. Therefore, for Bainham, a preferred welfare assessment should account for 
the interests of all parties to litigation with a court attempting to separate these into primary, 
secondary and collective considerations. Such an approach, he argues, allows for the balancing 
of interests and a means of resolving conflict therein. 
 
It is important to note that this theory was developed before enactment of the HRA. Following 
advent of the HRA, Bainham has subsequently developed his theory, in light of developments 
in the law of parental responsibility, to place a greater emphasis on children’s rights.6 Whilst 
his categorisation of interests as primary and secondary remains unaltered, the problem he 
 
3 Choudhry and Fenwick (n1) 469 
4 Andrew Bainham, ‘Honour thy father and thy mother: Children’s rights and Children’s duties’, in Gillian 
Douglas and L Sebba (eds), Children’s rights and traditional values, (1st edition, Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1998) 
5 ibid 211 
6 See Andrew Bainham, ‘Is anything left of children’s rights?’ (2016) 24 IJCR 624 
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seeks to remedy has changed. Instead of focusing on section 1(1) CA, Bainham challenges the 
rise of parental responsibility as a basis for child law which obscures the focus on children’s 
rights and allows parents to act as they please so long as this lies in the bounds of the law.7 
Given Bainham switches his focus away from section 1(1) CA and towards the field of parental 
responsibility, his later work lies largely beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
Whilst Bainham’s model is ‘simplistic’, it does constitute an important contribution to the 
reinterpretation of the paramountcy principle in that this model provides a means for 
conceptualising the separation of interests between parent and child.8 Given the timing of 
Bainham’s writing, his work is grounded in the language of interests as opposed to rights. 
Therefore, in order for Bainham’s work to carry weight in a post-HRA legal framework, one 
must replace the notion of interests with article 8(1) rights. If such a step is accepted, the 
oppositional approach to reinterpretation seems more closely aligned to the deontological 
methodology of Choudhry and Fenwick in weighing competing article 8(1) rights against each 
other. This will be an important development in the modified parallel analysis presented in 
Chapter Five that utilises an oppositional approach to identify composite article 8(1) rights of 
litigants. Therefore, in terms of achieving ECHR compatibility, Bainham’s reinterpretation 
could allow for the identification of independent article 8(1) rights. This would seem to prevent 
adults aligning their interests with those of the child as per the traditional criticisms of the 
paramountcy principle.  
 
However, as Eekelaar notes, Bainham’s work is procedural in nature and suffers from 
indeterminacy when applied to litigation. For example, Bainham provides the distinction 
between primary and secondary interests but does not state how interests are to be characterised 
as such and by whom. In attempting to apply Bainham’s approach, a judge must first make the 
decision as to which rights are ‘primary’ and consequently override competing secondary 
rights.9 Moreover, Bainham does not provide adequate guidance for resolving conflict between 
two primary rights. Whilst, his theory may offer scope for delineating independent rights, there 
is no provision for the balancing of these in the event of conflict. 
 
 
7 ibid 627 
8 John Eekelaar, ‘Beyond the welfare principle’, (2002) 14 CFLQ 237 
9 ibid 238 
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If contact between a non-resident father and child is taken as an example of a primary right, 
the shortcomings of Bainham’s proposals become evident. Bainham’s approach can be mapped 
onto the dispute in Re E.10 Explored as a case study in Chapter Two, this complex scenario 
involved a father’s challenge to the removal of his child from the jurisdiction by the mother 
(relying on her rights to move freely and live wherever she chose). In such a case, under 
Bainham’s construction, interests, or article 8(1) rights as we would now term them, would 
appear to exist in conflict. The father would be said to have a primary right in enjoying a 
meaningful relationship with his child as part of his article 8(1) right to respect for private and 
family life. This would require the child to remain in the jurisdiction. Equally, the child would 
be said to have a primary right to contact with his father as part of their article 8(1) rights. 
However, the mother would also possess the right to move and reside freely. Given the effect 
of restricting that ability being severe in this case, a court may legitimately also describe this 
as a primary right. 
 
Therefore, Bainham’s approach has permitted the separate identification of individual rights. 
However, what this reinterpretation does not allow for is the resolution of the conflict between 
these primary rights. This is important for this thesis because it must be recognised that, for 
any reinterpretation to be adopted, it must be realistic and actionable by judges in family courts. 
Under this approach alone, it is unclear whose primary interest wins out and what reasons a 
court must provide for this. For instance, the court could protect the father’s right to maintain 
contact with his child (and indirectly the child’s right to a relationship with the father) at the 
expense of the mother’s right to live wherever she chose. This would mean the mother’s 
primary rights were overridden. One means of resolving this conflict would be to characterise 
the mother’s rights as secondary in which case the father’s primary rights would win out. 
However, linguistically, it seems inappropriate and artificial to ‘downgrade’ rights from 
primary to secondary to ensure resolution; a court would naturally feel uncomfortable with the 
child’s interests suffering as such. If this were to be the case then a court would also be 
presented with difficult questions surrounding on what basis interests were to be downgraded. 
Therefore, an adequate means of adjudicating which primary interest prevails in the event of 
conflict is required.  
 
 
10 Re E (Residence: Imposition of Conditions) [1997] 2 FLR 638 
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However, far from completely dismissing the work of Bainham, it is important to understand 
the limitations of his project so as to better inform proposals advanced by this thesis. Bainham’s 
work was not seeking to offer a full practical methodology for conflict resolution but was 
instead an academic attempt to reinterpret the paramountcy principle in light of criticisms 
identified in Chapter Two. This was in a pre-HRA legal framework and so, naturally, 
Bainham’s work cannot be characterised as deontological in nature. In a pre-HRA legal system, 
the primary influence for a rights-based model of litigation would have been an unincorporated 
UNCRC. What Bainham does offer is an appreciation that the rights of adult and child must be 
separately assessed. This has been subsequently developed in a deontological framework by 
Choudhry and Fenwick’s ‘parallel analysis’. For the sake of this thesis, Bainham’s work is 
significant in that it highlights the need for an actionable model of litigation in order to fully 
accept a reinterpretation of the paramountcy principle.  
 
Relationship-Based Approaches: Contrasting Herring and Eekelaar 
 
In contrast to Bainham, Herring has reconceptualised the paramountcy principle via a focus on 
what he terms ‘relationship-based welfare’.11 Based on an analysis of Bainham’s work, Herring 
argued recourse should be had to the relationship between parent and child to allow a broader 
consideration of what a child’s welfare requirements necessitate.12 Therefore, for Herring, the 
paramountcy principle ought to reflect the interests of not just the child but also the adult upon 
which the child’s welfare is dependent. As he argues, to see a child’s interests outside of the 
context of their carers is ‘highly artificial’ and lacks realism.13 
 
To evidence this claim, Foster and Herring draw comparisons between welfare as invoked in 
family proceedings and medical practice. In the medical context, it is trite law that courts take 
into account a wide range of factors to determine the best interests of the patient.14 Herring 
cites dicta of Thorpe LJ to the effect that a medical best interests determination embraces 
considerations such as social conditions and the wishes of those closest to the patient.15 Given 
this approach will involve consideration of interests beyond the patient themselves, Herring 
 
11 Jonathan Herring, ‘The Human Rights Act and the Welfare Principle- Conflicting or Complementary?’ (1999) 
223 CFLQ 1 
12 ibid 4 (emphasis added) 
13 Jonathan Herring, ‘Farewell welfare?’ (2005) 27  JSWFL 167 
14 See Lady Butler Sloss in Re MB (an adult) (medical treatment) [1997] 8 Med LR 217, [225] 
15 See Re SL (adult patient) (medical treatment) [2000] 1 FCR 361 
 118 
argues this ‘supports [his] contention that the necessary determination can include the interests 
of people other than the child in litigation on the grounds that their best interests cannot be 
separated from others’.16 Such a claim is significant in the context of this thesis in that it 
suggests article 8(1) rights cannot be independently assessed and that the interests of the child 
are contingent on maximising beneficial relationships with the parent.17 
 
In his later work, Herring turns to examining the meaning of ‘welfare’ to bolster his claim that 
a welfare model should look to maximising the health and durability of relationships between 
parent and child in the context of orders under the Children Act 1989.18 Herring finds that an 
understanding of welfare must include an element of altruism in that family relationships are 
inevitably based on mutual compromise; the paramountcy of the child’s interests is not an 
inevitability in such a relationship.19  
 
Therefore, there are two central claims discernible in the relationship-based welfare approach 
pertinent to this thesis. Firstly, domestic judges must recognise that the process of development 
for a child involves learning to ‘suffer sacrifices’ alongside claiming benefits.20 For Herring, 
society is built on mutual cooperation and, as such, children should be encouraged to be 
altruistic to the extent they should not expect minimal gain if this requires excessive sacrifice 
from primary carers. Secondly, judges must recognise that the child’s welfare necessitates that 
relationships are ‘just and fair’. He argues that a parental relationship based on ‘unacceptable 
demands’ does not enhance welfare and that the mutual respect between family members 
results in the expectation that children may be expected to make some sacrifices.21 Therefore, 
Herring’s approach stands in contrast to that of Bainham. For Bainham, key to reinterpreting 
the paramountcy principle is to separate the interests of parent and child. For Herring, those 
interests cannot be separated without creating an artificial depiction of the child’s welfare 
requirements.  
 
Critics have challenged Herring’s assertion that the interests of parent and child cannot be 
distinguished. For example, Crisp argues it is uncontroversial to accept that parental interests 
 
16 Charles Foster and Jonathan Herring, ‘Welfare means rationality, virtue and altruism’ (2012) 32 LS 480, 487 
17 Jo Bridgeman, ‘In the best interests of the child?’, in Jo Bridgeman, Parental Responsibility, Young Children 
and Healthcare Law, (1st edition, CUP, 2007) 132 
18 Foster and Herring (n16) 480 
19 ibid 
20 Herring, ‘The Human Rights Act and the Welfare Principle- Conflicting or Complementary?’ (n11) 4 
21 ibid 5 
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are connected to those of the child. However, he then states it is not incompatible to argue that 
a child’s rights can be identified independently from those of the parent.22 Thus, it one thing to 
argue that an individual’s welfare depends on another yet it is another to state it is constituted 
as such.23 This is an argument echoed by both Harris-Short and Fortin who have pointed to the 
dangers of assimilating the interests of parent and child in terms of recognising children as 
independent rights holders.24 Indeed, following widespread ratification of the UNCRC, it now 
seems widely accepted that children are capable of bearing individual rights separate from 
those of their parents. 
 
Crisp’s criticisms are pertinent if Herring’s proposal is mapped onto the factual matrix of Re 
E. For Herring, a court would resolve the situation by reference to the relationship between the 
parties. With reference to the specific facts in Re E, it is accurate to state that the child’s welfare 
was dependent on the mother given she was the primary carer. Therefore, the mother argued 
that an inability to relocate would have adversely affected the welfare of the child because she 
would have been unable to provide for these interests. This reflects dependency. However, it 
is inaccurate to state the child’s welfare was constituted by the mother. As Herring himself 
states, a child’s welfare is determined by consideration of their relationship beyond the scope 
of one individual. To seek to resolve the question of contact by looking to the relationship 
between mother and child alone ignores the interests of the father as a non-residential parent. 
This also ignores the web of relationships central to the care of the child.25 It is that web that 
constitutes the child’s welfare, not the relationship with the mother in isolation. This 
understanding becomes significant for Chapter Five of this thesis in the development of a 
cumulative article 8(2) balancing exercise based on a relational-approach to the primary 
principle. 
 
In order to resolve conflict between the interests of litigants, a court would look to the 
relationship between mother and child. During this evaluation, the child’s interests are not 
inevitably paramount and the child should not expect an order affecting minimal benefit if this 
 
22 See Roger Crisp, ‘Well-being’, available at <plato.stanford.edu/entries/well-being> accessed 5/5/2020 
23 ibid (emphasis added) 
24 See Sonia Harris-Short, ‘Family law and the HRA 1998: Judicial restraint or revolution?’ in Helen Fenwick, 
Gavin Philipson and Roger Masterman, Judicial reasoning under the UK Human Rights Act, (1st edition, CUP, 
2007) 329 and See Jane Fortin, ‘The HRA’s impact on litigation involving children and their families’, (1999) 11 
CFLQ 225  
25 Matthew Kavanagh, ‘Rewriting the legal family: Beyond exclusivity to a care-based standard’ (2004) 16 YLJF 
83 
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were to cause damage to the interests of the mother. The court would, therefore, have to make 
a value judgement surrounding the level of sacrifice expected of the child. Similarly, the court 
would look to the relationship between father and child and the extent to which that would be 
adversely affected by a reduction or severing of contact. The problem here is that Herring’s 
proposals offer no substantive solution to the question of contact. In the same way that 
Bainham’s proposals were found to be procedural in nature, an approach premised on 
examining the relationship between parties provides no means of resolving conflict if, and 
when, it arises.  
 
It is further argued that it is difficult to utilise Herring’s thesis in attempting to achieve ECHR 
compliance. He, like Bainham, provides no process for a court to resolve a conflict of interests 
bar looking to the ‘relationship’ of virtue and altruism. This assimilates the rights of the parent 
and child and makes it virtually impossible to independently assess the article 8(1) rights of 
each. Given this, it is difficult to see how any court could undertake an article 8(2) balancing 
exercise guided by only an examination of the relationship between the parties. This would 
seem to exist in tension with the process outlined by the Strasbourg court in Johansen which 
necessitates the individual identification of composite article 8(1) rights. Procedurally, it seems 
that neither oppositional nor relationship-based theories, taken in isolation, provide a means of 
resolving rights-based clashes as required under a Convention compliant model of litigation.  
 
Eekelaar and the Modified Least Detrimental Alternative Method 
 
Given the relationship-based approach fails to provide a means of resolving conflict between 
the interests of parties, Eekelaar attempted to offer a means of resolving conflict via a modified 
relationship-based approach. For Eekelaar, this can be achieved without substantively 
modifying section 1(1) CA. Instead, he argues the paramountcy principle should be 
reinterpreted in the light of recognising children as independent rights holders. 
 
Eekelaar seeks to advance his theory by dividing a child’s interests into three areas: basic, 
developmental and autonomy.26 Basic and developmental interests are rights in the strong sense 
in that these are necessities such as feeding, shelter and basic education.27 In the event of 
 
26 John Eekelaar, Family and personal life, (1st edition, OUP, 2006) 155 
27 ibid 160 
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conflict, these interests should take precedence over the third category of autonomous interests. 
Autonomous interests are complex in nature. These interests necessitate that a child has some 
ability to participate in decisions affecting their upbringing.28 Therefore, according to Eekelaar, 
a reinterpretation is able to retain section 1(1) CA if it allows scope for a child to engage in a 
process of ‘dynamic self-determination’.29 This, for Eekelaar,  is a means to discover what is 
‘good’ for an individual child and implies neither licence nor that the child becomes the only 
voice in the decision making process.30 Therefore, a child’s views are ‘fed into a shifting social 
matrix and its wants are viewed against the matrix’.31 If these wants are unrealistic then they 
will be modified. This theory recognises, like those of Bainham and Herring, that a child’s 
interests should not automatically assume paramountcy and that they must be weighed against 
other relationships. Through dynamic self-determination, Eekelaar creates the potential for a 
child’s views to be assessed independently and aims to provide children with a weightier role 
in determining what lies in their own best interests. This, inevitably, will develop as the child 
grows older.32  
 
Eekelaar’s later work turns to the question of how to resolve conflict in these situations. The 
solution proposed is to adopt a course of action that ‘avoids inflicting the most damage on the 
well-being of any individual’.33 To calculate which result provides this, Eekelaar proposes that 
a value is assigned to benefit and detriment resultant of a court order. The calculation appears 
thus, supposing there were three possible orders with the following benefit (+) and detriment 
(-) ratio:34 
 
Solution 1: C+15, X+10, Y-30 
Solution 2: C+10, X+10, Y-20 
Solution 3: C+5, X-5, Y-10 
 
If a court were to utilise the current interpretation of section 1(1) CA it would be bound to 
follow Solution One as this maximises the welfare of the child. However, under Eekelaar’s 
 
28 Jonathan Herring, ‘Parents and children’, in John Eekelaar Family law issues, debates and policy, (1st edition, 
Willian Publishing, 2001) 
29 John Eekelaar, ‘The interests of the child and the child’s wishes: the role of dynamic self-determinism’ (1994) 
8 IJLF 42  
30 ibid 
31 ibid 2 
32 ibid 2 
33 John Eekelaar, ‘Beyond the welfare principle’, (2002) 14 CFLQ 237 
34 C stands for Child. X and Y stand for the parents. Similarly, + stands for benefit and – for detriment. 
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‘modified least detrimental alternative’ approach, the court should opt for Solution Three given 
that spreads disadvantage across all parties and minimises the detrimental impact on both X 
and Y.35 Whilst C will have marginally less benefit, Solution Three avoids Y suffering 
disproportionately and minimises any detriment to X. This provides the most ‘propitious 
environment’ to develop a child’s three interests.36 To summarise, Eekelaar proposes that the 
child be afforded a greater role in decisions affecting their upbringing. This is achieved by his 
focus on ‘dynamic self-determination’. However, when these interests come into conflict with 
the interests of other family members, Eekelaar denies that they should automatically assume 
paramountcy. Instead, the paramountcy principle should be reinterpreted so as to favour the 
solution that avoids inflicting the most damage on any individual.  
 
When attempting to apply Eekelaar’s theoretical approach to litigation, it appears overly 
complex in that it is difficult to see how a court would quantify values pertaining to benefit and 
detriment. Such a finding is significant for this thesis because, no matter which reinterpretation 
is favoured, it must be remembered that it is to be applied by judges. Taking the facts in Re E, 
it would seem that the only party with a positive outcome in that case would be the mother. 
The father would seem to have a strongly negative score in that he bore the detriment of losing 
continued contact with his child. The child would also bear a negative score in that he loses 
contact with his father. The benefit to the child, in this case, is centred around his mother being 
able to meet any welfare needs by living where she chose. Therefore, employing Eekelaar’s 
formula, it is difficult to assign a score to the child because there are no tangible benefits for 
him per se. The court must, therefore, engage in a speculative process of quantifying 
benefit/detriment that would see the interests of the child aligned strongly with the interests of 
the primary carer. Thus, drawing on Eekelaar’s methodology, the solution in Re E may appear 
as follows: 
 
Solution 1: C-5, X+20, Y-10.  
 
Whilst this is unappealing, given it allocates detriment to the child, it would form a legitimate 
solution under Eekelaar’s theory assuming the solution is not considered ‘inappropriate’.37 This 
 
35 Eekelaar, ‘The interests of the child (n29) and his discussion of J Goldstein, A Freud and A J Solnit, Beyond 
the best interests of the child’, (Second edition, New York Free Press, 1979) 
36 Eekelaar, ‘Beyond the welfare principle’ (n33) 237 
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test of ‘inappropriateness’ is introduced by Eekelaar as a means of discounting potential 
solutions where detriment is attributed as a result of every possible solution. Importantly, as 
Eekelaar concedes, this term can only be elucidated by examples such as expecting a child to 
remain and care for a terminally ill parent.38  Therefore, although Eekelaar clearly attempts to 
develop a structured model of judicial discretion, his theory fails to provide the guidance judges 
would require with regards to assigning value to interests and in determining when a situation 
is deemed ‘inappropriate’. Indeed, in order to give effect to such application of the 
paramountcy principle, judges would necessarily be afforded wider discretion than under the 
current model. Given the aim of this thesis is to create a structured account of judicial 
discretion, Eekelaar’s proposals cannot be accepted as viable in practice. 
 
Furthermore, this thesis argues that this numerical approach reintroduces the winner/looser 
dichotomy that the Children Act 1989 and subsequent amendments sought to jettison. Instead, 
the Children Act 1989 seeks to encourage cooperation between parents to maximise the welfare 
of the child.39 It is in this light that Lord Mackay stated, when debating what was to become 
the Children Act 1989, that: ‘[t]he overwhelming purpose of parenthood is the responsibility 
for caring and raising the child’; the Children Act ensures this is a mutual responsibility.40 
Therefore, the Children Act 1989 ensures that parental responsibility does not end, for the 
father, if it is acquired by other individuals involved in the care of the child.41 Whilst the 
unmarried father will not automatically acquire parental responsibility upon the birth of the 
child,42 the Act provides multiple avenues to acquire responsibility either via a court order or 
with the consent of the mother.43 This emphasis on co-operation is further emphasised by the 
rise of couples choosing to settle familial disputes via ‘collaborative practice’. This is a more 
transparent method of dispute resolution aimed at keeping parents out of courts and around the 
negotiating table. 44 Therefore, it is evident that the Children Act 1989 envisages a collaborative 
approach to maximising a child’s welfare that will, following the adoption of section 1(2A) 
CA, presume involvement with both parents is in the best interests of the child. The addition 
 
38 Eekelaar, ‘Beyond the welfare principle’ (n33) 238 
39 See HL Deb, 6th December 1988, Vol.502, 448  
40 HL Deb, 6th December 1988, Vol.502, 449 
41 Section 2(6) CA 1989 
42 Section 2(2)(a) CA 1989 
43For example, registration on the child’s birth certificate with the consent of the mother; s4(1)(a)CA 1989. A 
Court may grant the father PR via a s4(1)(c) CA order. 
44 See Connie Healy, ‘Dispute resolution through collaborative practice: a comparative analysis’, (2015) 27 
CFLQ 173 
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of the presumption in favour of continued parental involvement reflects the belief that ‘the 
evidence is clear that children do better with both parents as fully involved in their lives’.45 
 
It is argued that envisaging detriment based on a judicial ‘scoring’ system undermines this 
collaborative approach. Instead, Eekelaar’s thesis creates a looser/winner dichotomy. This 
places parents in direct competition in a manner that threatens to undermine the centrality of 
protecting a child’s welfare. Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, Eekelaar’s proposals, 
although they offer a substantive means of balancing the interests of parent and child, are not 
actionable in practice and cannot assist in achieving Convention-compliance.  
 
However, as Kilkelly notes, Eekelaar’s work is an important contribution in terms of 
‘normalising’ the proposition that the child’s voice should play a leading role in decisions 
affecting their wellbeing.46 This seeks to ensure that a reinterpreted section 1(1) CA operates 
fairly and serves to advance the rights of children. Therefore, in this thesis seeking to move 
practice towards a ECHR compliant model, Eekelaar is an important influence in terms of 
bridging the welfare-rights gap that has been evidenced in domestic litigation. In that sense, it 
is suggested that Eekelaar’s work is actually reflective of the UNCRC position in maximising 
the child’s voice in decisions affecting their wellbeing. 
 
It is argued that the two categories of proposals analysed thus far fail to adequately satisfy the 
problem of Convention-compliance and do not provide a means of balancing the rights of 
litigants in a manner that ‘reflects the important social and moral value that children must be 
protected from harm’.47 However, these theories evidence an attempt to structure the judicial 
discretion inherent in application of the paramountcy principle. Whether this be through 
assigning numerical values to certain interests or simply looking to party relationships, both 
the oppositional and relationship-based approaches attempt to provide guidance and greater 
clarity to judges in the context of making, varying or discharging section 8 CA orders. For the 
various reasons provided above, these attempts to structure discretion have proven 
unsuccessful. Therefore, this thesis will now turn to a deontological method of reinterpreting 
 
45 Tim Loughton, ‘Children’s minister clarifies nature of proposals for shared parenting after divorce’, < 
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46 Ursula Kikelly, ‘Best interests of the child, A gateway to children’s rights?’, in, Lesley Anne-Barnes 
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(1st edition, CUP, 2016), 62 
47 Judith Mason, Rebecca Bailey-Harris, Rebecca Probert, ‘Principles of family law’, (8th edition, 2008, Sweet 
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section 1(1) CA that will align itself more closely with the requirements set down by the 
ECtHR. However, this thesis will identify that such an approach is complex to realise in 
practice. It will be the purpose of Chapter Five of this thesis to simplify these deontological-
based proposals in the light of Dworkinian jurisprudence. 
 
 
Developing a Deontological Framework for Reinterpreting the Paramountcy Principle 
 
Following the criticisms levelled at previous proposals, academics such as Fortin, Choudhry 
and Fenwick have sought to amend the statutory construction of section 1(1) CA.48 These 
proposals seek to isolate the interests of individual litigants yet differ by utilising a rights-based 
method of balancing these in the event of conflict. It is important to note that, whilst this thesis 
will adopt Choudhry and Fenwick’s parallel analysis as the basis for its own Convention-
compliant model of litigation, it does not do so without developing both the means of achieving 
reform and methods to be used when balancing the rights of litigants.  
 
Prior to Choudhry and Fenwick’s contribution, Fortin proposed a rights-based framework that 
developed a change in terminology from interests to rights. This was an important progression 
in light of earlier comments surrounding the adaptation of an oppositional approach to 
accommodate the language of rights. Fortin initially envisaged a structure similar to the 
formulation of the paramountcy principle outlined by Lord Oliver in Re KD.49As discussed in 
Chapter Three, such an interpretive approach results in the child’s interests serving as an 
automatic justification under article 8(2) ECHR. This provides a ‘simple method of retaining 
the paramountcy principle as currently understood.50 However, as subsequent ECtHR 
jurisprudence evidences, Fortin’s initial proposal does not achieve Convention-compliance. 
Here, Chapter Three outlined the inconsistency with applying section 1(1) CA as an automatic 
justification under article 8(2) ECHR as a matter of law. Indeed, such an approach has been 
described as ‘cavalier’ in its interpretation of the Strasbourg jurisprudence.51 
 
48 Note Helen Reece made early undeveloped observations surrounding the need to develop a rights-based 
framework when using section 1(1) CA in Helen Reece, ‘The paramountcy principle- consensus or construct?’, 
(1996) 49 LP 303 
49 Jane Fortin, ‘See Jane Fortin, ‘The HRA’s impact on litigation involving children and their families’ (1999) 11 
CFLQ 225. Citing Re K.D (A Minor) (Ward: Termination of access) [1988] A.C 806 
50 ibid 
51 Shazia Choudhry, ‘The adoption and Children Act 2002, the welfare principle and the Human Rights Act 
1998- a missed opportunity?’ (2003) 15 CFLQ 131  
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In response, Choudhry and Fenwick developed the parallel analysis and this will form the main 
focus for the remainder of this Chapter. Categorised as a deontological approach, Choudhry 
and Fenwick sought to reinterpret the paramountcy principle as the ‘primary principle’. 
Therefore, under their proposed methodology, courts would first identify individual article 8(1) 
rights on a presumptively equal footing before then applying an article 8(2) proportionality 
exercise to each. In this respect, the rights of the child assume ‘primary’ importance during this 
article 8(2) process. The following section will analyse these proposals in greater detail in order 
to fully outline the expectations on courts when applying the primary principle. Importantly, 
this Chapter will update the work of Choudhry and Fenwick in light of recent case-law, before 
critiquing the application of the ‘primary principle’. 
 
Interestingly, Choudhry and Fenwick do not fully consider the influence of the UNCRC in 
assisting domestic practice move towards a rights-based interpretation of section 1(1) CA. 
They note that the UNCRC may have a role in turning the ECHR into ‘workable tool for rights 
protection’ before merely stating this is a process that would have to be undertaken by 
individual judges.52 This is surprising in light of their reform proposal (the primary principle) 
linguistically mirroring the current formulation of article 3(1) UNCRC. As a result, this thesis 
suggests that article 3(1) UNCRC can assist in structuring a workable reform proposal that is 
readily applicable in domestic practice. 
 
Employing Section 3 HRA 
 
For Fenwick, the solution to satisfying section 1(1) CA with the demands of the ECHR is to 
‘bring section 3 HRA to bear against the paramountcy principle’.53 Section 3 HRA states that, 
so far as is possible, primary legislation must be read, and given effect to, in a manner 
compatible with Convention rights. As Sir Steven Sedley argued, by Parliament placing this 
interpretive obligation at the heart of the HRA, the process of judicial reasoning has been 
fundamentally altered.54 Resultant of section 3, domestic courts have ‘[assumed] a great deal 
 
52 Choudhry and Fenwick (n1) 490 
53 Helen Fenwick, ‘Clashing rights, the welfare of the child and the HRA’ (2004) 67 MLR 889 
54 Sir Stephen Sedley, ‘The rocks or the open Sea: Where is the Human Rights Act heading?’ (2005) 32 JLS 3,9 
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of constitutional responsibility’ for robust domestic rights protection.55 The aim of this section 
is provide the basis for Choudhry and Fenwick’s use of section 3 HRA to reinterpret section 
1(1) CA. However, in Chapter Five of this thesis, their use of section 3 HRA will be challenged 
as constitutionally inappropriate and, instead, this thesis will propose that a section 4 
Declaration of Incompatibility is the more appropriate means of achieving reform. 
 
The extent to which section 3 HRA permits courts to reinterpret legislation to cure non-
compatibility with Convention rights is subject to debate. The leading case on the use of section 
3 is Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza.56 Ghaidan concerned a challenge to the Rent Act 1977 in that 
the Act permitted succession to a particular form of tenancy by spouses. As a result, individuals 
in homosexual relationships, unable to marry at that time, could not succeed to a tenancy under 
the Act. The appellants challenged this as a breach of article 8(1), taken with article 14, of the 
ECHR. 
 
The House of Lords began by noting there existed clear discrimination as a result of applying 
the statutory provision.57 The question of relevance for this thesis became one of how to remedy 
the statutory incompatibility. The court had the option of reinterpreting the legislation via the 
use of section 3 HRA. Lord Nicholls stated that the powers to do so were ‘unusual and far 
reaching’ and allowed courts to ‘read in’ and modify the meaning of primary and secondary 
legislation.58 The majority further found that section 3 HRA may require the court to ‘depart 
from unambiguous meaning legislation would otherwise bear’.59 This resulted in the 
application of section 3 not depending on the ‘particular form of words adopted by the 
draftsmen’ and thus judges could legitimately ‘read in’ and ‘modify’ the meaning of primary 
and secondary legislation to achieve Convention-compliance.60 
 
However, this is not to say such powers were without limit. The court stated that section 3 
HRA could not be used to give effect to an interpretation contrary to parliamentary intention.61 
 
55 Aileen Kavanagh, ‘Choosing between section 3 and 4 Human Rights Act: Judicial reasoning after Ghaidan v 
Godin Mendoza’, in Helen Fenwick, Gavin Philipson and Roger Masterman, Judicial reasoning under the UK 
Human Rights Act, (1st edition, CUP, 2007) 142 
56 [2004] UKHL 30 
57 ibid [5] 
58 ibid [30] 
59 ibid [29] 
60 ibid [32] 
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Furthermore, judges are limited to a ‘sphere of legislative meaning’62 in that section 3 could 
not be used to read ‘black as white’.63 This prevents reinterpretation of terms that would prove 
fundamentally inconsistent with the primary features of the legislation. For Lord Millet, who 
dissented, an example of such was extension of a provision providing for tenancy succession 
by mixed-sex to same-sex couples.64 This said, the majority of the House of Lords found that 
there was no inconsistency in using section 3 HRA to reinterpret the relevant provision of the 
Rent Act. As a result, the House of Lords mandated that the relevant provision, instead of 
stipulating the couple are husband and wife, should read: as if the couple were husband and 
wife.65 As Bellamy argues, this interpretation of the power contained in section 3 corresponds 
to the overriding aim of the HRA to ‘bring rights home’.66 It is accurate to describe section 3 
HRA as a rights enhancing provision that imbues judges with a discretionary power to provide 
relief in instant cases via curing non-compliance in domestic legislation. Its use was central to 
the reinterpretation Choudhry and Fenwick argued was necessary to cure non-compliance in 
application of the paramountcy principle. 
 
Whilst Ghaidan was one of the first cases in which the House of Lords utilised its new powers 
under section 3 HRA, its assertion that the obligation was powerful and far-reaching has been 
cited frequently in appellate courts. In a recent piece, Wagner and Barth have stated that, 
following analysis of contemporary public-law jurisprudence, ‘where the legislation leaves 
room for manoeuvre, a court should use section 3’.67 Later case law has emphasised that section 
3 empowers a court to find a possible, as opposed to reasonable, interpretation to achieve 
Convention-compliance.68  
 
However, recent application of section 3 HRA by family courts would seem to cast some doubt 
on the strength of the obligation in certain cases. TT concerned a transgender man whom had 
received a Gender Recognition Certificate (GRC).69 Under section 9(1) Gender Recognition 
Act 2004, attainment of a GRC had the effect of TT becoming a male for ‘all purposes of the 
 
62 Richard Bellamy, ‘Political constitutionalism and the Human Rights Act’ (2011) 9 IJCL 86, 90 
63 Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza (n56) [70] as per Lord Millet 
64 ibid [78]  
65 ibid [51] (emphasis added) 
66 Bellamy, (n62) 90 
67 Adam Wagner and Gideon Barth, ‘Judicial interpretation or Judicial vandalism” Section 3 of the HRA 1998’ 
(2016) 21 JR 101 
68 Helen Fenwick, Gavin Philipson and Alexander Williams, Text, Cases and Material on Public Law and 
Human Rights, (4th edition, Routledge, 2017) 
69 R (on the application of McConnell) v Registrar General [2020] EWCA Civ 559 
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acquired gender’. However, upon TT giving birth to a child, and consequently seeking 
registration as father, the relationship between section 9 GRA and section 12 GRA came into 
question. Whilst section 9 GRA states that the GRC is valid for all purposes of the acquired 
gender, this seemed to conflict with section 12 GRA which stated a certificate did not alter the 
status of a mother following childbirth. On appeal, TT argued that denying him the ability to 
register as the child’s father was a breach of his article 8(1) rights. He argued that section 12 
GRA was not prospective in effect and, as such, did not restrict the scope of section 9(1) GRA. 
Therefore, in his submission, parenthood was ‘a purpose’ of the acquired gender. If the Court 
of Appeal found against him on this, he argued, in the alternative, that such a construction 
would breach his article 8(1) Convention rights and so the court was under an obligation to 
reinterpret section 12 GRA in a compliant manner via use of section 3 HRA. 
Whilst the Court of Appeal approved the President’s previous analysis of the domestic statutory 
position in the High Court, it made obiter comments on the obligation to bring section 3 to bear 
against section 12 GRA.70 Here, the Court of Appeal was wary of appearing to legislate on 
what were emotive social questions and it repeatedly drew attention to the ‘democratic 
legitimacy’ enjoyed by Parliament that was not shared by the courts.71 The court held that the 
proper place of the judiciary, in a post HRA-legal framework, was as a body of review that 
‘should be slow to occupy the margin of judgement more appropriately within the preserve of 
Parliament’.72 Despite the court providing no further elucidation as to how far this ‘margin of 
Parliamentary judgement stretches’ it was clearly wary of applying the section 3 obligation in 
this sensitive area of public policy. Such unwillingness has been evidenced in cases such as 
Bellinger v Bellinger in which the House of Lords refused to use section 3 as a remedial tool 
to recognise a post-operative transsexual as female under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.  
Therefore, in this thesis updating the work of Choudhry and Fenwick, one may now say that, 
whilst the interpretive obligation contained in section 3 HRA is a strong one, the courts have 
shown a reluctance in applying this to sensitive social and family-based questions. Such 
considerations are amplified given the fragile political context of the HRA today. However, in 
the example of TT, it is important to remember that the High Court and Court of Appeal found 
that there was no breach of the litigants Convention rights. This makes discussion of section 3 
HRA a secondary issue and, therefore, it becomes unlikely that the court would advocate for 
 
70 The Queen (on application of TT) v Registrar General for England and Wales [2019] EWHC 2384 (Fam) 
71 R (on the application of McConnell) v Registrar General (n69) [82] 
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its application in obiter. In chapters Two and Three, this thesis analysed the contemporary case-
law of the family courts to find a modest willingness to engage with rights-based language in 
contact disputes. However, a highly strained application of the Strasbourg jurisprudence was 
found to undermine the Convention-compliance these judgments purported to achieve. As 
Chapter Five will discuss, for Choudhry and Fenwick, writing shortly after Ghaidan, it was not 
unrealistic to envisage the use of section 3 HRA to reinterpret section 1(1) CA in a Convention-
compliant manner. Indeed, even today, this would seem to form the most straightforward 
means of remedying any incompatibility. However, given the reluctance of courts to engage in 
issues of social policy, alongside continued non-compliance with demands under the ECHR in 
recent years, this thesis will argue that recourse to section 4 HRA is the more appropriate means 
of achieving reform at a statutory level. 
Application of Section 3 HRA to Section 1(1) CA 
 
For the purposes of reinterpretation, Choudhry suggests that the linguistic reinterpretation of 
section 1(1) CA need not be radical. She argues that the term paramount connotes ideas of pre-
eminence rather than the interpretation adopted under the J v C model of application.73 
Therefore, Choudhry and Fenwick argue that the courts should reinterpret the paramountcy 
principle as the ‘primary principle’ using their section 3 HRA interpretive powers. In the light 
of requirements laid down in Ghaidan, this does not fundamentally alter the meaning of the 
legislation given children’s interests are still privileged under the ‘primary principle’. Such a 
reinterpretation would ensure that no rule of prioritisation could apply automatically to pre-
empt the proportionality exercise required under article 8(2) ECHR.74 As will be analysed 
shortly, such an approach would necessitate the court first identifying competing article 8(1) 
rights before proceeding to balance these against each other in an ‘ultimate balancing exercise’.  
 
This, according to Ferguson, would still make children a ‘special case’.75 Here, Ferguson 
creates a distinction between the prioritisation and privileging of children’s interests.76 
Prioritisation favours children’ rights at the outset of any decision-making process in that a 
 
73 Choudhry (n51) 131 
74 Lucinda Ferguson, ‘An argument for treating children as a special case’, in Elizabeth Brake and Lucinda 
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child’s interests a prioritised as a matter of law.77 This is contrasted with privileging the rights 
of children. This approach grants greater weight to the interests of the child when contrasted 
with the interests of an adult.78 In a balancing exercise, the primary principle would dictate that 
judges assess the rights of children and adults on a presumptively equal footing. If these rights 
were to come into conflict, judges should then privilege the rights of the child under article 
8(2). Importantly, if this was the case, the rights of the child have not been automatically 
prioritised as a matter of law. Ferguson’s theory is significant for this thesis in that it 
corresponds to the application of the primary principle that is utilised as a basis for its own 
reinterpreted model of litigation. 
 
Such an approach is also in accord with the position of the Strasbourg court in constituting a 
move away from the welfare-centric model of family law. Indeed, Fenwick identifies modest 
support for such a move in atypical family litigation.79 For example, the judgment in Ex Parte 
Gangadeen highlights judicial understanding of the disparity between the domestic and 
Strasbourg positions relating to the paramountcy principle. Here, the judge held that the 
Convention case law dictated ‘the problem involves a simple balancing exercise in which the 
scales start even and where the weight to be given to the considerations on each side are to be 
assessed according to the individual circumstances of the case’.80 Thus, in the context of those 
proceedings, the paramountcy principle did not automatically guarantee the prioritisation of 
the child’s rights over and above those of the parent.81 
 
Here, it is worth briefly considering the similarities between Choudhry and Fenwick’s proposal 
and article 3(1) UNCRC. The UN committee on the Rights of the Child has presented article 
3(1) as a principle that gives rise to a substantive right. This is a child’s right to have their best 
interests assessed as a primary consideration when weighted against interests of other parties 
relevant the issue at stake.82 Therefore, article 3(1) UNCRC can be described as a rights 
enhancing principle in that, procedurally and substantively, it seeks to ensure that a child’s best 
interests receive a privileged status in law. This is reflected in debates surrounding adoption of 
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article 3(1) UNCRC in which contracting states discussed the relative merits of paramountcy 
and primacy-based models. In terms of how a ‘primacy’ model would operate, it was argued 
that ‘primacy’ implied that other considerations may be taken into account and balanced 
against the interests of children to find a suitable compromise.83 In this compromise, a child’s 
interests would be afforded ‘high priority’.84 
 
It is in this sense that focus on the UNCRC can illuminate what Choudhry and Fenwick are 
trying to achieve in their model of the primary principle whilst also assisting in bridging from 
a welfare-centric to rights-based model of domestic litigation. As Kilkelly notes, the line 
between a child’s rights and interests remains ‘blurred and increased domestic focus on an 
international rights-enhancing provision can only assist in both delineating that line and 
achieving better understanding of a rights-based approach to litigation.85 Indeed, discussion of 
the weight attached to a child’s interests will inform statutory amendment proposed in Chapter 
Five of this thesis and serves to provide context to Choudhry and Fenwick’s initial reform 
proposal.  
 
Therefore, for Choudhry and Fenwick, there existed both a constitutional and precedential basis 
for re-interpretation of the paramountcy principle via the interpretive obligation found in 
section 3 HRA. However, this thesis will not simply accept the demands of the parallel analysis. 
Instead, this Chapter will seek to critique the parallel analysis and develop a more simplistic 
model of litigation that is actionable in domestic family courts. This Chapter will now analyse 




Deriving a Methodology from Media Law Disputes 
 
Choudhry, Fenwick and Fortin all point to the development of jurisprudence balancing rights-
claims advanced under article 10 and 8 as demonstrative of the approach the family judiciary 
would adopt under the parallel analysis. Importantly, regarding the balance between article 10 
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and 8, section 12(4) HRA dictates that the court must have ‘particular regard’ to the importance 
of the Convention right to freedom of expression. This section will now analyse the decision 
in Re S as representative of the approach judges should undertake when applying Choudhry 
and Fenwick’s ‘primary principle’. 
 
The Court of Appeal and House of Lords decisions in Re S offers a means of interrogating the 
process of judicial reasoning advocated under the parallel analysis. The case concerned the 
proposed granting of an injunction surrounding publication of the defendant and victim’s 
identities in a murder trial. This restriction would have served the purpose of protecting the 
identity of the son who was the subject of ongoing care proceedings. Here, the victim was S’s 
brother and expert evidence suggested that revealing S’s identity would have caused 
considerable harm to his welfare. At first instance it was held that, despite the court having 
competence to grant the order, it would not do so.86 Importantly, the court granted pre-
eminence to article 10 and, as a result, the rights of the child were only considered as an 
exception under article 10(2).87 
 
On appeal, the Court of Appeal adopted Hale LJ’s (as she then was) analysis of the law.88 The 
majority found that Hedley J was correct in asserting that the High Court had the jurisdiction 
to grant the injunction although, in light of the HRA, the court’s jurisdiction may now exist to 
the extent that it becomes the ‘vehicle’ to conduct the balancing exercise required between 
article 10 and 8 ECHR.89 Importantly, in what appears to introduce an element of horizontal 
effect, Fenwick states that the Convention rights themselves provide this vehicle as opposed to 
the inherent jurisdiction of the court. If this were correct, it would appear that, in calling for 
restraint to protect the privacy of the child, it would make no difference if the inherent 
jurisdiction existed or not given this is now a rights-based assessment. This takes the primary 
focus of litigation away from the existence of the court’s jurisdiction and towards the correct 
means of balancing competing Convention rights.90 
 
 
86 Re S (A child) (identification: restrictions on publication) [2003] EWCA Civ 963 [1] 
87 Re S (A child) (identification: restrictions on publication) [2003] EWHC (Fam) 
88 Note that the majority diverged from Hale LJ on the application of the law to the instant case. Therefore, 
whilst the court of first instance applied erred in law, this would not have altered the decision it reached. 
89 Re S (A child) (n86) [40] 
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Hale LJ constructed the conflict of rights as follows. The child’s right to respect for private and 
family life is engaged. Therefore, any interference with that right must be justified by reference 
to article 8(2). This comes into conflict with the newspaper’s article 10(1) right to freedom of 
expression, including the public’s right to freely receive information, and any restriction must 
be justified by reference to article 10(2).91 This is, therefore, a situation whereby two qualified 
rights come into conflict. In what Fenwick terms a ‘highly significant break’,92 the Court of 
Appeal rejected the pre-eminence of article 10 over article 8. Instead, both articles were 
‘independent elements’ that required independent analysis.93 This was found on the authority 
of A v B in which Lord Woolf stated: ‘[e]ach article is qualified expressly in a way which 
allows the interests under the other article to be accounted’.94 As a result, the High Court had 
erred in assuming article 10 took priority and it was an error in law to treat article 8(1) rights 
as mere exceptions under article 10(2). 
 
This gives rise to the ‘presumptive equality’ between articles 8 and 10 ECHR.95 It is against 
this background that the Court of Appeal undertook the proportionality exercise using both 
articles 8(2) and 10(2). The Court of Appeal first assessed the proportionality of the proposed 
interference with article 10(1) rights. Here, the court noted the particularly significant aspects 
of the right engaged; the importance of reporting criminal trials in ensuring public confidence 
in the law, the corresponding public interest in receiving the information and the controversial 
aspects of this particular trial.96 There existed a strong public interest in permitting publication 
and vindicating the newspapers article 10(1) rights. However, this did not mean that a 
justification could not be found under article 10(2).97 For example, the court considered what 
impact prohibiting publication of photographs and the family name would have on the article 
10(1) right. Importantly, the Court of Appeal noted that CS’s mother was not yet convicted and 
reasoned that there was a stronger public interest in publication of already convicted abusers. 
 
The Court of Appeal then proceeded to examine the issue of proportionality from the 
perspective of CS’s article 8(1) right to respect for private and family life. Here, the court 
identified four relevant considerations when analysing the extent of the interference with CS’s 
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rights. Firstly, the court had to consider the extent to which publication would add to the 
existing interference and the extent of any further harm that identification would cause. 
Additionally, the court considered the impact of publication not only on the child but on his 
family in providing for the welfare of CS and, finally, the impact on the child’s relationship 
with his mother.98 Therefore, the Court of Appeal found that Hedley J erred in not conducting 
the ‘difficult balancing exercise’ required under the Convention.99 For Hale LJ, given the 
proposed infringement on the article 10(1) right was ‘not so great’, it was possible to find 
justification under article 10(2). She concluded that the case should be sent for rehearing in the 
High Court in which the complex exercise should be conducted. 
 
In summary, and offering key insights for this thesis, a judge should begin by acknowledging 
the presumptive equality between article 8 and 10 before identifying each independently. For 
example, the article 8(1) right should be identified before undertaking the article 8(2) balancing 
exercise. Here, article 10(1) rights constitute exceptions. The same process should then be 
undertaken starting with article 10(1). This process constitutes the balancing act required under 
the ECHR.100 Such an approach was subsequently affirmed by the House of Lords in which 
Lord Steyn termed Hale LJ’s approach the ‘ultimate balancing exercise’.101 Importantly, Hale’s 
approach was approved in Angela Roddy where the court applied the Re S approach to 
proportionality in finding the existence of the court’s jurisdiction allows no more than an 
assessment of presumptively equal Convention rights.102 Re S was further affirmed by the 
House of Lords in Campbell v AGM Ltd. Here, Hale LJ’s dictum was found to be ‘entirely 
consistent’103 with requirements laid down by the ECtHR with Lord Hoffmann asserting that 
‘there is no question of automatic priority’.104 Such an approach forms the basis for judicial 
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The Role of Section 1(1) CA in Re S 
 
Given that presumptive equality between article 8 and 10 has received approval from the House 
of Lords in both Re S and Campbell, Choudhry and Fenwick argue it is now the authoritative 
approach for when qualified Convention rights come into conflict.105 However, whilst Re S 
provides an indication of how the courts should approach the ‘ultimate balancing exercise’, its 
relationship with section 1(1) CA undermines the Convention-compliance it purports to 
achieve. In Re S, in accordance with the first instance court, the Court of Appeal held that 
publication did not affect the manner in which CS was to be brought up given this was the 
subject of separate care proceedings. As a result, the case did not fall in the scope of section 
1(1) CA. At first instance, Hedley J held obiter that, even if the case had fallen within the scope 
of section 1(1) CA, this would not have made a material difference to his decision.106 
 
In the Court of Appeal holding that the matter did not concern the child’s upbringing, it avoided 
confrontation between the ECHR and section 1(1) CA.107 However, Hale LJ repeated the 
domestic J v C exposition of the paramountcy principle by stating ‘if the child’s welfare is the 
paramount consideration, then when everything else has been taken into account and weighed, 
it rules on or determines the issue before the court’.108 The court went so far as to describe the 
paramountcy principle as a ‘trump’ card.109 Evidently, if the paramountcy principle acts as 
such, it would seem to upset the presumptive equality of articles 8 and 10 as they would only 
be equal insofar as the paramountcy principle does not apply.110 This reveals the ‘logically 
flawed’ aspect of the judgment that renders it non-compliant with demands under the ECHR.111 
This is because, if the paramountcy principle had applied, the result of the balancing exercise 
would have been predetermined before assessment of the Convention rights on a presumptively 
equal footing.112  
 
In response, Choudhry and Fenwick argue that the methodology in Re S should apply to cases 
in which the paramountcy principle is applied by the courts.113 This would seem preferable in 
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that, although its application could be avoided in the Media Law dispute in Re S, it would seem 
more difficult to circumvent in a standard section 8 CA hearing. Furthermore, given 
presumptive equality applies to clashes between Convention rights, Fenwick asserts it is only 
logical that it applies to clashes within Convention rights.114 Therefore, the parallel analysis 
would apply equally to conflict between qualified Convention rights as to conflict within a 
singular Convention right (competing rights under article 8(1)). These findings are significant 
in the context of this thesis because, as is apparent from Chapter Two, the litigation analysed 
involves singular Convention rights in cases which the application of the paramountcy 
principle is not disputed. It is only via the extension of the Re S methodology to such cases that 
a Convention-compliant model of litigation can be achieved. 
 
 
Applying the Parallel Analysis to Litigation 
 
As a means of modelling how the primary principle may operate in practice, this thesis will 
adopt a fictitious contact dispute envisaged by Herring. Whilst Herring devised the dispute to 
model his ‘relationship-based welfare’ approach, the rights-based conflict makes it suitable for 
highlighting the operation of the parallel analysis.115 It is argued that, by applying the 
interpretive process used in Re S, we are left with a model of litigation that permits the 
privileging of children’s rights following their identification on a presumptively equal footing. 
 
Herring’s hypothetical scenario concerns what were previously termed contact orders sought 
by a non-residential father. The child, in this scenario, resides with the mother whilst the father 
is serving prison time for violent offences. As such, the mother must facilitate contact by taking 
the child to prison and this is something the she opposes given the father has a history of 
violence against her. This said, expert evidence suggests that contact may be beneficial for the 
child. Importantly, the Strasbourg court has held that the parental right to family life does not 
terminate on relationship breakdown and that parents enjoy a continuing right to enjoyment of 
the child’s company.116 Therefore, to infringe this right, and refuse to grant the section 8 order, 
the court must find justification under article 8(2) ECHR. 
 
114 Choudhry and Fenwick (n1) 465 
115 Herring, ‘The Human Rights Act and the Welfare Principle- Conflicting or Complementary? (n11) 
116 The question of whether there exists a right to contact on the part of a non-residential father is a contested 
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Hokkanen v Finland (application No.19823/92) [1995] 19 E.H.R.R. 139 as authority for a parental right to contact. 
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Here, we are faced with a not uncommon situation whereby a non-resident father seeks a 
section 8 CA order to facilitate contact with their child. It is important to remember that, as a 
public authority under section 6(3)(a) HRA, it is unlawful for the court to act in a manner 
incompatible with Convention rights. Therefore, the father does not need to point to a pre-
existing order to establish a breach of his Convention rights. Instead, he is able to advance a 
rights-based argument from the outset. Realistically, despite the parallel analysis purporting to 
place the rights of the litigants in a (here) tri-partite analysis that first identifies 8(1) rights, 
before balancing these against each other under 8(2), the court would begin with the 8(1) rights 
of the father as he is bringing the application. The following section will demonstrate how such 




The court would begin by identifying the article 8(1) rights of the non-resident father as 
comprising his right to a meaningful relationship with the child. The court would have to 
consider to what extent the refusal to grant a section 8 CA order would infringe that right. The 
court would look to the individual circumstances of the case and what impact this may have on 
the strength of the application. Here, this may encompass the desirability of granting contact 
to individuals with a violent past or the reasons the father has for seeking contact. The latter 
would be relevant if his motivation was to merely damage the welfare of the child.117 The court 
may conclude that the article 8(1) right exists (albeit in a weak form) and, as such, refusal to 
make a section 8 order constitutes an infringement of his Convention rights. Thus, in an article 
8(2) balancing exercise, the court would require less weighty reasons for displacing the article 
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The court would then identify the article 8(1) right engaged on the part of the child.119 The 
court would note the child’s right to respect for family life exists in relation to both the 
residential and non-residential parent. Given the identification of article 8(1) rights occurs on 
an equal footing to other parties, the court can examine any features of the case that may impact 
the scale of the rights infringement. For example, the court may question the importance of 
children enjoying contact with violent non-resident fathers or children undertaking contact in 
public prisons. Using the approach in Re S, the court may find that, although the article 8(1) 
right is present, its manifestation in the welfare of the child dictates that they are not as strong 
as if the father were a non-violent and supportive figure. Therefore, the justification required 
to infringe the article 8(1) right need not be necessarily weighty. 
 
The court would then proceed to consider justifications for infringing the right under article 
8(2). This is where this scenario must be differentiated from Re S in which the Court of Appeal 
reasoned that the case did not engage the paramountcy principle. Such an approach is not 
possible here in that section 1(1) CA is clearly relevant to the proceedings. Therefore, in order 
to afford the children’s interests some degree of privilege in the article 8(2) balancing exercise, 
the court would apply the ‘primary principle’. In doing so, as Fenwick argues, the court 
recognises that children’s rights still require independent and robust protection in a post-HRA 
legal framework.120  
 
Resident Mother  
 
Before adjudicating on whether the father’s rights have been infringed, the court would 
consider the article 8(1) rights of the mother. She is a relevant party to the litigation because 
she would be responsible for facilitating contact with the father. Under article 8(1) the mother 
would likely argue that, as an aspect of her right to respect for private life, she should not have 
to endure contact with a previously abusive partner. On the facts, the court may decide this is 
a relatively severe rights infringement given the history of abuse perpetrated against her. 
 
 
119 Choudhry and Fenwick, ‘Taking the rights of parents and children seriously: Confronting the Welfare Principle 
under the Human Rights Act’, (n1) 488 
120 ibid 
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Granting the Section 8 Order in These Circumstances 
 
Using this example, the court would have identified the various article 8(1) rights of the parties 
in a tripartite parallel analysis. As a consequence, the proportionality assessment has been 
applied to each individual set of article 8(1) rights forming the ultimate balancing exercise. In 
this sense, it is clear that each parties’ rights, though assessed independently, are not mutually 
exclusive. This will prove significant for the cumulative balancing exercise outlined in Chapter 
Five in which it is argued that a relational approach is central to creating a balancing exercise 
that recognises the interconnectivity of independent rights in the family unit. 
 
From the perspective of the father, refusal to grant the section 8 CA order is a prima facie 
infringement of his article 8(1) right to respect for family life. Here, these rights would balance 
against the already identified rights of the mother and child under article 8(2). In terms of the 
proportionality assessment, the court would need to decide to what extent the child may be 
harmed as a result of any contact with the father. If there was a degree of positive harm then it 
may be proportionate to either limit or prevent contact.121 The court would further have to 
examine the extent to which contact with the father would damage the child’s relationship with 
the mother. Again, if contact were to cause significant damage, the proportionality exercise 
dictates that the article 8(1) right of the father be justifiably infringed. 
 
From the perspective of the child, the court must respect both his right to contact with the 
father, his relationship with the mother and interest in not engaging with potentially harmful 
individuals. Under an article 8(2) balancing exercise, the child’s welfare would be the primary 
concern of the court. This necessitates that the child’s welfare is subsumed within a rights 
discourse and the child’s rights, manifested in their welfare, are privileged. This, as per the 
ECtHR jurisprudence in Johnasen, affords a privileged status in law and means that a parent 
cannot pursue a course of action that will actively harm the child.122 In this case, in treating the 
child’s rights as the primary consideration, a court may well grant the section 8 order in favour 
of the father given the presence of expert evidence to this effect. However, more importantly, 
the court would have engaged in a Convention-compliant model of litigation that firstly 
identified composite article 8(1) rights before balancing these against each other in an article 
 
121 ibid 490 
122 Johansen v Norway (application no. 17383/90) [1997] 23 E.H.R.R. 33 
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8(2) analysis. In that process, the child’s rights are privileged in accordance with the demands 
of the, now reinterpreted, primary principle. This gives rise to a model of litigation that closely 
accords with the demands of the ECtHR in Johansen in that a child’s rights may, dependent on 
their nature and severity, override those of the parents. In this sense, Choudhry and Fenwick’s 
proposals provide a basis for this thesis’ further reinterpretation of the paramountcy principle. 
 
 
Criticism of the parallel analysis 
 
Lack of Engagement with Application of Legal Principles 
 
This thesis does not intend to adopt the parallel analysis without adaptation. Whilst Choudhry 
and Fenwick’s model provides a Convention-compliant methodology, it does not engage in a 
theoretical debate surrounding the term ‘principle’ and this, it is argued, leaves their proposals 
vulnerable challenge based on the findings of Chapter One and Two of this thesis. In Chapter 
One, the essential distinction between a Dworkinian rule and principle was established. Chapter 
Two then applied this to the current application of the paramountcy principle to provide a novel 
critique of domestic law when viewed through the lens of Dworkinian legal theory. This thesis 
argues that the consequences of the terms ‘paramount’ and ‘primary’ are, in part, dictated by 
the way in which we understand a legal principle to operate. As has already been shown, the J 
v C model operated as a ‘rule’ in that it necessitated the automatic prioritisation of the child’s 
interests at law. In response to this, Choudhry and Fenwick devised the ‘primary principle’ to 
prevent automatic prioritisation of children’s interests in an article 8(2) balancing exercise.  
 
It is the contention of this thesis that, without a basic juristic understanding of how a principle 
operates in law, it is a simple step for the judiciary to revert back to interpreting the primary 
‘principle’ as granting priority to a child’s welfare as expressed via their article 8(1) 
Convention rights. This would correspond to the rule-like application of the paramountcy 
principle identified in Chapter Two of this thesis. As Ferguson identifies, it is questionable to 
what extent judges would adopt ‘clear reasoning’ in relation to the weight afforded to children’s 
rights when viewing litigation through a rights-based lens as opposed to welfarism.123 It is 
 
123 Lucinda Ferguson, ‘Not merely rights for children but children’s rights: The theory gap and the assumption of 
the importance of children’s rights’ (n74) 188 
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argued that, without a juristic understanding of the term principle, a judge may easily lapse into 
a rule-like application of section 1(1) CA even after reinterpretation via section 3 HRA. This 
is because, given the reality of litigation and the pressures of an over-stretched family justice 
system, it is more time-effective to simply begin with the article 8(1) rights of the appellant 
before assessing the rights of the child as an exception. If this were to occur, it is only a small 
step to grant the child’s rights priority therein. As will be developed in the following Chapter, 
although Choudhry and Fenwick provide passing reference to the paramountcy principle’s 
application as a ‘rule’, they do not develop this in order to protect their own model of litigation 
from such judicial interpretation.  
 
As Chapter Five will argue, a juristic understanding of principles ensures that the judiciary 
continue to balance substantive article 8(1) Convention rights against each other on a 
presumptively equal footing. This is because principles possess many of the characteristics that 
Fenwick seeks to endow upon article 8(1) rights under the parallel analysis. For example, 
principles do not necessitate automatic legal consequences and instead enjoy an element of 
weight that permits balancing to resolve conflict. It is argued that a closer focus on the term 
‘principle’, as opposed to the adjective (primary), allows for robust rights protection in 
ensuring continued application of the ‘ultimate balancing exercise’. 
 
Lack of Structured Guidance when Applying the Parallel Analysis 
 
The danger of the family judiciary simply applying the orthodox model of the paramountcy 
principle arises because Choudhry and Fenwick do not provide enough guidance to judges in 
applying their new model of litigation. Their model is an important thought-experiment but 
lacks an appreciation of how it could be applied in practice. As a result, it is argued that 
Choudhry and Fenwick’s ‘primary principle’ fails to deliver the structured discretion this thesis 
seeks to deliver. Choudhry and Fenwick provide only limited discussion of how section 3 HRA 
would actually be used by appellate courts to reinterpret section 1(1) CA. Instead, they merely 
reference how section 1(1) CA would ‘undergo re-definition’ but this need not be radical and 
would result in use of the term ‘primary’.124 They argue this would accord more closely with 
the position of the ECtHR and obviate the need for a section 4 Declaration of Incompatibility. 
 
124 Choudhry and Fenwick, ‘Taking the rights of parents and children seriously: Confronting the Welfare 
Principle under the Human Rights Act’, (n1) 480 
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Whilst, in an academic response to Convention-non-compliance, this grants a full account of 
actions an appellate court must take, in reality, it is difficult to envisage a judge undertaking 
this interpretive process in full. Even without discussing the constitutional appropriateness of 
reinterpretation via recourse to section 3 HRA, Choudhry and Fenwick do not provide an 
adequate framework out of which an appellate court would reinterpreted section 1(1) CA and, 
therefore, this thesis argues their works utility in actioning such reform is limited. 
 
Furthermore, this lack of guidance is amplified by the complexity of the process judges are 
expected to undertake. As has been shown throughout this thesis, section 8 CA order hearings 
can involve multiple parties each with conflicting claims. The scenario adopted in this thesis 
saw a judge undertaking a tri-partite analysis. In many section 8 CA applications there may be 
more parties to the litigation. This would force an already time-pressured family judge to 
identify every article 8(1) right before applying an article 8(2) balancing exercise to each. This 
thesis argues that it is unrealistic to expect lower level family judges to undertake this 
cumbersome process.  
 
Indeed, such a criticism recognises that implementation of the primary principle is subject to 
individual judges in litigation and they will apply their own conceptions of what the primary 
principle demands. Even if Choudhry and Fenwick’s model were to be adopted by appellate 
courts, this would simply result in the House of Lords stating that the paramountcy principle is 
to be reinterpreted as the primary principle and its application requires a model of litigation 
akin to that in Re S. In realistic terms, for a divisional family court, this will take time to filter 
into judicial reasoning and likely have little to no effect on the manner in which immediate 
section 8 litigation is conducted. This is because such a finding provides a judge with no 
structure as to how they are to conduct Convention-compliant litigation aside from the complex 
and time-consuming process required under the Re S model of litigation. The danger then 
becomes that, accounting for the nature of precedent in the family system, judges simply 
continue paying lip-service to Convention arguments and justify orders based on a simple 
welfare analysis. It is argued this is not an unrealistic assertion given the existing inconsistency 
in the weight attached to Convention-based submissions in the case-law.  
 
Therefore, it is argued that a successful and realisable reinterpretation of the paramountcy 
principle must be mindful that, whilst academically achieving a compliant methodology is 
important, this must be applied by judges in litigation. Chapter Five of this thesis will attempt 
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to develop a simplistic and realisable model of Convention-compliant litigation that seeks to 






This chapter has analysed the various reinterpretations of section 1(1) CA and found a 
deontological approach to be the most actionable Convention-compliant model of litigation. 
Such an interpretation, in the form of Choudhry and Fenwick’s parallel analysis, requires the 
use of section 3 HRA to reinterpret the paramountcy principle as the primary principle. This 
reinterpretation seeks to privilege the child’s rights as opposed to granting automatic priority 
as a matter of law. These rights are expressed through a child’s welfare requirements. Such a 
model of judicial reasoning was then modelled on a contact dispute to evidence how judicial 
reasoning would occur when undertaking the ‘ultimate balancing exercise’. 
 
However, this thesis does not intend to accept Choudhry and Fenwick’s account of the parallel 
analysis in totality. Instead, in the next Chapter, Dworkinian jurisprudence will be applied to 
the primary ‘principle’ to ensure judicial interpretation does not lapse into the language of 
rules. It is argued that the unique contribution of this thesis is twofold. Firstly, this thesis 
provides a contemporary account of the relevant jurisprudence in terms of applying rights-
based language to contact disputes. This has evidenced an increased willingness to frame 
section 8 orders in terms of rights but a questionable application of the Strasbourg case-law. 
This highlights the second unique contribution of this thesis which is the re-evaluation of the 
parallel analysis in light of the jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin. This provides Fenwick’s 
theory with both an understanding of the term ‘primary’ and ‘principle’ that is so crucial in 
determining its interpretation. This thesis argues that a well-informed understanding of judicial 
discretion, as evidenced in Chapter One, will assist when thinking about how to apply 









































Having adopted Choudhry and Fenwick’s reinterpretation of section 1(1) CA as a basis for 
achieving compliance with demands in a post-HRA legal framework, this thesis will now look 
to develop the parallel analysis through a focus on analytical jurisprudence. Choudhry and 
Fenwick’s proposals provide a valuable starting point in terms of identifying a Convention-
compliant methodology for the separation, identification and balancing of conflicting article 
8(1) rights in child law disputes. However, it is the purpose of this Chapter to re-evaluate the 
parallel analysis using the theoretical lens outlined in Chapter One to create a structured model 
of judicial discretion in section 8 CA applications. 
 
Central to this is appreciation of the two critiques advanced in this thesis. These are the 
application of the paramountcy principle as a Dworkinian-stye rule and domestic non-
compliance with obligations under the ECHR. This Chapter will connect these two criticisms 
by arguing a rule-like application of the paramountcy principle prevents domestic Convention-
compliance because, logically and when conceptualised through theoretical jurisprudence, a 
rule cannot be balanced given it applies in an all-or-nothing fashion.1 As has been suggested, 
Choudhry and Fenwick fail to engage directly with this and instead focus solely on 
reinterpreting ‘paramountcy’ as ‘primary’. 
 
This Chapter endeavours to justify reimagining Choudhry and Fenwick’s proposals to create a 
more coherently structured model of judicial discretion. It is argued that, through a closer focus 
on the nature of a legal principle, the complexities of the Re S model of litigation can be 
simplified and applied in everyday children’s litigation. This Chapter will critique the parallel 
analysis and conclude that, whilst its use by the judiciary is preferable, realistically, it is 
unlikely to be followed in lower level family courts. Instead, a basic understanding surrounding 
the nature of legal principles will automatically lead a judge towards the language of article 
8(2) in that, owing to the element of weight a principle enjoys, they require balancing. Whilst 
 
1 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (8th edition, Bloomsbury, 2018) 41 
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this by no means attempts to prevent courts from undertaking the parallel analysis, it seeks to 
provide a simplistic means of moving lower courts towards a Convention-compliant model of 
reasoning in private family litigation.  
 
 
Connecting the Taxonomical Critique with ECHR Non-Compliance 
 
This thesis has focussed on two of the main criticisms surrounding application of the 
paramountcy principle. This section will now briefly review each of these criticisms before 
assessing the connection between the two and how they relate to the proposed thesis.  
 
Chapter Two of this thesis identified a previously unexplored critique concerning application 
of the paramountcy principle. Analysis of the domestic case-law was preceded by discussion 
of the Law Commission documents leading to the adoption of the Children Act 1989. These 
documents evidenced clear confusion as to the taxonomic status of section 1(1) CA in domestic 
law. Therefore, even before adoption of the legislation and subsequent application by the 
courts, Chapter Two concluded that there existed uncertainty as to the precise status of section 
1(1) CA which, invariably, affected its application in practice. Such confusion was further 
evidenced through analysis of both the historical and contemporary case law. Here, J v C forms 
the orthodox approach to the paramountcy principle.2  Given the recent paucity of academic 
commentary, Chapter Two contained a detailed analysis the paramountcy principle’s 
application. Recent cases such as Re H,3 evidence the continued application of the J v C 
approach as the comprehensive test to be applied in private law litigation concerning children.  
 
This application of the paramountcy principle was then analysed through the lens of 
Dworkinian jurisprudence with a focus on the distinction between rules and principles. The 
prevailing application was found to link closely to the characteristics of a legal rule. This was 
because, once a case falls in the ambit of section 1(1) CA, a judge possesses no scope for 
balancing a child’s interests against those of other litigants. From a Dworkinian perspective 
this would seem to suggest that, even today, the paramountcy principle is applied in an all or 
nothing fashion.4  
 
2 J v C [1970] AC 668, 388 
3 PA v TT, H (A child by way of 16.4 Children’s Guardian) [2019] EWHC 2723 
4 Dworkin (n1) 41 
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In addition to this previously unexplored criticism, Chapter Three analysed domestic non-
compliance with demands under article 8 ECHR. Following analysis of the Johansen line of 
case-law, this thesis concluded that, at the very least, the ECtHR demands that the interests of 
all parties be independently assessed and weighed against each other under an article 8(2) 
balancing exercise.5 It is only in that article 8(2) exercise than any privileged status can be 
attributed to the interests of the child. This is the position in spite of the recent developments 
in Yousef which were found to form a mere ‘aberration’ on the court’s previously well-
established approach.6  
 
This was contrasted with the domestic position on Convention-compliance and this was divided 
into two composite branches. Firstly, as per the House of Lords in Re B, judges have presumed 
divining the best interests of the child, by use of section 1(3) CA, satisfies requirements under 
article 8(2) ECHR given this forms factually the same process that is undertaken in cases 
concerning Convention rights.7 Secondly, judges have treated the interests of the child as an 
automatic justification under article 8(2) as a matter of law. This finds expression in Payne and 
holds that a factual assessment of the case is unnecessary because the interests of the child will 
inevitably outweigh those of the parents.8 Both of these approaches were found to premised on 
a misunderstanding of the Strasbourg jurisprudence. 
 
Turning to domestic application of the paramountcy principle, contemporary case-law points 
to the overall rejection of a rights-based discourse in cases falling in the ambit of section 1(1) 
CA. This is evidenced in the dicta of Mr Justice Keehan in Re O: ‘The test is, and must always 
be, based on a comprehensive analysis of the child’s welfare’.9 Such dicta was taken as the 
basis for characterising the application of section 1(1) CA as rule-like in nature. Whilst it is too 
far to suggest the Family Division have adopted a deontological approach to litigation, this 
thesis concluded that the language of rights was beginning to permeate some section 8 CA 
judgments. Whilst references to rights were largely cursory comments such as: ‘In addition to 
those statutory provisions the court must have regard to the article 8 rights of both parents and 
of G’,10 the jurisprudence seems to suggest that certain judges are more receptive to rights-
 
5 Johansen v Norway (application no. 17383/90) [1997] 23 E.H.R.R. 33 
6 Shazia Choudhry, ‘The adoption and Children Act 2002, the welfare principle and the Human Rights Act 1998- 
a missed opportunity?’ (2003) 15 CFLQ 119 
7 Re B (A Minor) (Adoption: Natural Parent) [2001] UKHL 70 [31] 
8 Payne v Payne [2001] EWCA Civ 166 
9 Re L (a Child) [2019] EWHC 867 (Fam) 
10 Re G (A child: Intractable Contact) [2019] EWHC 2984 (Fam) (emphasis added) 
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based arguments than others. However, as shown above, the overall picture is one of family 
judges applying a rule-like model of the paramountcy principle that still refers to interests as 
opposed to rights. Therefore, reference to rights was taken as an indication of judicial 
personality as opposed to a change in mindset. 
 
This rejection of a rights-based approach has been further noted in domestic reports on 
implementation of the UNCRC. As has already been noted, article 3(1) states that a child’s 
interests shall be the primary consideration in all actions concerning them. Given the UK 
operates under a dualist system, Parliament must incorporate the UNCRC for it to have any 
binding legal affect. At the moment, it has not done so.11 As such, Taylor described the current 
welfare-centric model as ‘falling far short’ of the requirements in article 3(1) UNCRC.12 This 
has been noted and criticised in a 2015 JCHR report into UNCRC compliance in the UK.13 As 
such, it is clear that both domestic courts and Parliament have rejected a move towards a rights-
based model of litigating disputes involving children’s interests. 
 
The connection between this rejection and domestic non-compliance is clear if seen through 
the Dworkinian distinction between a rule and principle. A rule applies in an all or nothing 
fashion; for example a Baseball player is out after three strikes. Such a rule cannot be balanced 
against other considerations, outside of those specified in the rule itself, and either applies or 
is set aside.14 In contrast, a principle suggests a direction but does not necessitate a course of 
action as a result of its application.15 When applied, principles will conflict with other 
principles and can be said to enjoy an element of weight in that they must be balanced in the 
resolution of any given situation.  
 
Therefore, given this thesis has established application of the paramountcy principle as rule-
like, it is clear why judges cannot conduct an article 8(2) balancing exercise under the current 
application of section 1(1) CA. This is because rules cannot be balanced in application. If a 
rule applies, it determines a specific outcome. If that outcome is not reached, the rule is not 
binding and set aside. Therefore, if the application of the paramountcy principle dictates that 
 
11 Note, some devolved assemblies have given effect to the language of section 3(1) UNCRC. See Rachel 
Taylor, ‘Putting Children First? Children’s interests as a primary consideration in public law’, (2016) 28 CFLQ 
49 
12 ibid 51 
13 Joint Committee on Human Rights, ‘The UK’s compliance with the UNCRC’, HC, 1016 (2015). 
14 Dworkin, (n1) 41 
15 ibid 
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the best interests of the child are determinative then, by definition, these interests cannot be 
balanced against any other rights . It is in this sense that uncertainty surrounding the 
terminology employed by the Law Commission assumes significance in the context of this 
thesis. If the provision within section 1(1) CA is termed the paramountcy rule then Convention-
compliance, premised on the balancing of rights, becomes impossible. If termed the 
paramountcy principle, Convention-compliance becomes possible depending on the correct 
judicial application of a legal principle. 
 
Therefore, by connecting the taxonomy of the term principle to non-compliance with demands 
under the ECHR, this thesis can justify the use of a theoretical lens through which to develop 
the proposals of Choudhry and Fenwick. It is by connecting these two criticisms that this thesis 
can fully highlight the shortfalls of the parallel analysis. It is argued that, regardless of how 
paramountcy is reinterpreted, ignoring application of the term ‘principle’ undermines any 
Convention-compliance reinterpretation may purport to achieve. It is only by combining the 
practical aspects of the term ‘primary’ with theoretical considerations inherent in the term 
‘principle’ that a full account of domestic Convention-compliance can be established. 
 
 
Adapting the Parallel Analysis 
 
Given this thesis has established a logical connection between the taxonomical critique and 
ECHR non-compliance, it can now confront adapting Choudhry and Fenwick’s parallel 
analysis. In doing so, this thesis remains mindful of the fact that any reinterpretation must be 
applied by judges. Therefore, whilst maintaining a commitment to establishing a Convention-
compliant methodology, this thesis is cognisant of the realities of litigation and the fact that 
judges are unlikely to exhaustively apply the Re S model of reasoning. Therefore, in order to 
construct a realisable model of the primary principle, extensive guidance is required to structure 
the judicial discretion in both the application of section 1(1) CA and subsequent jurisprudence 
concerning the balancing of rights. 
 
This Chapter will now outline a modified construction of the parallel analysis that places 
emphasis on a juristic interpretation of a legal principle. Such an approach would involve a 
judge identifying composite article 8(1) rights on a presumptively equal footing before 
undertaking a cumulative balancing exercise that begins with the article 8(1) rights of the child. 
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In this sense, the welfare of the child is the ‘primary’ consideration in a wider framework that 
recognises the rights of other litigants.  
 
Judicial Understanding of Legal Principles 
 
It is important to re-emphasise that this thesis does not seek to challenge reinterpretation of 
paramountcy as the ‘primary principle’. This reinterpretation is an important step towards 
preventing the automatic prioritisation of children’s welfare. Instead, in order to develop the 
Convention-compliant nature of the parallel analysis, domestic judges should be instilled with 
a juristic understanding of the divergence between applying a legal rule and principle. Judicial 
understanding need only form a working knowledge. What a judge must comprehend, 
following this thesis’ taxonomic critique, is how principles are balanced against other each 
other to indicate a particular legal result. This gives rise to the balancing of rights in a structured 
model of judicial discretion. 
 
Under this thesis’ re-development of the parallel analysis judges must appreciate why section 
1(1) CA requires reinterpretation under section 3 HRA. For Choudhry and Fenwick, 
reinterpretation was necessitated as a result of domestic case-law failing to satisfy requirements 
under article 8(2) ECHR. This thesis has developed that critique and argued that domestic non-
compliance is, in turn, caused by the misapplication of the paramountcy principle as a rule. It 
is the latter statement that must now assume greater significance. Judges must appreciate that 
a legal principle enjoys an element of weight. This necessitates its balancing against other 
competing principles. Linguistically, a judge cannot then afford automatic priority to the 
interests of a child whilst applying a legal principle. It is the element of weight that will later 
be identified as ensuring that a fully theoretically-informed application of a legal principle 
mirrors the process required under article 8(2) ECHR.  
 
This thesis argues that such an understanding can be modelled onto the issuing of a section 8 
CA order to simplify the parallel analysis methodology. Through a full understanding of a 
principles weight, a judge is automatically drawn towards the language of article 8(2) and is, 
therefore, more likely to follow a process that is Convention-compliant. Such an argument 
seeks to respond to the reality of family litigation in non-appellate courts. If an appellate court 
were to carry out the full Re S methodology then this would evidently satisfy Convention-
compliance but, as this thesis has discussed in the context of lower courts, this is not realisable. 
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With hindsight, it is clear that family courts have not adopted the deontological approach 
espoused by Choudhry and Fenwick and, given its complexity coupled with the reality of 
litigation, it is unlikely they will do so moving forward. What this thesis provides is a means 
of retaining a modified form of the parallel analysis that is actionable in everyday family 
litigation.  
 
Simplifying the Re S Methodology 
 
In developing the work of Choudhry and Fenwick, this thesis must first confront the meaning 
of what has previously been termed the ‘privileging’ of children’s interests in the form of the 
‘primary principle’. In Choudhry and Fenwick’s work, little exposition is provided surrounding 
how the ‘primary principle’ would operate in practice or how judges would apply the 
appropriate weighting to the rights it seeks to protect. In the redevelopment of this thesis, the 
welfare of the child is primary in that any article 8(2) analysis conducted by the courts must 
begin with consideration of the child. This will be analysed in greater depth but such provision 
is an important development of the parallel analysis in terms of judicial actionability.  
 
Taking Herring’s hypothetical scenario as an example, this thesis will now model how 
adaptation of the parallel analysis can produce a Convention-compliant model of litigation that 
is simplistic and easily applied in everyday family litigation. Under Choudhry and Fenwick’s 
parallel analysis, a judge should begin by identifying the composite article 8(1) rights of each 
party. This step is not challenged in this thesis. In order to achieve Convention-compliance it 
is important to identify article 8(1) rights on a presumptively equal footing without attaching 
any automatic prioritisation. Additionally, a judge would also examine any features of the case 
that may weigh particularly on the strength of the Convention right. Neither of these exercises 
differ from the methodology provided in Chapter Four and apply equally to the article 8(1) 
rights of the resident mother and child. 
 
In addition, it is argued that express recognition of the need to identify article 8(1) rights on a 
presumptively equal footing would have further benefits in defining the scope of article 8(1) 
rights. This thesis has already commented on the amorphous nature of article 8(1) and the rights 
it purports to protect. As has been discussed in Chapter Four, some argue that this incorporates 
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a right to contact with a child.16 Others, sceptical of the Strasbourg support for this position, 
argue that the article 8(1) right merely protects the right to a meaningful relationship with a 
child. In having to identify article 8(1) rights on a regular basis, domestic courts would 
inevitably achieve clearer definition of domestic protections under article 8(1). This forces 
courts to confront the amorphous scope of the right and is a process numerous academics have 
called on since the advent of the HRA itself.17 
 
The Cumulative Balancing Exercise under Article 8(2) 
 
Following this, in this thesis’ fictitious scenario, a judge would have identified the three 
composite article 8(1) rights and found conflict to exist between them. Under the parallel 
analysis as originally conceived, a Family judge would need to engage in a justificatory 
analysis for each litigants article 8(1) rights under article 8(2). This would then be repeated in 
a tri-partite justificatory evaluation. It is argued that this is time-consuming, complex and, 
given judges may not have an extensive academic grounding in the justificatory analysis 
required, a potentially easily confused process. It is the purpose of this Chapter to simplify this 
process. 
 
Before this thesis introduces the utility of Dworkinian principles, it is pertinent to first outline 
how its reinterpretation of the parallel analysis would seek to operate in practice. Instead of a 
justificatory analysis applying to each individuals article 8(1) rights, this thesis argues that 
judges should undertake a cumulative article 8(2) analysis beginning with the rights of the 
child. In beginning with the rights of the child, a judge is reminded that their rights remain 
privileged in law under the ‘primary principle’. However, as per the requirements in Johansen, 
these are still subject to a balancing exercise alongside the rights of mother and father in this 
scenario. This simplifies the analysis required under Choudhry and Fenwick’s parallel analysis 
in that only one article 8(2) analysis need be conducted. 
 
Importantly, these proposals are influenced by the attempts of Bainham and Herring to 
structure discretion in application of the paramountcy principle. In the identification of article 
8(1) rights, this thesis adopts an oppositional approach to reinterpreting the paramountcy 
 
16 Jonathan Herring ‘The Human Rights Act and the Welfare Principle- Conflicting or Complementary?’ (1999) 
223 CFLQ 1, 7 
17 Jane Fortin, ‘The HRA’s impact on litigation involving children and their families’ (1999) 11 CFLQ 225 
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principle in that, like Bainham, the article 8(1) rights of the three litigants are identified as 
existing in conflict to each other.18 If such a claim were left at that stage, then this thesis would 
be subject to the same criticisms as those made against Bainham’s work as such a formulation 
provides no means for resolving conflict. However, in terms of merely identifying article 8(1) 
rights, viewing the rights in individualised terms is helpful in assessing the scope and strength 
of the right therein. 
 
However, in providing a simplified model of the article 8(2) justificatory process, this thesis 
draws on the relational approaches to the paramountcy principle espoused by academics such 
as Herring and, later, Eekelaar.19 In the parallel analysis, Choudhry and Fenwick envisaged a 
separate justificatory process applying to each individual article 8(1) right. This seems a similar 
oppositional approach to that adopted by Bainham in the identification of article 8(1) rights. 
Instead, this thesis argues that, in conducting a cumulative article 8(2) analysis, judges can 
draw on a relationship-based approach to allow broader assessment of the balancing exercise 
required in terms of the relationships between parties. This is a relational assessment judges 
will be used to making in routine findings of facts. Such a cumulative approach requires judges 
to look to the relationships between the parties when conducting the balancing exercise that 
begins with the primary rights of the child. This is significant because it prevents judges 
viewing rights in individualised terms under article 8(2) and, instead, focuses a judge towards 
the interdependency of the family unit.  
 
Therefore, when faced with the three article 8(1) rights, the judge in this fictitious scenario 
would conduct a cumulative article 8(2) justificatory analysis. The judge would begin with the 
article 8(1) rights of the child, manifested in their welfare requirements, and balance these 
against the rights of other litigants. Here, the domestic judge would weigh the rights of the 
child against those of the parents, having regard to their nature and severity, before deciding 
whether an order is justified in that factual scenario. In the hypothetical situation, the child’s 
right to enjoy a meaningful relationship with both parents, alongside their interest in avoiding 
contact with those who may harm them, would be balanced against the right of the father to a 
 
18 Andrew Bainham, ‘Honour thy father and thy mother: Children’s rights and Children’s duties’, in Gillian 
Douglas and L Sebba (eds), Children’s rights and traditional values, (1st edition, Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1998) 
211 
19 Herring (n13) and John Eekelaar, ‘The interests of the child and the child’s wishes: the role of dynamic self-
determinism’ (1994) 8 IJLF 42 
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relationship with his son and right of the mother to avoid contact with her abuser. Such a 
situation, with clashing interdependent rights, aligns itself closely with a relationship-based 
approach. In this sense, as per the requirements outlined in Chapter Three, the rights of the 
child are privileged in law whilst still subject to a factual enquiry before any order is issued. 
This forms a methodology that this thesis argues is much more practically realisable in 
everyday litigation and that provides a structured account of judicial discretion when applying 
the revised section 1(1) CA. 
 
 
Realising the Primary Principle in the Domestic Legal Framework 
 
One of the criticisms levelled against the work of Choudhry and Fenwick was that their 
reinterpretation of the paramountcy principle was an academic response to the critique they 
advanced. In terms of applying their reinterpretation to a domestic framework, they were 
content to allow judges to adapt the paramountcy principle through recourse to section 3 HRA 
and thus concluded that no statutory amendment was required in order to achieve compliance 
with demands under the ECHR. This thesis will now challenge these findings by arguing 
statutory amendment to section 1(1) CA is required to ensure judges engage with the process 
of identifying and balancing rights under article 8(2). Following such amendment, family 
judges could begin to develop a jurisprudence in terms of applying the primary principle in 
litigation. This provides for the structured discretion so important to the proper functioning of 
the primary principle. 
 
Here, it is pertinent to address the continued role of welfare in this thesis’ revised deontological 
approach. Importantly, this thesis does not advocate total abandonment of the welfare 
assessment in its revised model.  In Choudhry and Fenwick’s work, they envisaged the welfare 
of the child becoming primary. Therefore, a welfare assessment became implicitly relevant to 
the article 8(2) ‘ultimate balancing exercise’. Here, competing interests, articulated as article 
8(1) rights, could be balanced against each other with the welfare of the child becoming the 
primary consideration of the court. Therefore, the child’s welfare was the means of expressing 
article 8(1) rights. 
 
In contrast, this thesis will examine welfare, and explicitly rights, at both the article 8(1) and 
8(2) stages. This is through a statutory provision stating that exploration of a child’s welfare 
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shall encompass recognition of their rights. Therefore, the link between welfare and rights is 
made explicit. It is through framing litigation around competing article 8(1) claims, that the 
‘primary principle’ allows litigants to ventilate ECHR-based claims. Given this forms a 
deontological model of litigation, the traditional welfare assessment will be undertaken as a 
means of examining the article 8(1) rights of the child. It is in this sense that thesis is able to 
bridge the gap between welfarism and rights through creating an almost ‘hybridised’ model of 
litigation. As will be suggested, this allows domestic courts to retain the traditional welfare 
analysis they are so used to undertaking whilst framing that process in a Convention-compliant 
manner. 
 
Statutory Amendment to Section 1(1) CA 
 
When this thesis critiques the work of Choudhry and Fenwick, it is mindful of the legal 
background against which it was written. Their reinterpretation of the paramountcy principle 
was proffered shortly after the House of Lords handed down judgment in Ghaidan v Godin 
Mendoza in which it identified the ‘unusual and far-reaching’ powers granted to the court by 
virtue of section 3 HRA.20 It is unsurprising, therefore, that Choudhry and Fenwick chose 
judicial reinterpretation via section 3 HRA as the means by which to realise the primary 
principle and parallel analysis methodology. 
 
It is argued that, in order to realise the modified parallel analysis presented in this thesis, 
recourse to section 3 HRA is unappealing. This is not necessarily because such a 
reinterpretation would ‘go against the grain’ of the legislation, although such reinterpretation 
would require an undoubtedly bold judge, but more that appellate courts have refused to use 
section 3 in this activist manner in recent years. This was discussed in Chapter Four of this 
thesis and the domestic position now seems one in which a court is more likely to show ‘caution 
and defence’ as opposed to an expansive approach to reinterpreting non-compliant 
legislation.21 There are further questions of efficiency surrounding invocation of the section 3 
interpretive obligation. If an appellate court were to remedy non-compliance, given the loose 
system of precedent in often fact-specific and discretionary family law adjudication, there 
would be uncertainty as to whether lower level family judges would either realise the 
 
20 Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30 [30] 
21 Adam Wagner and Gideon Barth, ‘Judicial interpretation or Judicial vandalism” Section 3 of the HRA 1998’, 
(2016) 21 JR 99 
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significance of reinterpretation or implement it. Here, analysis of judgments in lower courts 
evidenced how some judges still refuse to engage with rights in a post-HRA legal system and 
continue to behave as though advent of the HRA makes no difference to the way in which cases 
are litigated. Instead, Government intervention, and the consequential media and public 
attention, would ensure that lower level divisional judges are clearly aware of the changes in 
practice and the importance of implementation therein. 
 
This thesis argues that a section 4 HRA Declaration of Incompatibility is required in relation 
to section 1(1) CA. Such a declaration has the constitutional effect of alerting the legislature as 
to the non-compliant nature of the legislation and then placing an onus on Parliament to remedy 
this. Importantly, Parliament is not mandated to act in curing the inconsistency. Whilst the 
constitutional impact of a section 4 declaration lies outside the scope of this thesis, it is 
nevertheless normal practice for Parliament to respond by bringing forward compliant 
legislation and there is recent precedent for such. For example, in 2018, the Supreme Court 
issued a declaration of incompatibility in relation to section 1 and section 3 of the Civil 
Partnership Act 2004 containing a ban on opposite-sex civil partnerships.22 This was found to 
breach article 8, taken alongside article 14 ECHR, and, as a result of the section 4 declaration, 
the Government has recently brought forward primary and secondary legislation to remedy 
non-compliance.23 It is argued that such a process, given its recent success in achieving 
legislative reform, is a better and more precise means of effecting reinterpretation and creating 
a system of structured discretion in the reinterpreted section 1(1) CA. 
 
In advocating for statutory amendment, this thesis argues that any reinterpretation to section 
1(1) CA must outline the process judges are to follow in both identifying and balancing the 
rights of parent and child. Without such explanation, courts may simply revert to interpretation 
akin to application of section 1(2A) CA in that introduction of the presumption does not affect 
the nature of the paramountcy principle’s application to litigation concerning children. 





22 R (on the application of Steinfeld and Keidan) v Secretary of State for the International Development [2018] 
UKSC 32   
23 See s2(1) Civil Partnership, Marriages and Deaths (Registration etc) Act 2019 
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Section 1 Welfare of the child 
 
1(1) When a court determines any question with respect to- 
(a) The upbringing of a child; or 
(b) The administration of a child’s property or the application of any income arising from 
it 
 
The welfare of the child shall be the court’s primary consideration and such determination 
shall encompass full recognition of their rights. 
 
1(1A) When a court is determining any question under section 1, the court must both identify 
and balance the relevant individual rights of all parties to the litigation. 
 
It is argued that such amendment meets the key aims outlined in this thesis. Notably, this 
amendment achieves the hybridisation of welfare and rights central to this thesis’ argument. 
This is realised by section 1(1) CA referring to the welfare of the child and this sitting alongside 
section 1(1A) which directs domestic courts to identify and balance article 8(1) rights in 
litigation. This combined welfare and deontological approach is significant in that, in light of 
any statutory reform requiring a ‘sea change’ in judicial consciousness being unrealisable, this 
thesis seeks to give effect to a pragmatic model of litigation. Therefore, the revised section 1(1) 
CA allows a litigant to ventilate rights-based claims whilst retaining focus on the privileged 
nature of the child’s welfare requirements. It is in this sense that the amended section 1(1) CA 
balances a deontological approach with the existing welfare framework in a manner that 
structures judicial application of the primary principle. This further prevents any judicial 
reference to rights being the product of mere judicial personality. 
 
Whilst this reinterpretation of Choudhry and Fenwick’s work may not achieve the degree of 
ECHR-compliance that they believed desirable, it is argued that this methodology provides a 
manageable process for judges to undertake in litigation. It is in this sense that the reinterpreted 
section 1(1) CA takes courts towards Convention-compliance and provides the basis for further 
judicial interpretation to bolster the deontological approach it fosters. Indeed, this thesis does 
not suggest any further structuring of the discretion here aside from the explanatory notes 
accompanying the revised section 1(1) CA. These would include discussion of why the 
amendment was made and references to the identification and balancing exercises required 
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under a Convention-compliant model of litigation.24 It is argued that judges must undertake the 
process of further structuring application of section 1(1A) CA through developing a 
jurisprudence pertaining to the balancing of rights under article 8(2). Such a process is termed 
‘rule building discretion’. Given the guidance provided by the ECtHR, taken alongside 
obligations under section 6 HRA and the explanatory notes to section 1(1A) CA, family judges 
have clear authority for the process required in domestic litigation under article 8(2) ECHR.  
 
Incidentally, such statutory amendment would provide further benefits outside of the 
Convention-compliant focus adopted by this thesis. In Chapter Two, further criticisms 
surrounding the application of the paramountcy principle were found to include a lack of 
transparency, in that parents aligned their own interests with those of the child, and a failure to 
robustly protect the interests of children. The reinterpretation proposed in this thesis achieves 
broader improvement of section 1(1) CA in that it prevents the paramountcy principle acting 
as a smokescreen for protecting the interests of parties other than the child. In courts following 
the process outlined in section 1(1A), the rights of all litigants are independently identified on 
a presumptively equal footing. It, therefore, becomes impossible for one party to align their 
own rights with the child given the oppositional approach adopted. Furthermore, the welfare 
of the child receives robust protection in that a court is mandated to begin the article 8(2) 
balancing exercise with the rights of the child. This reaffirms the protections owed to children 
whilst also acknowledges that their welfare may override the rights of the parents dependant 
on a factual assessment of the case. 
 
Furthermore, statutory amendment has the benefit of moving domestic practice closer to a 
position that is compliant with demands under the UNCRC. If references to section 3(1) 
UNCRC are made within the now amended explanatory notes to section 1(1) CA, it is argued 
judges would begin to engage more actively with developing a practice that is compliant with 
international law. This, inevitably, would bring consistency to domestic and international 





24 This would necessarily include references to case law of the Strasbourg Court as analysed in Chapter Three of 
this thesis. 
 160 
Subsequent Judicial Development of the Primary Principle 
 
Numerous alternative descriptive accounts of judicial discretion have been discussed in order 
to evidence its pervasiveness and necessity in the domestic legal system. Following statutory 
amendment to section 1(1) CA, domestic judges would be granted an element of ‘rule-building 
discretion’ to develop a jurisprudence that interprets and applies the revised primary principle. 
Rule-building discretion occurs when a legislature could have provided exhaustive guidance 
surrounding the application of a statutory provision but, instead, grants courts a degree of 
discretion in building a body of case-law. This allows judges flexibility in applying certain 
provisions to novel scenarios and permits judicial development to achieve greater clarity for 
its invocation in lower level courts. Chapter One modelled this on section 1(3) CA which 
imports a degree of discretion in the weight afforded to certain subsections therein; for example 
granting more weight to the wishes and feelings of the child depending on their age. 
Importantly, the characterisation of this type of discretion as ‘rule building’ could import a 
degree of confusion given this thesis’ emphasis on legal principles. Therefore, for clarity, this 
type of discretion will now be termed ‘principle building’ discretion. 
 
This thesis argues that such an approach is suited to the development of jurisprudence 
pertaining to the revised section 1(1) CA. Given that one of the criticisms frequently levelled 
at the operation of the paramountcy principle is the seeming lack of structure in its application, 
the revised section 1(1A) CA is appealing in that it creates a clearly structured process for 
judges to undertake that can be developed in light of any changing requirements at Strasbourg 
level. Instead of exhaustively spelling out requirements under the balancing exercise, it is 
argued that permitting the development of a jurisprudence, in light of the section 2 HRA 
obligations, permits judges to further strengthen the Convention-compliant nature of section 1 
CA if appellate courts feel this is necessary. Realistically, this is a process that must be left to 
the domestic judiciary given both the nature of family litigation and historic hostility to 
deontological approaches.  
 
Therefore, the amended section 1(1A) CA provides a starting point that is consistent with the 
approach adopted under the UNCRC. Furthermore, the amended legislation cures the 
incompatibility identified by the section 4 HRA declaration and is, therefore, broadly consistent 
with the requirements outlined under article 8(2) by the Strasbourg court in Johansen. From 
this starting point, equipped with a degree of principle building discretion, family judges can 
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begin to build a Convention-compliant jurisprudence that adopts a deontological focus and 
balances the rights of parent and child in a cumulative exercise under article 8(2) ECHR. 
 
Why is this Development Necessary? 
 
Under such a model, the interpretive process a judge must follow is clear. This thesis argues 
that, by adopting a modified form of the parallel analysis, family courts would no longer 
produce confusing dicta such as that evidenced in Chapter Two. With section 1(1) CA now 
spelling out the methodology judges must undertake, the inherent tension between welfarism 
and deontology should no longer be evident in section 8 CA judgments. For example, the 
comments of His Honour Judge Bellamy in Re G would not be possible under a reinterpreted 
section 1(1A) CA. In Re G he stated: ‘In addition to those statutory provisions the court must 
have regard to the article 8 rights of both parents and of G and must endeavour to arrive at an 
outcome that is both proportionate and in G’s best interests’.25 Such comments were identified 
as creating an uneasy hybridisation of welfarism and rights that did not sit comfortably in the 
existing statutory framework. However, comments such as these would not be made under the 
revised section 1(1) CA given that the welfare of the child is now a primary consideration in a 
rights-based article 8(2) justificatory exercise. In that sense, given this provision achieves a 
coherent hybridisation between welfare and rights in that the proportionality exercise and 
primary principle are not separate enquiries but form part of one Convention-compliant 
methodology. 
 
Here, it is pertinent to contrast the dicta of Mr. Justice Keehan with requirements under the 
revised model of Convention-compliant litigation. In Re H, he asserted the centrality of section 
1(1) CA in dictating the order he could grant.26 However, Mr Justice Keehan then proceeded 
to state that ‘I am satisfied that this order is a necessary and proportionate response to the 
situation’.27 Chapter Two critiqued this as a mere throw-away comment to achieve Convention-
compliance and that, given the first statement concerning the automatic centrality of the child’s 
best interests, a proper article 8(2) balancing exercise cannot have been undertaken. This, 
again, evidenced the incoherent hybridisation of welfare and rights in the existing judicial 
framework. 
 
25 Re G (A child: Intractable Contact) (n10) [32] (emphasis added)  
26 PA v TT, H (A Child by way of 16.4 Children’s Guardian) [2019] EWHC 2723 [34] 
27 ibid  
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Under a revised model of the parallel analysis, the first statement pertaining to the centrality of 
welfarism would not appear given the best interests of the child no longer automatically dictate 
the making, varying or discharging of an order. Under the revised section 1(1A) CA, family 
courts would be forced to balance composite article 8(1) rights and, as a result, throwaway 
comments such as ‘this is a necessary and proportionate response’ would no longer appear in 
isolation. Such throwaway comments lead to a lack of transparency and allow judges to shielf 
behind a cursory nod to Convention-compliance. Under the streamlined reinterpretation of the 
parallel analysis, the smokescreen that was the paramountcy principle is removed and litigation 
becomes more transparent in that judges must identify the composite article 8(1) rights of 
litigants before subjecting these to a balancing exercise. This opens up judicial reasoning and 
serves to develop confidence in that both litigants and practioners can predict the process a 
judge will follow in determining a section 8 CA application. 
 
As already stated, on a domestic level, family courts are not utilising a Convention-compliant 
methodology in litigation. Therefore, since the parallel analysis was conceived in a work 
written over fifteen years ago, it can now be concluded that its calls for a shift towards a 
deontological model of litigation have been rejected, or at least not adopted, by the Family 
judiciary. Whilst the reasons for this have been discussed in this thesis, it is clear that private 
litigation has not embraced requirements under the post-HRA legal framework in the manner 
that some areas of public litigation have. Here, as early as 2001, family judges emphasised the 
centrality of the justificatory exercise to care proceedings resulting in the finding that removal 
of a child at birth required almost ‘extraordinary’ circumstances to be established.28 It is in this 
light that Harris-Short identifies the trend of public law cases accepting Convention-compliant 
practices in a line of cases in which Munby J (as then was) highlighted the change required in 
the judicial mind-set as a result of the HRA.29 Whilst this applies irrespective of the 
public/private divide, this thesis has highlighted the relative ignorance of the domestic judiciary 
to the latter. Whether this be due to public litigation sitting more easily in the ‘individual against 
the state’ framework of the Convention or judges simply refusing to change approach in private 
 
28 Re C and B (Care Order: Future Harm) [2001] 1 FLR 611 
29 Sonia Harris-Short, ‘Family law and the HRA 1998: Judicial restraint or revolution?’ in Helen Fenwick, 
Gavin Philipson and Roger Masterman, Judicial reasoning under the UK Human Rights Act, (1st edition, CUP, 
2007). These cases include: ReG (Care: Challenge to Local Authority Decision) [2003] EWHC 551 (Fam) and 
Re L (Care Assessment: Fair Trial) [2003] EWHC (Fam). 
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law hearings, it is clear the family judiciary have acted, and will continue to act, without proper 
regard to demands under a post-HRA framework. This thesis does not suggest that such an 
attitude is disingenuous and suggests that judges have acted like this in order to protect 
procedural simplicity in an under-resourced practice area. 
 
The statutory reform advocated in this thesis responds to that reality. Whilst it is unrealistic to 
expect divisional family judges to fully comply with an Re S model of litigation, it is equally 
unreasonable to expect a judge to utilise a deontological approach to litigation simply out of 
an understanding of Dworkinian principles or Strasbourg jurisprudence. Instead, it is argued 
statutory amendment is required to begin the process of courts developing a Convention-
compliant jurisprudence in interpreting the requirements under the new section 1(1) CA.  
 
 
The Relevance of Legal Principles  
 
Having established how this thesis’ development of the parallel analysis would function in 
practice, it can now evidence how a working knowledge of Dworkinian legal theory can further 
develop judicial understanding of the process required under article 8(2) ECHR. In the process 
outlined above, it is argued that emphasis on the term principle takes a domestic judge closer 
to a position that is Convention-compliant than that evidenced in the contemporary case-law. 
Again, in the face of a family judiciary reluctant to engage with obligations in a post-HRA 
legal framework, any reinterpretation of section 1(1) CA may not achieve a fully Convention-
compliant model of litigation. What this thesis intends to demonstrate is how an informed 
understanding of how a principle ought to operate in law can assist in moving the domestic 
judiciary towards a fully structured account of judicial discretion giving rise to a Convention-
compliant domestic practice.  
 
 
The Primary Principle Operating as a Dworkinian Principle 
 
Starting with proper application of a legal principle, this thesis argues that adopting a 
Dworkinian lens illustrates how the primary principle ought to apply in litigation concerning 
children. Under Dworkin’s theory, a principle enjoys an element of weight and, in the event of 
conflict with opposing principles, must be balanced by a judge in its application. In this sense, 
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invoking a legal principle cannot lead to an automatic legal consequence in the manner that 
applying a legal rule does.  
 
In the proposals of this thesis, the primary principle operates as a Dworkinian legal principle 
in that its application indicates that the welfare of the child is privileged but this does not 
necessitate any particular automatic legal result. The extent of this privileging, alongside how 
this is applied to the factual matrix of the case, are a matter for further judicial interpretation. 
Therefore, the primary principle forms a legal principle that must be balanced against 
competing considerations in its application. These considerations would include the rights of 
other parties to litigation and provisions in the Children Act 1989 such as the no order 
principle.30 In a judge only being guided by the principle, they are free to balance the welfare 
of the child against the rights of the adult in a manner that permits analysis of individual facts 
of a case. It is in this sense that Dworkinian legal theory serves as a useful lens for modelling 
operation of the reinterpreted parallel analysis. 
 
It is further argued that recourse to theoretical jurisprudence prevents the lapse back to a rule-
like application of the reinterpreted section 1(1) CA. As was evidenced in Chapter Two, 
criticism of the paramountcy principle focused not on its statutory construction per se, but on 
its application in the courts. In this light, this thesis offered a new criticism of the paramountcy 
principle based on a Dworkinian interpretation of its application as a rule. This thesis argues 
that the only way to rectify this misapplication is to provide for statutory amendment to the 
Children Act itself. In granting judicial discretion to develop a jurisprudence surrounding the 
reinterpreted primary principle there is a risk of reversion to equating the demands of the term 
principle to those of its previous rule-like application. This is where the Dworkinian lens 
applied in this thesis assumes important. 
 
Here, when a judge applies a theoretically informed model of the primary principle they cannot 
automatically prioritise the rights of the child. On a purely linguistic level, the term ‘primary’ 
prevents this. However, focus on proper application of a legal principle acts as almost a 
secondary level of protection in that, if a judge was to interpret the primary principle without 
conducting any form of balancing exercise, this would form an error in law given they have 
 
30 S1(5) Children Act 1989 
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applied a rule and not a principle. As a matter of legal theory a judge cannot revert back to the 
previous orthodoxy and still be said to apply a principle.  
 
It is in this light that this thesis argues that a proper theoretical understanding of legal principles 
takes judges towards a deontological and Convention-compliant model of litigation. Indeed, 
legal principles form an important part of Dworkin’s focus on ‘taking rights seriously’ in that 
arguments of principle are utilised to establish individual rights when such rights are contested 
in litigation.31 The objective of Dworkin’s theory is to establish a means through which a court 
can give effect to pre-existing rights established in the context of that legal framework. In this 
sense, his theory is rights enhancing in nature. Such considerations, in particular the centrality 
of judicial deliberation, is reflected in the qualified nature of article 8 ECHR. Therefore, it is 
only via argumentation and judicial deliberation that a court can give effect to the article 8(1) 
right.  
 
Principles as Part of a Judge’s Weak Discretion 
 
It is the objective of this Chapter to provide a structured account of weak judicial discretion 
pertaining to the reinterpreted primary principle. For Dworkin, judicial discretion formed a 
residual area permitting the application of rules and principles in a legal system.32 This was 
described as structured discretion as a judge is provided with clear guidance in applying their 
discretion in relation to the individual facts of a case. Given the primary principle now operates 
as a Dworkinian principle ought, its application can form part of the process Dworkin termed 
‘discretion as interpretation’. To evidence how this thesis has developed a structured model of 
weak judicial discretion, the operation of the primary principle will now be applied to the 
process Dworkin envisaged a judge undertaking when applying legal principles. 
 
If the negative model of judicial discretion is adopted, the judge is seen as occupying the area 
of discretionary judgement situated at the heart of the Dworkinian ‘donut’. In this space, the 
judge interacts with the encircling ring of principles and rules to enforce pre-existing individual 
rights. In the context of section 8 CA hearings, one such principle to be applied is the ‘primary 
principle’. This provides that the child’s welfare is to be privileged but not prioritised. 
 
31 Dworkin, (n1) 113 
32 Robert Goodin, ‘Welfare, rights and discretion’, OJLS, 1986, Vol.6(2) 234 
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Therefore, when applying the revised primary principle, a judge is bound to first identify the 
competing article 8(1) rights of litigants before balancing these cumulatively beginning with 
the child.  
 
However, a judge would also have to account competing principles such as obligations under 
section 6 HRA and the commitment to take account of ECtHR jurisprudence under section 2(1) 
HRA. This is alongside other principles in the Children Act 1989 such as the presumption in 
favour of continued parental involvement and no order principle contained in section 1(2A) 
and section 1(5) respectively. It is in this sense that the judge would be said to enjoy weak 
discretion as the order is governed by a statutory framework. Here, application of the primary 
principle is structured by the process outlined in the new section 1(1A) CA. Furthermore, any 
subsequent development of the principle, and process required under article 8(2), is structured 
by both the wording of the statutory provision, juristic understanding of the term principle and 
Strasbourg jurisprudence relating to the article 8(2) balancing exercise. Therefore, this thesis 
has structured the process a judge must undertake when applying section 1(1) CA in a manner 
that is statutorily realisable and achievable in practice. 
 
The obvious response to this development of the parallel analysis is to simply argue that judges 
are no more likely to engage with a proper article 8(2) justificatory analysis than they are to 
apply legal principles in the Dworkinian sense. Therefore, some may critique the arguments 
advanced in this Chapter in the same manner in which this thesis has challenged the practicality 
of Choudhry and Fenwick’s Re S methodology. 
 
This thesis would respond by highlighting that it has not suggested that judges require an in-
depth understanding of the complexities surrounding Dworkinian jurisprudence. Chapter One 
of this thesis included such an analysis because it provided an original critique surrounding 
application of section 1(1) CA. This is largely an academic point but it does have practical 
implications in that the interests of the child are automatically prioritised and thus, under such 
a formulation, domestic Convention-compliance cannot be achieved. Whilst such analysis was 
required to justify adoption of a Dworkinian lens to develop the parallel analysis, it is not 
particularly important whether judges understand Dworkin’s theory of discretion as 
interpretation. This thesis argues that a judge should be mindful of the fact that, if they are 
applying a principle, logically it requires balancing against competing principles in the 
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interpretive process. It is argued that this does not require an unreasonable level of 
understanding from everyday family judges.  
 
Evidently, the ultimate goal in achieving a Convention-compliant position is adoption of the 
parallel analysis model of litigation. However, noting that such a model would be adopted by 
individual judges this seems unrealistic given historic and ongoing hostility to ECHR-based 
arguments. Instead, a simplistic model of litigation that involves a cumulative article 8(2) 
exercise takes domestic judges further towards the adoption of a deontological approach to 





This Chapter has summarised the previous findings of this thesis and applied them in a manner 
that develops and simplifies the parallel analysis model of litigation. Whilst it has been 
emphasised that such a methodology remains the ultimate goal, this thesis has confronted the 
reality that domestic judges are unlikely to implement such an approach when viewed through 
a practice-based lens. Instead, it has been argued that a simplified model of litigation would 
take Family Division judges towards a Convention-compliant position by necessitating the 
balancing of rights privileged by the primary principle. Such an approach seeks to theoretically 
prevent the automatic prioritisation of a child’s welfare in law. 
 
The amended model of the primary principle facilitates structured application of judicial 
discretion in that it provides clear guidance when undertaking the identification and balancing 
of rights in litigation concerning children. Returning to the theoretical lens provided in Chapter 
One, this mirrors a Dworkinian model of discretion as interpretation. This structuring refers to 
not only the application of the primary principle but also to the subsequent development of a 
jurisprudence concerning the balancing of rights required under article 8(2) ECHR. Whilst the 
cumulative article 8(2) exercise may not provide as thorough account of Convention-
compliance as the Re S model of litigation, it is argued that this forms a more realisable model 
in practice that takes the domestic judiciary towards a compliant methodology for the 


























Conclusion: Moving Towards a Convention-Compliant Model of Litigation 
 
The title of this thesis spoke of a reinterpreted model of section 1(1) CA moving domestic 
practice towards a Convention-compliant position. It has been the view of this thesis that, 
despite Choudhry and Fenwick’s parallel analysis forming an academically sound model of 
Convention-compliant litigation, such a model is unrealisable in practice. This is because of 
the sea-change in approach it would necessitate for time pressured lower-level family judges 
sceptical of rights based submissions in litigation. Instead, this thesis has proposed a modest 
approach that serves to move domestic practice towards a position that is compliant with 
demands under the ECHR. 
 
This thesis has advanced a reformulation of the paramountcy principle which draws upon three 
distinct strategies for reform. Firstly, the cumulative analysis was proposed as a viable 
alternative to Choudhry and Fenwick’s complex proportionality exercise. This modified 
analysis is informed by a relationship-based approach and seeks to recognise both the 
interconnected nature of litigants rights and the reality of time-pressured family litigation. 
Secondly, this thesis proposed statutory reform to section 1(1) CA. This gave effect to a 
hybridised model of welfare and rights that privileges the welfare of the child in an article 8(2) 
balancing exercise. It is argued that, far from overhauling domestic practice, such reform 
constitutes a modest move towards a Convention-compliant position. Finally, Dworkinian 
jurisprudence was used as a means to highlight how the revised section 1(1) CA results in a 
system of discretion that structures judicial application of the primary principle. This refers to 
both interpreting demands under section 1(1A) CA and application of the principle in and of 
itself. 
 
It is argued that the unique contributions of this thesis are two-fold. Firstly, Chapter Two 
updated the existing academic commentary on case-law surrounding application of the 
paramountcy principle to section 8 CA order applications. This found that, despite judges no 
longer explicitly citing J v C, it remains the authoritative interpretation of the paramountcy 
principle’s application. This was despite a modest shift towards the language of rights and 
‘hybridisation’ of a welfare and rights based approach to litigation. It is this hybridisation that 
the reformed section 1(1) CA seeks to give effect to in a theoretically coherent manner. This 
thesis then took the novel step of applying theoretical jurisprudence to taxonomically assess 
the application of the paramountcy ‘principle’ against the standards of a Dworkinian rule. It 
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concluded that, far from operating with an element of weight, the paramountcy principle has 
been applied as a rule. This thesis, therefore, applied traditional analytical jurisprudence to 
domestic family practice in a manner that previous academics have been wary of. 
 
This taxonomic finding was then utilised to develop the parallel analysis of Choudhry and 
Fenwick by linking the paramountcy principle’s rule-like application to non-compliance with 
demands under the ECHR. This allowed Chapter Five of this thesis to develop the parallel 
analysis in light of a Dworkinian critique of domestic law to create a system of discretion that 
structures both the application and subsequent development of the primary principle in 
domestic courts. It is argued that this creates a fuller theoretical account of the primary principle 
both academically and in terms of its application in family courts. 
 
Whilst this redevelopment may not, prima facie, establish Convention-compliance to the extent 
that the original parallel analysis model achieved, it reflects the reality of everyday family 
litigation. In order for domestic courts to ‘take rights seriously’ in a manner envisaged in 
Justice for Hedgehogs, we require more than mere statutory amendments to the Children Act 
1989. For a rights-based discourse to become properly embedded in domestic practice, a 
change in judicial mindset is required to a position more akin to public law litigation. Whilst 
this has not occurred, and in reality will not for some time, it is important that references to 
rights in private family litigation are based on more than mere judicial personality.  Until a 
time is reached in which family courts are willing to properly reflect Strasbourg case-law and 
demands under the ECHR in private family litigation, academia must be realistic about the 
changes that can be achieved on the ground. It is a focus on the reality of the situation, as 
opposed to a scepticism, that drives the findings of this thesis. Whilst achieving complete 
Convention-compliance at a faster pace may appear desirable, incremental reform, driven by 
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